


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Alexander

From bust found on site of Villa Pisso, Fivoli 1779.

... *shrubae* (grisea)

1. *Amphibolite* 2. *Metavolcanic* 3. *Metavolcanic*

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Great Captains

ALEXANDER

A HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ART OF WAR FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BATTLE OF IPSUS, B. C. 301, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE GREAT MACEDONIAN

WITH 237 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND TACTICAL MANŒUVRES, CUTS OF ARMOR, UNIFORMS, SIEGE DEVICES, AND PORTRAITS

BY

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“THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE,” “A BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF OUR
CIVIL WAR,” “PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE, A CHAT IN THE
SADDLE,” “GREAT CAPTAINS,” ETC., ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES — VOLUME I.



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FOURTH IMPRESSION

To

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER

WHO, NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED
THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY

These Volumes

ARE DEDICATED

“Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, César, Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugène et Frédéric ; lisez, relisez l’histoire de leur quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modélez-vous sur eux, — c’est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et de surprendre le secret de l’art ; votre génie, ainsi éclairé, vous fera rejeter des maximes opposées à celles de ces grands hommes.” — NAPOLEON.

“La tactique, les évolutions, la science de l’officier de génie, de l’officier d’artillerie peuvent s’apprendre dans les traités ; — mais la connaissance de la grande tactique ne s’acquiert que par l’expérience et par l’étude de l’histoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines.”
— NAPOLEON.

PREFACE.

THE basis of this history is the *Anabasis* of Alexander by Arrian of Nicomedia, who lived in the second century of our era. Arrian was surnamed in Athens the Younger Xenophon, because he occupied the same relation to Epictetus which Xenophon did to Socrates. This historian is by far the most reliable, plain and exact of all those who have told us of the great Macedonian. Arrian, though a Greek, was long in the service of the Roman state, having fallen into the good graces of the Emperor Hadrian, whom he accompanied to Rome, and who later appointed him prefect of Cappadocia. Under Antoninus Pius, Arrian rose to the supreme dignity of consul. He wrote several philosophical and historical treatises, among them an account of his own campaign against the Alani. Arrian was himself a distinguished soldier, and it is this which enables him to make all military situations so clear to us. Of the fifteen works which we know he wrote, the *Anabasis* is the most valuable.

Arrian had in his hands the histories of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, one of Alexander's most distinguished officers, later king of Egypt, and of Aristobulus, a minor officer of Alexander's. He also used the works of Eratosthenes, Megasthenes, Nearchus, Alexander's famous admiral, Aristus, and Asclepiades, as well as had access to all which had been written before him, a large part of which he rejected in favor of the testimony of those who served under Alexander in person. He quotes from the king's own letters, and from the

diary of Eumenes, his secretary, which he appears to have had at hand.

Next to Arrian's history comes that of Quintus Curtius, who wrote in the first century. Of ten books, the eight last are extant. This work is far behind Arrian's in credibility. Curtius is somewhat of a romancer, though he gives local color, and occasionally supplies a fact missing in Arrian. But he is neither clear nor consistent. He draws his facts largely from Clitarchus, a contemporary of Alexander.

Plutarch (50 to 130 A. D.) is always interesting, and his short life of Alexander is just and helpful. Many stray facts can be gleaned in the other Lives.

Diodorus Siculus, a contemporary of Cæsar and Augustus, in his Historical Library, gives us many items of worth. Out of his forty books, only fifteen have survived. Diodorus is suggestive, but must be construed in the light of other works.

Justinus, a Roman historian who lived in the second or third century A. D., wrote a History of Macedonia. This ranks with Diodorus in usefulness. The chapters relating to Philip and Alexander supply some gaps, and give an occasional glimpse into the character of these monarchs, lacking elsewhere. But one cannot rely on Justin unsupported.

Strabo's Geography (first century) contains material which ekes out what we glean elsewhere, and there are in many of the old authors — Dionysius, Livy, Josephus, Frontinus, Ammian, and others — frequent references to Alexander which can be drawn from. Vegetius' *De re militari* is somewhat mixed, but very valuable. Onosander's *Strategos* can be put to use in explaining tactical manœuvres.

Polybius, one of the most valuable of all our ancient sources of information, military and political, in his Universal History, strays off to Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt, and

we find some material in his pages. He lived in the third century.

There were numberless historians of Alexander. Very few have survived. Rafael Volteran quotes Clitarchus, Polycrates, Onesicritus, Antigenes Istrus, Aristobulus, Chares, Hecataeus Eritreus, Philip the Chalcidian, Duris the Samian, Ptolemy, Anticlides, Philo the Theban, Philip, Hisangelus, Antisthenes, Menechmus the Sicyonian, Nymphis of Heraclea, Potamon the Mitylenæan, Sotericus Arsites, Arrian, Plutarch, Quintus Curtius. Plutarch quotes most of the above, and Callisthenes, Eratosthenes, Polyclitus, Hermippus, and Sotion, beside. Most of these authors did not long survive their own era; but they were known to those whose works have remained to us, and were by them accepted or rejected, according to the credibility of each. It may be claimed that Arrian furnishes us the main body of all histories of Alexander. Other sources are, as it were, appendices. And this, because the trained military mind of Arrian enabled him to distinguish clearly between what was valuable and consistent, and what was manifestly incredible or unimportant.

The early chapters, about the military art preceding Philip, come mainly from Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. Cornelius Nepos draws a clever character, and we all know what a fund of riches Plutarch lays before us, available for all purposes, if not always exact.

So much for the facts. But the ancient authors rarely give more than just the bald facts in dealing with military matters. They tell us where Alexander went and what he did, with sketches of character and interesting incidents; but they furnish no clue to the special why and wherefore which the soldier likes to know; or if a clue, quite frequently a wrong one. What to us is clear, because the art which Alexander created has since been expanded by the deeds of the

other great captains and elucidated by their commentators, was, even to Arrian, a sealed book. Arrian did not understand what Alexander did as Jomini would have understood it; for it needed the remarkable campaigns of a Frederick and a Napoleon to enable Jomini to compass the inner meaning of the art of war. This meaning we must seek in modern military criticism.

There is by no means a perfect sequence to the origin and growth of the art of war. Its continuity has been interrupted by periods of many centuries. But as all great soldiers have acknowledged their indebtedness to their predecessors, though they themselves have been able to improve upon the art, so it is interesting and instructive to study what these predecessors did, and see from what small beginnings and through how many fluctuations the art has grown to its present perfect state.

There have been many lives of Alexander written in modern times, some within this generation. Much of the best of military criticism has been devoted to this subject. It is hard to say anything about Alexander that some one may not already have said. But a good deal contained in these volumes in the way of comment is new, and the author does not know of a life of Alexander, which, by the use of such charts and maps as abound in the histories of our own Civil War, makes the perusal of his great conquests an easy task. The military student is willing to devote his days to research; he should not rely on others; the general reader has no leisure for such work. He has a right to demand that his way should be made plain. The author has tried to do just this, while not neglecting the requirements of those who wish to dwell upon the military aspect of Alexander's campaigns.

There is no mystery about the methods of great captains. A hundred years ago there was; but Jomini and his follow-

ers have brushed away the cobwebs from the secret and laid it bare. The technical details relating to war are intricate and difficult, nor are they of interest to the general reader. They take many years to learn. No officer, who drops for an instant his studies, can save himself from falling behind his fellows. Especially is this true to-day. This, however, relates chiefly to the *minutiæ* of the profession. The higher the art of the soldier goes, the simpler it is, because it becomes part of his own individuality ; but the captain must first have mastered every detail of the profession by the hardest of work. He must be familiar with the capacities and limitations of every arm of the service, and be able to judge accurately what ground each needs for its march, its manœuvres, and its fire. He must be so apt a business man as never to fail in providing for his troops, however fast he moves or however far from his base. He must be an engineer of the first class. Almost all great generals have been able to drill a company, or serve a gun, or throw up a breastwork, or conduct a reconnoissance better than most of their subordinates. Intimate knowledge of detail is of the essence. *Ad astra per aspera.*

Having reached the top, the captain's work is less intricate in one sense. Nothing is more beautifully simple than the leading features of the best campaign of Napoleon. We may all understand them. But to few, indeed, has the power ever been given to conceive and execute such a masterpiece. A bare half-dozen men in the world's history stand in the highest group of captains. The larger operations of war are in themselves plain, but they are founded on complicated detail. War on the map, or strategy, appears to us, in the event, easy enough ; but to conceive and develop, and then move an army in pursuance of, a strategic plan requires the deepest knowledge of all arts and sciences applicable to war,

and such exertion, mental, moral and physical, as is known to no one but the commander of a great army in time of war. The simple rests upon the difficult. What is treated of in this book is not, as a rule, the minutiae, but the larger operations, though details have sometimes to be dwelt on for their historical value. What is difficult to do may be easy to narrate.

There is no pretense to make this a military text-book. It contains nothing but what the professional soldier already knows. A military text-book is practically useless to the general reader. Even Jomini acknowledged that he could not make his books interesting except to professionals ; and there are now enough good text-books accessible to those who wish to study the technical side of war. But it is hoped that the presentation may commend itself to those military men whose studies in their peculiar branch of the profession have led them in other directions, and who may wish to refresh their knowledge of Alexander's campaigns, even if they do not agree with all the conclusions reached.

It is assumed by some excellent military critics that there are no lessons to be learned from antiquity. This was not what Frederick and Napoleon thought or said. It is certainly difficult to develop a text-book of the modern science from ancient campaigns alone ; illustrations and parallelisms must for the most part be sought in the campaigns of the last three centuries. But it will not do to forget that Frederick's victory at Leuthen was directly due to his knowledge of Epaminondas' manœuvre at Leuctra, or that the passage of the Hydaspes has been the model for the crossing of rivers in the face of the enemy ever since. All gain is bred of the successes and failures of our predecessors in the art ; it is well to know what these were. While all the principles of the modern science of war are not shown in the

old campaigns, because the different conditions did not call for their development, as well as because history is full of gaps, the underlying ones certainly are ; and these can be best understood by tracing them from their origin. It is believed that when the series of volumes of which these are the first shall have reached our own times, the entire body of the art of war will have been well covered. These volumes can include but a small part of it.

This is not a political history. If any errors in the description of the intricate political conditions of Alexander's age have crept in, the author begs that they may be pardoned as not properly within the scope of the work. Time has been devoted to manœuvres and battles ; politics has been treated as a side issue.

Individual prowess was a large part of ancient war. In Homeric times it was especially prominent. A narrative of Alexander is apt to abound in instances of his personal courage rather than of his moral or intellectual force. The former seemed to appeal more strongly to the ancients. The old historians deal almost exclusively in details of this kind, and in following them, one is instinctively led into giving much prominence to acts of individual gallantry. In olden days troops had to be led, and the commander-in-chief was called on to give a daily example of his bravery. Troops are now moved. Brigades are mere blocks. While he needs courage as much as ever, the commander should avoid exposure to unnecessary risk. His moral and intellectual forces are more in demand than the merely physical.

There are singular discrepancies between all atlases, ancient and modern. The best of maps vary in their details to an annoying extent. The maps herein given do not aim at infallibility. They are accurate enough not to mislead. The charts are original. In many cases topography has been

created to conform to the relations of the authorities. Such is the chart of Aornus. The larger part of the Eastern conquests of Alexander are practically inaccessible to the modern traveler, and no geographer has been able to secure more than general accuracy. The local topography is quite unknown. In such cases the chart is merely suggestive, and is inserted as it were as a part of the text. Helpfulness to the reader has been sought rather than artistic excellence. There are some slight variations between charts and maps, but none of moment. The scales of miles may not in all cases be quite exact. There is an occasional variation between chart and text. In such cases the text is to be followed. The maps and charts are usually north and south. The relative sizes of the blocks of troops are not meant to be accurate. Sometimes exaggeration is resorted to to make the meaning of a manœuvre more plain. Accuracy is not always possible. The peculiar use of the charts is to elucidate the text. Between charts and text it is hoped that the book will be easy to read, and the author believes that a single perusal of the battle of Arbela will make its general features as plain as those of the battle of Gettysburg. Lest any part of the book should prove dull, so that the reader may desire to exert his right to skip, short arguments at the heads of the chapters have been provided, specific enough to preserve the continuity of the narrative.

The cuts of uniforms, arms and siege-devices will be found interesting. Most of them have their origin in old architectural or ceramic decoration. The dress and arms of the soldiers are largely taken from Kretschmar-Rohrbach's *Trachten der Völker*, whose materials are copied from the ruins and the relics of the ancient world.

Among very recent writers, the author desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Prince Galitzin, whose just com-

pleted History of War is a well-digested and admirably classified work, drawn from all sources, ancient and modern. It has been laid under free contribution. Droysen's History of Alexander is accurate, full and complete, but lacks the advantage of charts and maps. It has been equally utilized. From the middle of the last century, when Folard and Guishard began their commentaries and discussions on the ancient historians, up till now, there has been such a mass of matter published, often of highest value and often trivial, that its mere bibliography is tiresome. But there is no existing commentary on the great Macedonian, known to the author to be of acknowledged value, which has not been consulted. The facts, however, have been uniformly taken from or compared with the old authorities themselves. The labors and commentaries of many philologists, geographers and soldiers have now moulded the ancient histories into a form easily accessible to him who possesses but a tithe of the knowledge and patience they have so freely placed at the service of their fellow-man.

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ALEXANDER.

I.

IN GENERAL.

ALL early history is a record of wars. Peace was too uneventful to call for record. But mere record cannot fashion a science. The art of war has been created by the intellectual conceptions of a few great captains; it has been reduced to a science by the analysis of their recorded deeds. Strategy is war on the map; tactics is battlefield manœuvring. Both depend less on rules than on the brain, courage, and activity of the captain. Strategy has been of slow growth, and was, as a science, unknown to the ancients; tactics was highly developed, as were, within given limits, logistics and engineering. No study is so fruitful to the soldier as that of the history of great captains. From their deeds alone can the true instinct of war be gleaned. These pages propose to sketch briefly the typical events and the status of armies antedating Alexander, to show what then was already known of war; and, by a relation of Alexander's campaigns, to illustrate his influence upon the art.

THE earliest histories are but a record of wars. The seasons of peace were too uneventful to call for historians. The sharply defined events which arrest attention, because followed by political or territorial changes, have always been wars, and these have been the subject-matter of nearly all early writings. The greatest of poems would never have seen the light had not Homer been inspired by the warlike deeds of heroes; nor would Herodotus and Thucydides have penned their invaluable pages had not the stirring events of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars impelled them to the task. Xenophon, Arrian, Cæsar, are strictly military historians; and the works of the other great writers of ancient

history contain only the rehearsal of wars held together by a network of political conditions influencing these struggles. It is indeed peculiarly in the fact that war is now subordinate to peace that our modern civilization differs from that of the ancients ; and but within a couple of generations can it be truly claimed that the arts of peace have assumed more prominence than the arts of war. So long as war remains the eventual arbitrament of all national disputes, so long must the arts of peace contribute to the art of war, and so long must this be studied, and an active interest in the deeds of the great captains be maintained.

The art of war has been created by the intellectual conceptions of a few great captains. It is best studied in the story of their triumphs. The memorizing of technical rules can teach but the detail of the art. The lessons contained in what the masters did can be learned only by an intelligent analysis of the events themselves ; the inspiration essential to success can be caught only by assimilation of their methods. Nothing is so fruitful to the soldier as to study closely the character and intellect of these great men, and to make himself familiar with the events which they have illustrated. Few topics have greater interest for the layman. Less than a generation since, we Americans were a nation of soldiers. In four years something like four millions of men had worn the blue or gray. In the autumn of their life many of these veterans may enjoy the comparison of their own campaigns with those of the men whom all unite in calling the masters of the art. To such my work is principally addressed.

Strategy has been aptly described as the art of making war upon the map. Nor is this a mere figure of speech. Napoleon always planned and conducted his campaigns on maps of the country spread out for him by his staff, and into

these maps he stuck colored pins to indicate where his divisions were to move. Having thus wrought out his plan, he issued orders accordingly. To the general the map is a chess-board, and upon this he moves his troops as players move queen and knight. Strategy is, in other words, the art by which a general so moves his army about the country in relation to but beyond the proximity of the enemy, that when he finally reaches him, the enemy shall be placed in a disadvantageous position for battle or other manœuvre. The movements of an army in the immediate presence of the enemy, or on the field of battle, belong to the domain of grand tactics. Strategy is the common law or common sense of war. As the common law has arisen from the decisions of great judges relating to the common affairs of life, so strategy has arisen from the action of the great masters of war in the events they were called on to control. The word is very properly derived from *strategos*, the name given by the Greeks to the leader of a certain unit of service — to a general. It is not the army, nor the people, nor the territory, nor the cause which are the origin of strategic movements, though, indeed, all these bear their due part in the calculation. It is the head and heart of the leader which always have furnished and always must furnish the strategic values of every campaign. From his intellectual and moral vigor — in other words, his personal equipment — must ever come the motive power and direction.

Strategy has its rules, like every science. Until within a little over a century these have been unwritten. They are in principle inflexible, in practice elastic. They are but the tools of the trade, the nomenclature of the science; the “Barbara Celarent” of logic. The strictness or laxity of the maxims of strategy is measured by the ability of the general. The second-rate commander transcends them at his

peril. For the great captain they vary as the conditions vary. The man who can rise superior to mere rules, and succeed, has always a spark of genius. But as these maxims are, like those of the common law, nothing but a statement of what is the highest common sense, the genius who makes exceptions to them does so because the circumstances warrant the exception, or because he feels that he can control circumstances. The great captain will never permit mere rules to tie his hands ; but his action will always be in general, if not specific, accordance with them. The one thing which distinguishes the great captains of history from the rank and file of commanders is that they have known when to disregard maxims, and that they have succeeded while disregarding them, and because of their disregard of them. But in all cases their successes have proved the rule.

The first requisite of oratory, said Demosthenes, is action ; the second, action ; the third, action. In this generation of conversational speeches the saying is less applicable to oratory than to strategy and tactics. It is the general who can think rapidly and move rapidly ; who can originate correct lines of manœuvre, and unceasingly and skillfully follow them, who becomes great. The few instances of Fabian tactics are but the complement to this rule. They prove its truth. Fabius Maximus was in one sense as active as Hannibal. It was mainly in the avoidance of armed conflict that he differed from the great Carthaginian. How, indeed, could he follow each movement of his wonderful antagonist,— as he did,— unless his every faculty was in constant action ? Incessant action is not of necessity unceasing motion ; it is motion in the right direction at the right moment ; though, indeed, it is the legs of an army, as much as its stomach, which enable the brain tissue and throbbing blood of the captain to conduct a successful campaign or win a pitched battle.

Strategy has been a growth, like other sciences. Its earliest manifestation was in the ruthless invasion by one barbarian tribe of the territory of another, in search of bread, metals, wives, or plunder of any kind. The greater or less skill or rapidity of such an invasion, by which the population attacked was taken unawares or at a disadvantage, meant success or failure. Thus grew offensive strategy. The invaded people cut the roads, blocked the defiles, defended the fords of the rivers, lay in ambush in the forests. The ability shown in these simple operations originated the strategy of defense. Often the strong, relying on their strength, showed the least ability ; the weak, conscious of their weakness, the most. From such simple beginnings has grown up the science and art of war, which to-day, among the greatest nations,—saving always our own happily exempt America,—embraces all arts and sciences, and makes them each and all primarily subservient to its demands.

As with strategy, so tactics, logistics and engineering came to perfection by a slow growth in ancient and modern times. The tactics of organization and drill rose to a high degree among the ancients ; the tactics of the battlefield were sometimes superb. Logistics were simpler, for armies were neither large, nor carried such enormous supplies of material. Engineering, as exemplified at the sieges of Tyre, Rhodes, and Alesia, has rarely been equaled in the adaptation of the means at hand to the end to be accomplished. War is scarcely more perfect to-day, according to our resources in arts and mechanics, than it was twenty odd centuries ago among the Greeks, according to theirs.

It is not, however, the purpose of these pages to discourse upon the art of war. It will be a far more pleasant task to tell the story of the great captains whose deeds have created this art, and through them, by unvarnished comment, to lay

open to the friendly reader the rules and maxims which govern or limit strategy and tactics. And before coming to the first,—and perhaps the greatest of all,—Alexander of Macedon, it is proposed to describe briefly the armies antedating his, to say something about his predecessors in the art, and to give a short account of a very few of their campaigns or battles, in order to show what equipment this wonderful soldier possessed when, a mere lad, he undertook, as captain-general of the smallest and yet greatest nation on earth, Greece, the expedition against the stupendous power of the Persian empire, and thus placed the weight of the world upon his youthful shoulders. This cannot readily be done in a well connected historical narrative. Many noted wars and brilliant generals must be omitted. The instances and commanders to be quoted will be but typical of the rest, and will illustrate the gradual advance from unintelligent to intellectual warfare. A history of war must embrace all wars and battles, small and great. A history of the art of war may confine itself to narrating such typical wars and battles as best illustrate its growth.



Persian Noble.

II.

EARLY HISTORY OF WAR.

THE first reliable history of war is found in the Bible ; the next comes from Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. All ancient historians are properly military historians. During the Middle Ages chronicles were kept, but no history was written, and war as an art was at a low ebb. It was the French Revolution which first developed the national sentiment and the study of war as a science. The world's wars may for our uses be conveniently divided into Ancient Wars, Middle Age Wars, Modern Wars, Recent Wars. The eras of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon contain the names of nearly all the great captains.—Man is a fighting animal. His club was the first hand-to-hand weapon ; his slung-stone the early long-range arm. The organization of armies came about in a perfectly simple manner, just as the first stockade around a barbarian village was the origin of the stupendous walls of Babylon. The beginning of all military devices was in the East ; they have been perfected in the West. The character of all Oriental wars was that of huge raids, accompanied by extravagant cruelties and devastation. Entirely unmethodical, they contain no lessons for us to-day.

THE first reliable history of war may be said to have come to us from the Jews. The historical books of the Bible give us the earliest written glimpse into very ancient methods of warfare, as the Egyptian monuments give us the pictorial. This narrative was followed by the Iliad, which portrays the condition of war twelve hundred years before Christ. Herodotus († 418 b. c.) next appeared, and by his faithful description of the Persian wars justly earned the title of Father of History ; and following him closely came Thucydides († 384 b. c.), who narrated the great political and interesting, though in instruction meagre, military events of the Peloponnesian War. Xenophon († 360 b. c.) graphically, if sometimes imaginatively, described the deeds of the elder

Cyrus, and capped all military-historical works in his wonderful *Anabasis*. The same character was kept up by Polybius, Diodorus, Dionysius, Arrian, Plutarch, among the Greeks, and by Cæsar, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Nepos, among the Romans. That the works of all these and many other authors should deal mostly with war was a necessity. It was war which was, as a rule, the precursor of advancing civilization.

From the decline of Rome throughout the Middle Ages there was no history, properly speaking. Only chronicles and partial notes were kept; nor did history emerge from its hiding until the revival of learning and the arts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was then patterned, as was everything else, on ancient models. The invention of gunpowder gave a new direction to war and its records, though the classical influence and a certain pedantry in historical work remained until the eighteenth century. The systems of war partook of this same pedantry, with the exception of what was done by a few great masters, and it was not until the French Revolution overturned all preconceived notions on every subject that the art of war, as we understand it, arose and thrived. The worship of the ancient models gave way to a national sentiment, and the growth of scientific war became assured and permanent, as well as the fruitful study of what the great captains had really done. Military history had been but a record. It became an inquiry into the principles governing the acts recorded.

Prince Galitzin's splendid work divides the history of war into four sections: —

A. *Ancient War.*

- 1°. Down to 500 b. c.
- 2°. From the beginning of the Persian wars, 500 b. c., down to the death of Alexander, 323 b. c.

3°. From the death of Alexander, 323 b. c., to the death of Cæsar, 44 b. c.

4°. From the death of Cæsar, 44 b. c., to the fall of the West Roman Empire, A. D. 476.

B. Wars of the Middle Ages.

1°. From A. D. 476 to the death of Charles the Great, A. D. 814.

2°. From A. D. 814 to the introduction of firearms, A. D. 1350.

3°. From A. D. 1350 to the Thirty Years' War, A. D. 1618.

C. Modern Wars.

1°. The Thirty Years' War, A. D. 1618 to 1648.

2°. Wars from A. D. 1648 to Frederick the Great.

3°. Frederick's era to the beginning of the French Revolution, A. D. 1740 to 1792.

D. Recent Wars.

1°. From the French Revolution to 1805.

2°. Napoleon's wars, A. D. 1805 to 1815.

3°. Wars since 1815.

Of these several periods the most important by far to the military student are those which contain the deeds of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, in ancient days, and those of Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon in modern times. Few of the other great generals fall without these periods. To narrate the military achievements of these great masters, and incidentally a few others, and to connect them by a mere thread of the intervening events, will suffice to give all which is best in the rise and progress of the science of war. "Read," says Napoleon, "re-read the history of their campaigns, make them your model; this is the sole means of becoming a great captain and of guessing the secret of the art."

So long as man has existed on the earth he has been a fighting animal. After settling his quarrels with the weapons of nature, he resorted to clubs and stones, that is, weapons

for use hand to hand and at a distance; and no doubt at an early day built himself huts and surrounded them with stakes, stones and earth, so as to keep away aggressive neighbors. Herein we have the origin of weapons and of fortification. As men joined themselves into communities, the arts of attack and defense, and their uses as applied to numbers, grew. The citizen was always a soldier. But often only a portion of the citizens required to be sent away from home to fight, and this originated standing armies, which became a well-settled institution when conquerors made themselves kings. As man invented useful arts, these were first applied to the demands of war. Bows and arrows, lances, slings, swords, breastplates and shields came into use, and horses were tamed and employed for war, first as beasts of burden, and then in chariots and for cavalry. Chariots and horses for cavalry were first adopted because they afforded the fighters a higher position from which to cast their weapons, as well as rendered their aspect more dreadful. Elephants and camels came into warfare for a similar reason. No doubt chariots antedated cavalry. Troops began by fighting in masses, without settled order, and the victory was won by those who had the bravest, strongest, or most numerous array. With better weapons came greater order. The best-armed warriors were placed together. The slingers could not do good work side by side with the pikemen, nor the charioteer or mounted man with the foot-soldier. Thus certain tactical formations arose, and as the more intelligent soldiers were put in charge of the less so, rank and command appeared. It was soon found that the light-armed, bowmen and slingers, could best use their weapons and most rapidly move in open, skirmishing order; that the heavy-armed, pikemen and swordsmen, could best give decisive blows when ployed into masses. The growth of army organization came about in a

perfectly natural sequence, and grew side by side with all other pursuits.

Fortification originated in a similar manner. Tribes built their villages in inaccessible places,—on rocks or hills,—and surrounded them with ditches, stockades or loosely-piled walls. Such simple habitations gradually grew into fortified cities, and the walls and ditches increased in size and difficulty of approach. Inner citadels were built; and towers crowned the walls, to enable these to be swept by missiles if reached by the besiegers. The art of sieges was of much later and more formal growth. For many generations fortified cities were deemed inexpugnable, and artifice or hunger were resorted to for their capture. But gradually it was found that walls could be undermined or weakened or breached, or that they could be mounted by various means, and the art of besieging cities began to take on form.

As tribes grew into nations war assumed larger dimensions. As a rule, it was brute weight alone which accomplished results, but sometimes the weaker party would resort to stratagems to defend itself,—such as declining battle, and making instead thereof night or partial attacks, defending river fords or mountain passes, and falling on the enemy from ambush or from cities. Out of such small beginnings of moral opposition to physical preponderance has come into existence, by slow degrees and through many centuries, what we now know as the science of war.

Mid - Rahmat Toplazte

Except the Phœnicians and Jews, the Oriental nations of remote antiquity were divided into castes, of which the most noble or elevated were alone entitled to bear arms, and to this profession they were trained with scrupulous care. The military caste in some nations was wont to monopolize all offices and political control; in others it wielded a lesser sway.

The existence of such castes gave rise to what eventually became standing armies, and from the ranks of these were chosen the king's body-guard, always an important factor in Oriental government.


The Phœnicians first employed mercenary troops. A paid force enabled the citizens to continue without interruption the commercial life on which their power rested. But such troops were of necessity unreliable. Egypt and Persia in later times employed mercenaries in large numbers.

In addition to these methods of recruitment, drafts of entire districts, or partial drafts of the country, were usual. These swelled the standing armies, caste or mercenary, to a huge size, but furnished an unreliable material, which, against good troops, was in itself a source of weakness, but which often won against similarly constituted bodies.

The methods of conducting war, in organization and tactics, were always on a low scale in the Orient. The origin of every military device is in the East; successive steps towards improvement were made in Europe by the Greeks and Romans. Despite that a certain luxurious civilization rose to a higher grade among the Orientals, the military instinct of these down-trodden races was less marked than among the freemen of the West. In one respect alone—cavalry—were the Oriental nations superior. This superiority was owing to the excellence of their horses and to the prevalence of horsemanship among them. In all other branches they fell distinctly below the Europeans.

The chief characteristic of the operations of the ancient Orientals was that of huge raids or wars of conquest, which overran vast territories, and often led to the conflict of enormous armies, to the extinguishment or enslaving of nations, or to long drawn-out sieges of capitals or commercial cities. In battles, it was sought by stratagem to fall on, and, by pre-

ponderance of force, to surround and annihilate the enemy. All such operations were accompanied by dire inhumanity to individuals and to peoples, by the shedding of blood and destruction of property beyond compute. But they have furnished no contribution to the art of war.



Assyrian Mounted Archer.

III.

EARLY ORIENTAL ARMIES.

AMONG the ancient Oriental nations, military service was generally confined to a caste. Infantry was the bulk, cavalry the flower, of the Oriental armies. Light troops came from the poorer classes and were miserably clad, and armed with bows and slings. The heavy foot, drawn from the richer classes, was, as a rule, splendidly armed and equipped. There was plenty of courage in the Eastern armies, but small discipline and *ensemble*. There was no strategic manœuvring; armies simply met and fought. Battle was opened by the light troops; the chariots then charged, and were followed up by an advance of the heavy foot, while the cavalry sought to surround the flanks of the enemy. The parallel order was universal, and open plains were chosen as battlefields. The Jews had, even under Moses, a fine organization. There was a sort of landwehr of two hundred and eighty-eight thousand men, of which a twelfth was always on duty. While using other arms, the sling remained a favorite weapon. The Jews learned much of war from the Philistines. The Egyptians were excellent soldiers in early times; but their chariots and cavalry were gradually driven out by the extension of the canal system, which prevented their manœuvring; and mercenaries crept into use to the detriment of the service. The Egyptian formation was generally in huge squares of one hundred files one hundred deep. The Persians had a hereditary warrior caste, and were in early history very warlike. Cyrus began his wonderful career of conquest with but thirty thousand infantry. Cavalry he accumulated afterwards. The Persians learned much from the conquered Medes in the way of technical skill. Their army contained many fine bodies of troops.

Assyrians, Babylonians and Medes.—The army organization of the Assyrians, Babylonians and Medes had a similar origin and much common likeness in form. Military service was the sole right of a certain caste, and among the Medes was looked on as the highest of pursuits. The standing armies consisted of the king's body-guard, often very large; particular corps under command of nobles of high

degree, which helped to sustain the centralized government ; and provincial troops. The population was divided into bodies of ten, one hundred, one thousand, ten thousand, each of which furnished its quota of men ; and the army was itself organized on a decimal basis. A vast horde of nomads, mostly horse, and excellent of its kind, was wont to accompany the regular army, either for pay or in hope of plunder.

Infantry constituted the bulk, cavalry the flower, of the



Assyrian Warriors.

Oriental armies. For many generations after the Greek infantry had shown to the world its superiority over any other, the Oriental cavalry was still far ahead of that of Greece. The Greeks were not horsemen, nor their hilly country as well suited for horse-breeding as the level plains of Asia. It is a truism, however, that a nation of horsemen overrun, a nation of footmen conquer a country. The Greeks and Romans were examples of this.

The armament of the light troops consisted of bows and

slings ; they wore no defensive armor. The nobles and well-to-do, who served as heavy troops, were superbly armed and



Babylonian Heavy Foot.



Babylonian Slinger.


equipped. They bore a sword, battle-axe, javelins, pike and dagger, or some of these. Though few in number, the heavy-



Babylonian Chariot.

armed were the one nucleus of value. There was no idea of strategic manœuvring ; armies marched out to seek each other and fought when they met. The troops were ranked for battle by order of nationalities, generally in a long and


often more or less concave order, so as, if possible, to surround the enemy. The foot stood in the centre, the cavalry on the wings ; the front was covered by chariots. The formation was in massed squares, often one hundred or more deep. The archers and slingers swarmed in the front of all, and opened the battle with a shower of light missiles. They then retired through the intervals between the squares of the advancing main line, or around its flanks, and continued their fire from its rear. The chariots then rushed in at a gallop and sought to break the enemy's line, generally by massing a charge on some one point. These were followed by the heavy footmen, who, covered with their shields and pike in hand, under the inspiration of the trumpet, and led by bearers of insignia, such as birds and beasts of prey or sacred emblems, mounted on long lances like our battle-flags, sought to force their way, by weight of mass, into the breaches made by the chariots ; while the cavalry swept round the flanks and charged in on the rear of the enemy. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting then ensued. The Orientals were far from lacking courage. It was mobility and discipline they wanted. That army which could overlap the enemy or had the stronger line — unless the enemy protected its front and flanks with chariots or chosen troops — was apt to win ; and the beaten army was annihilated. Battles were generally fought on open plains. It never seemed to occur to these peoples to lean a flank on a natural obstacle, such as



Military Insignia.

a wood or river. An unfortunate turn in a battle could not be retrieved.

The capital cities were splendidly fortified. Nineveh, Bab-




Median Scythed Chariot.

ylon, Ecbatana, had stone walls of extraordinary thickness and height. Those of Nineveh were still one hundred and fifty feet high in Xenophon's time. Babylon had two walls, an outer one stated by Herodotus as three hundred and thir-

ty-five feet high and eighty-five feet thick, and by Ctesias at almost these dimensions, and with a correspondingly wide ditch. The citadel was a marvel of strength, so far as massiveness was concerned. The art of engineering, as applied to sieges, was not highly developed. The mechanical means of the day were not as well adapted for besieging as for fortification, and the defense of a city was rendered desperate by the uniform penalty of its surrender or capture,

which was death or slavery. The Assyrians are said to have fortified their temporary camps, generally in circular form.

Jews.—Among the Jews, every man over twenty years of age, with certain stated exceptions, was a warrior. The



Assyrian Archer.

twelve tribes each furnished a corps, which, at the time of the flight from Egypt, was, on the average, fifty thousand strong. From this corps, in times of war, the needed number

of recruits was selected by lot or rote. It was a draft pure and simple. Saul first established a body-guard. In David's time (1025 ? b. c.) the number of Jews fit for war was one million three hundred thousand, and each tribe furnished twenty-four thousand men for active duty. One of these bodies

served each month, under a captain who reviewed it, and was held responsible for its effectiveness. The whole body of two hundred and eighty-eight thousand men was a sort of landwehr, of which one twelfth was constantly under arms. The organization was on a decimal basis of tens, hundreds and thousands. Solomon largely increased the number of cavalry and chariots, and perfected their organization and discipline.

On the flight from Egypt the Israelites were in possession of no weapons. They partially armed themselves from those cast up by the sea after the destruction of the Egyptians. Their arms, during the later part of their wanderings, were bows, slings and darts. Until they reached the promised land, they had no forged weapons. The Philistines, or dwellers in Palestine, were better provided, and were familiar with both cavalry and chariots. At a



Hebrew Pikeman.



Hebrew Pikeman.



Hebrew Heavy Footman.

later day the Jews acquired and used short, wide, curved swords and lances. But the sling always remained a favorite weapon, and in its use they were curiously expert. In the *corps d'élite* of the time of the Judges, which consisted of twenty-six thousand men who drew the sword, was a body of seven hundred left-handed slingers, who could sling stones at a hair's breadth. So early as the time of Moses, even, the drill

and discipline of the Jewish army was considerable. The method of battle was similar to that of other nations. The light troops in the van opened the battle in loose order; the heavy infantry in deep masses followed after. They fought under the inspiration of horns and battle-cries. They sometimes stood in three lines, light troops, main body ten to thirty


men deep, and a reserve of picked troops. Martial insignia representing animals were usually carried in the ranks.

The Jews had great numbers to encounter. The Philistines came against Saul with six thousand cavalry, thirty thousand chariots, and foot like to the sands of the seashore in number. In the war against Hadadeser, son

of Rehob, King of Zobah, David captured one thousand chariots, seven hundred horsemen, and twenty thousand infantry.



Hebrew Archer.




Slinger.

Solomon kept on foot fourteen hundred chariots and twelve thousand cavalry. He had stalls for forty thousand chariot-horses, which probably included the equipages for the royal household and the army trains. These figures, compared with the numbers of chariots at Thymbra and Arbela, seem exaggerated ; but they serve to show that the main reliance for the day was on chariots rather than on cavalry.

A careful military organization no doubt existed. We read in Holy Writ that David appointed Joab captain-general over his army, with twenty-seven lieutenants under him, and that his army was divided into three corps. There was clearly an established rank and command.

Under Moses, the Jews fortified their daily



Hebrew Irregular.

camp in form of a square. But permanent fortification of cities they only learned after conquering Palestine. Jerusalem was strongly fortified by David, on the method then usual among the Orientals.


Egyptians. — Thebes and Memphis appear to have had the earliest Egyptian military organization, but shortly after 1500 b. c. the first Pharaoh welded Egypt into one body. The warrior caste was at the head of society, second only to the priestly caste. Under the Sesostridae (1500–1200 b. c.) the army organization grew in effectiveness. The father of



Egyptian King in War Dress.

Sesostris, at the time of this great king's birth, selected all

the boys in Egypt born on the same day, and made of them a military school, out of which later grew Sesostris' confidential body-guard. Among the number were many of his generals. Sesostris first gave rewards in land to his soldiers, as feudal kings did in later centuries, and obliged these dependents, as a consideration for their tenure, to go to war with




Egyptian Soldier, in Scale Armor. Egyptian Soldier, in Linen Breastplate.

him at their own cost, and always to be prepared to perform this duty. The Egyptian army was over four hundred thousand strong. The youths of the warrior caste were carefully trained. All records and traditions agree that the Egyptians were excellent soldiers. The chief punishment for breach of discipline was loss of honor, which, however, the warrior could, by signal acts of bravery, regain. By 1200 b. c. came the decline of the Egyptian power, and, under Psammeticus, mercenary troops from Asia Minor and Greece gradually supplanted the warrior caste.

Infantry constituted the bulk of the forces. Chariots were

common, even in remote antiquity, as well as cavalry. These decreased in usefulness, however, as the canal-system of Egypt grew and left small room for manœuvring. The weapons were the usual arms, — bows, lances, slings, axes, darts and swords. The Egyptian soldiers were light and heavy, irregular and regular. Some carried shields covering the entire body, and wore helmets and mail. The army had martial music, and the emblem of the sacred bull or crocodile was carried on a lance as a standard. Xenophon, in the Cyropaedia, describes their tactics at the battle of Thymbra. They stood in large, dense masses, very deep, often in squares of one hundred files of one hundred men, and, covered by linked shields and protruded lances, were dangerous to attack. The Egyptians fortified their camps in rectangular form, and built extensive walls to protect their borders. Sesostris erected one extending from Pelusium to Heliopolis. Their cities were fortified with walls of several stories. But, as with other nations at this period, the art of sieges was little advanced. Ashdod, though not strongly fortified, resisted Psammeticus twenty-nine years.

Sesostris is supposed to have had six hundred thousand infantry, twenty-seven thousand chariots and twenty-four thousand horse. He is said to have conquered Ethiopia, then crossed from Meroë to Arabia Petrea, and thence made excursions as far as India. He later sailed to Phoenicia, and overran a large part of Asia Minor. Sesostris is alleged to



Egyptian Soldiers.

have conquered territory as far east as the Oxus and Indus, and to have levied contributions on the populations of these countries. But his conquests had no duration, even if what is related of him by tradition has a more than problematical basis of truth.



Persian Soldier.

Persians. — Under Cyrus the warrior caste was not only the uppermost, but was hereditary, and at all times thoroughly prepared for war. Assuming the Cyropaedia to be exact, Cyrus undertook his great conquests with but thirty thousand men, which later increased to seventy thousand, and still more by accessions from the conquered provinces. In all these provinces a kernel of Persian troops was stationed, but the local government was uniformly preserved. This proceeding testifies to the keen good sense of Cyrus, who left behind him contented peoples, under satraps closely watched by his own Persian officers. His course was later imitated by Alexander the Great, with equally satisfactory results. Cyrus subdued as large a part of Asia as Alexander did after him, holding the cities as *points d'appui* as he went along. During his lifetime, Persian discipline was excellent. After his death, contact with the luxury of the Medes destroyed much of his structure.

The Cyropaedia is, however, a sort of military romance, into which Xenophon has woven his own military experience and astuteness. It is full of exaggerated hero-worship. While its main features are correct, its details



Persian Irregular.

are unquestionably dressed up. But it has none the less as great value as it has charm.

The Persians fought mainly on foot. There were few horses in Persia proper. But Cyrus found cavalry necessary against the Asiatics, who had much which was excellent. He collected ten thousand horsemen from various sources, and at Thymbra used the body to good advantage. This was the origin of the superb Persian cavalry of later days. The foot had bows, slings, darts and small shields, to begin with, but gradually bettered these weapons as they hewed their way into Asia, and thereafter used battle-axes and swords, and wore helmet and mail. Thus, from what was at first but a species of light infantry grew up a later body of heavy foot, in addition to much that remained light. The Persian foot had been marshaled thirty deep; Cyrus reduced it to twelve ranks. The cavalry was divided in a similar manner,—the bulk was light horse, coming mainly from the nomad allies; a lesser part was heavy-armed. Cyrus also had scythed-chariots, and Xenophon describes at the battle of Thymbra the use of towers on wheels, filled with armed men, together with other curious devices, and camels carrying archers and catapults,—questionable but interesting assertions.

In the art of fortification and sieges the Persians had made little or no advance, but they learned something from the Medes and other Asiatics, and gradually acquired the use of catapults and rams. But stratagem, as at Sardis after the battle of Thymbra, had generally to be put into practice to



Persian Warrior.

capture towns, unless hunger speedily reduced them. Nebuchadnezzar besieged old Tyre thirteen years and failed to take it.

Cambyses, son of Cyrus, divided the male population of his kingdom into children, youths, men, old men. Each class had twelve chiefs, chosen from among the last two classes. Every lad of ten began his career by entering the first. Here he stayed till twenty ; among the youths till thirty ; among the men till forty ; and until fifty-five he was in the last class. After this he was free from military duty. Each class had its special occupations and discipline. This distribution is rather curious than valuable.



Assyrian Armsbearer.

IV.

EARLY GREEK ARMIES AND WARS.

EVERY Greek citizen was a soldier and trained as such. In Homeric times the great warriors fought in chariots, the lesser ones on foot. There was no cavalry. Distinct organization is traceable as far back as the times of the Seven against Thebes; tactics is observable in the Trojan war. The siege of Troy was a mere blockade, though its walls were very poor, for there was small knowledge of the means of siege. Religion, education, and public games combined to maintain the honor of the warrior's life. He was on duty from eighteen to sixty years of age, and only through arms could political preferment be reached. The phalanx was the main reliance of the Greeks; light troops were insignificant, cavalry poor. Chariots disappeared after the Trojan war. Battles were uniformly in parallel order, and decided as a rule by one shock. The Greek armies were very nimble; but sieges were long drawn out. Command was divided, much to the loss of directness. The men were not paid. Booty replaced emoluments. Rewards were mere marks of honor, punishments outward marks of disgrace. Sparta was noted for the severity of its discipline and the simplicity of its habits, but lacked the broad intelligence requisite to continued success in war. The infantry was perfect; the cavalry worthless. The kings, though in command, were subject to the whims of civil officials, known as ephors. The Spartans had no idea of strategy, though they practiced ruse. Peace to the soldier was incessant labor and deprivation to prepare his body for war; he went to war as to a feast, decked with flowers and singing hymns of joy. The Athenian citizen was equally bound and bred to arms. From eighteen to forty he must serve anywhere, from forty to sixty be prepared to fall in to resist invasion. The phalanx was the chief reliance, as in Sparta. The Athenian soldier was more fiery, less constant, than the Spartan. Few early wars call for any notice. The Messenian wars were noteworthy on account of the able defense made against the Spartans, and the marked skill of Euphaës and Aristomenes. Not Sparta's skill or courage, but her excess of strength, subdued the Messenians.

THE ancient Greeks borrowed the germs of all they knew of the art of war from the East, but with true national intel-

ligence they rejected the useless and improved the valuable up to its highest utility for the conditions of their age.

The early kings of Greece held both the civil and military power. Every freeman was a soldier, and was trained as such from his youth up. Bronze weapons were already familiar to the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war. The nobles



Paris, from *Ægina Marbles.*

and chiefs used thrusting pike, casting lance and sword, and left missile-weapons — bows and slings — to the less brave or expert. The Trojan chiefs did not disdain bows. Helmets, breastplates and large shields were likewise made of bronze. Fighting on foot and in chariots — the latter was the prerogative of the great — were the

usual methods. There was no cavalry, for the hilly character of Greece (except Thessaly and Boeotia) was unsuited to its evolutions, and neither, as a rule, were the horses good nor the men of Greece used to riding. The constant employment of chariots is all the more curious. From these two or four horse two-wheeled vehicles the warrior descended to fight, the driver meanwhile remaining near at hand. At best they were cumbrous and of doubtful value, except as a moral stimulant.

In the tradition of the Seven against Thebes, to assert Polynices' claims as king, there are some traces of organization suggested. The city was besieged by posting a separate detachment opposite each of its gates, and by relying on hunger as an ally. But the Thebans made a sortie, slew the seven kings, and drove their forces away. Ten years later the sons of these kings captured Thebes, and placed Polynices' son upon the throne.

At the siege of Troy (1193–1184 B. C.) we find clear evidences of organization. Agamemnon evidently had the legal power to compel the reluctant Greek monarchs to join him in an expedition based on a mere personal quarrel. Achilles had twenty-five hundred men, divided into five regiments of five hundred men each. The Greeks advanced to battle in a phalanx or deep body, shield to shield, and in silence, so that the orders of the leaders might be heard. But in front of the lines of the armies there always took place



Greek Soldier, in Linen Cuirass.




Ancient Greek Soldier.

a series of duels between the doughtiest champions, — as it were a prolonged and very important combat of skirmishers before the closing of the heavy lines. But coupled with an admirable idea of discipline was the habit of plundering the slain, for which purpose ranks would be broken and often a decisive advantage lost. Prisoners were treated with awful inhumanity.

Camps were regular, and often fortified. The men used

no tents, but camped in the open, building huts if long in one place. At Troy the Greek camp had a broad and deep ditch, palisades, or a wall made of the earth thrown up from the ditch, and wooden towers on the wall. Behind this the army camped in huts.

Fortification had advanced but little beyond the roughest work. The art of sieges was all but unknown. The ten



years' blockade of Troy amply shows the latter fact, as the constant fighting outside the town proves that little reliance was placed on the value of its walls by the Trojans. The Greeks did not surround the city, but sat down on the sea-coast before it and blockaded it, some hundred thousand strong. Troy was able to ration itself from the Mount

Ida region. The Greeks were sadly put to it for victuals, and were compelled to detail half the army to the Chersonesus

in order to raise breadstuffs. For nine years there was naught but insignificant small-war.


After the Greeks had wasted their time in isolated attacks on the Trojan territory until both sides were well-nigh exhausted, Nestor counseled concentration and the division of the army into bodies by race and families, in order to produce a spirit of rivalry and due ambition. It is evident that the troops knew how to deploy, for they filed out of the gates of their camps and then formed line of battle. The army had a right, centre and left. The infantry stood in several ranks, — in front the least brave, in the rear the most brave,

on the plan suggested by Nestor. And the army was marshaled on occasion in several lines ; as, for instance, the chariots in first, and the foot in second line. To attack the Greek intrenchments, Hector divided the Trojans into five troops, so that success should not depend on one attack alone. Here is the crude idea of a reserve, as it were. Aristides names Palamedes, who was at Troy, as the inventor of tactics ; but Nestor must evidently share the honor. The one thing which interfered with the successful use of tactics was the prolonged dueling part of the fray between the heroes of both sides. Of art in their warfare there was barely a trace. It was only in the tenth year, after heavy fighting, that Troy was taken, and it was without a siege, in the sense we understand it.

From the time of the Trojan war till the sixth century B. C. the Grecian states made gradual advances in military organization. The warrior's was the highest duty in the state, as well as the precious privilege of the freeman. Religion, education and public games combined to train the youth to war. Religion taught that heroes became demi-gods ; education was almost entirely confined to athletic and warlike exercises, training in patience and endurance, the inculcation of respect for superiors and elders and the love of country ; public games afforded the bravest, strongest and most expert an occasion of exhibiting their skill and prowess, and of earning honor and repute. Chariot and horse races and athletic games monopolized these ceremonies. The latter comprised running, leaping obstacles, wrestling, throwing the lance and discus, boxing, the pancratium or boxing and wrestling mixed, and the pentathlum or an exercise combining all the others. The prizes were as a rule mere evidences of honor, but these were held to be far beyond material reward. A noted victor had statues erected, inscriptions cut and hymns

sung in his honor, and was often maintained at the public expense.

The right and duty of war existed from the eighteenth to the sixtieth year, varying somewhat in different states. When



Hoplite (from a vase).

Hoplite (from a vase).

war occurred, a draft of the requisite number was made by lot, or rote, or age. A given number of years' honorable service yielded a citizen many privileges, and opened to him every civil office. Warriors crippled in battle were cared for by the state and highly honored.

About the sixth century B. C. the Greeks fought almost exclusively on foot. The hoplites or phalangites were the heavy, the psiloi the light, infantry. The former came from the best classes, and were armed with pikes up to ten feet long, short swords and large shields, and wore both helmet and breastplate, and sometimes greaves. The breastplate was often of leather, and everything being provided by each hoplite for himself made the arms and equipments as various as the tastes of the individuals. The



Leather Cuirass
(iron plates).

psiloi had no defensive armor, and carried only bows and slings. Recruited from the poorer classes, they were of far less value in action than the hoplites, but some psiloi, like the Cretan bowmen, were celebrated for their accurate aim and the penetration of their arrows.

Chariots fell into disuse after the Trojan war. They were found to be unavailable among the rugged hills and vales of Greece. But cavalry began to take their place, at just what period is uncertain. Xenophon mentions cavalry in the time of Lycurgus. It was undoubtedly employed in the Messenian war, a century later. As an arm it was not good, excepting possibly the Boeotian horse, and especially that from Thessaly, on whose broad meadows had been bred an excellent race of stout, serviceable cobs.

The tactical disposition of troops was very various, but generally in earliest times was based on a decimal system like that of the East. The light troops covered the front and flanks of the army ; and the hoplites were formed in a dense body, uniformly called a phalanx, which, however, at that time had no absolute rule of formation or numbers. Xenophon states that the unit of the then phalanx was a taxis (or lochos or century) of one hundred men, commanded by a captain, and ranged in four files twenty-four men deep, plus four officers, each file having four sections of six men each. Ten taxes made a chiliarchia, under a chiliarch, and four chiliarchias a phalanx. The names of the units of service were very various. Attacks were made in parallel order, but it was infrequently sought to lean the flanks and rear on obstacles which might prevent their being turned. Camps were pitched where they were secure from the nature of their location, and were rarely much fortified. The soldier carried no great burden, and the Greek armies were very nimble. The right flank was the post of honor. Marches were almost

invariably by the right, and the flanks of the column of march were covered by the psiloi.

Engineering, as applied to fortification and sieges, still remained singularly crude. The latter were wont to be of long duration. They scarcely amounted even to blockades. Ithome was besieged eight years ; Ira, eleven ; Crissa, nine.

To the government, whatever it might be, was intrusted the care of all things pertaining to the military establishment ; but the right to declare war and to make treaties was reserved by the people, which expressed itself in public gatherings. The weak feature of the Greek military organization

was the lack of unity of command. The armies were as a rule commanded alternately, for a given period,—often but a day,—by one of several leaders, elected by the people, who jointly made a council of war, and who were apt to be under the control of other non-military officials sent by the government to watch them. This system very naturally arose from the history and tendencies towards liberty of the various states, but was coupled with very difficult problems, and often resulted in disaster.

The Greek served his country without pay. To receive money for a duty was in early days considered an indignity. Plunder, however, made up for this lack of remuneration. After a victory, the booty was collected ; part was vowed to the gods and placed in their temples, and the rest was divided according to rank and merit,—the leaders being usually entitled to the lion's share.

Punishment for military crimes involved loss of honor, sometimes of civil rights,—the penalties most dreaded by the patriotic Greek. Rewards were embodied in an increased



Greek Strategos.

share of plunder, promotion, gifts of weapons and marks of honor, and in civil advancement or public support.

The Greek soldier was a curious mixture of virtues and vices. He possessed courage, discipline and self-abnegating patriotism in the highest measure, but was prejudiced, superstitious and monstrously cruel. The Greek states were characterized by similar tendencies. The individual merely reflected the state in miniature.

Sparta.—Among all the Greek states, Sparta in the ninth century B. C., and Athens in the sixth, were distinguished for the perfection of their military organization. The main object of the laws of Lycurgus (820 B. C.) was to form a military power out of a mass of free citizens, and to impress on the individual soldier those qualities of courage, endurance, obedience and skill which would make him irresistible. This they did by banishing arts and sciences, — civilization almost, — and by reducing life down to its lowest limits of simplicity and self-denial. This method fully accomplished its aim; soldiers have rarely, perhaps never, been animated by so single a martial spirit as the Spartans. Love of country, and willingness to sacrifice to it self and all which lends life worth, has never been more fully exemplified than in the Pass of Thermopylæ. But what was gained in one sense was lost in another. A state cannot become great in its best sense by its soldierly qualities and achievements alone.

The Spartan youth belonged, not to the parent, but to the state. They were educated in common, and drilled in gymnastics and the use of arms from earliest childhood. They



Greek Hoplite.

were compelled to undergo extraordinary fatigues, and this on slender rations ; and were taught the simpler virtues of respect for age and obedience to superiors. From twenty to sixty all men were under arms. War was to them the only

art ; death in battle the highest good. As a consequence, the Spartan army, for centuries, was considered invincible.



Greek Psilos (from a vase).


breastwork of the land. Still more curiously, the army was prohibited from pursuing a beaten enemy. Not conquest, but defense of the fatherland was sought. Such mistaken policy eventually gave Sparta's opponents the upper hand.

Heavy infantry was the main reliance of Sparta. The soldier wore full armor ; he held it a duty to the state to preserve intact his body for the state, but he did not seek safety by the method of Hudibras. He deemed it dishonor to lose, or to fight without, his shield. Not to have it with him implied that in his haste to run away he had cast it aside, so as to run the faster. He bore a heavy pike, generally a lighter lance, and a short double-edged sword. There was little light infantry, and the cavalry was mediocre. It was formed in eight ranks, and generally got beaten.


There is some conflict of statement between Xenophon and Thucydides as to the organization of the Spartan troops into bodies. This is probably due to the changes in such organi-

zation from time to time. But rank and command were well settled. In a *mora*, or regiment of four hundred, and later of nine hundred men — Thucydides

says five hundred and twelve men — were one *polemarch*, or colonel; four *lochagoi*, or majors; eight *pentekosteroi*, or captains; and sixteen *enomotarchoi*, or lieutenants. It had four *lochoi*, divided into sections of twenty-five and fifty men, each under a sort of sergeant. The word *lochos*, like *taxis*, or like our word division, is often applied to various bodies. Each *mora* had added to it a body of one hundred horse-men or less.



Greek Hoplite.



Back of Hoplite's helmet.

The kings were the commanders-in-chief. In peace their power was limited; it was unlimited in war. But they were strictly accountable to the people for their use of the army. If there were two armies, each king commanded one. If but one, the people decided who should command and who remain at the head of the home government. In the field the king had a species of staff and body-guard, consisting of one or two *polemarchs*, several of the victors at the public games and a number of younger mounted warriors. Later the kings were accompanied by the *ephors* (of whom there were five), who acted as a species of council of war. These *ephors* were civil officials, whose duty was to watch lest the kings should exceed their legal powers.

The Spartans knew nothing of strategy. Their tactics was simple. They moved out to meet the enemy, drew up in a deep, heavy phalanx, and decided the day by one stout blow.

If the enemy was superior in numbers, they sometimes tried ruse. They marched to battle in cadenced step and in silence, to the sound of the flute. If they won, they might not pursue; if beaten, they were generally able to withdraw slowly and in good order. A mounted vanguard accompanied the army on the march. In camp they had a police-guard under a provost-marshall, and they appear to have developed a system of pickets and patrols. They rarely fortified their camp, which was round in shape, if they could place it where its location made it reasonably secure.

Peace to the Spartans was a season of unremitting labor in preparing for war. War was their sole relaxation. The only duty then was to fight. The intervals between marches and battles were filled by games and gymnastic sports. They

had none of the tasks of peace; a campaign was a holiday. All fatigue-duties were performed by helots, who accompanied the army for that purpose only, but were in later years utilized in the ranks of fighting men. They carried abundant supplies on pack-animals, and the general meal, in peace a most coarse though ample mess, was in war rich and nutritious. The soldiers prepared for

battle as for a feast, wore their best garments, and plucked flowers wherewith to adorn their persons and their arms.

The Spartans never opened a campaign before the full moon. This was a religious custom, but occasionally, as at Marathon, far from auspicious. The gods were propitiated by tiresome but invariable ceremonials and offerings before every military movement.




Hoplite (from a vase).

Being allowed by law no fortresses, the Spartan territory was not only open to invasion, but the nation was ignorant of fortification. Nor did they understand how to lay siege to a strong place.

Athens. — From the abolition of the kings down to the days of Solon (1068–594 b. c.), owing to the internal dissords and external conflicts of Athens, the war-establishment was uncertain. Solon's laws aimed at producing a form of government which should keep the aristocratic element within bounds, and at the same time not run into pure democracy. He divided the citizens into four classes (or *phylæ*), according to wealth, — the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, the *hippeis*, or knights, the *zeugittoi*, and the *thetes*. The first were the richest, the last the poorest. Every citizen was bound to service. Though Athens was a democracy, the citizens were often in a small minority. There were at one time but ninety thousand of them to forty-five thousand foreigners and three hundred and sixty thousand slaves. Another census, taken under Demetrius, showed twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand metics, and four hundred thousand slaves. The members of the first two classes above named were obliged on requisition to keep each a horse and serve as cavalry, but were then free from infantry duty in all but exceptional cases. The third class furnished the heavy infantry, in which each man must supply himself with arms. Of the fourth class, those who could furnish the proper arms might serve in the heavy foot; the others were the light troops.

Every Athenian freeman was held to pursue a certain



Heroic Horseman
(from a vase).

gymnastic and military training in the public schools. At eighteen years of age he took a solemn oath of fealty to the state, and entered upon his military duties. From twenty to forty he was bound to serve, whenever drawn, within or beyond the Attic territory. After twenty years' service the citizen was discharged, and entered upon civil pursuits. But up to his sixtieth year he must be ready at all times to fall into the ranks to resist invasion. Towards the end of the sixth century B. C., the classes were increased to ten.

The heavy infantry was the strong arm of Athens, as of Sparta. The hoplite still bore the Homeric arms, consisting of large shield, long lance and short sword. The Homeric armor remained substantially the same among the Greeks ever after. The warrior wore a tunic. He first put on his greaves ; then his cuirass in two parts, the mitre underneath, the zone above ; then he hung his sword on the left side in the socket of a belt which went over the right shoulder ; he next assumed his shield, hung in similar manner ; then his helmet ; then his spears. The hoplite fought in closed phalanx eight or more deep. The cavalry was weak ; the light troops (*psiloi*) insignificant. The army was apt to be set up in one or two lines, with the heavy foot in the centre, the light foot in the wings, and the cavalry on the flanks. But this was not invariable.

The organization of the troops at this time is not accurately known. It appears to have been much the same as



Homeric Warrior.

the Spartan, — the names merely differing. Each of the ten phylæ furnished a body of one thousand or more hoplites, under command of a chiliarch, or colonel. The phylæ selected each a commander, called strategos, who was the equivalent of the Spartan polemarch. Of the ten strategoi, each in turn took command of the entire army ; all together they constituted the council of war.

The Athenian was equally brave, more fiery in his courage, but less constant and enduring than the Spartan, and the discipline to which he was subjected was somewhat less strict, as accorded with the national character.


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Wars. — Immediately after the Trojan war came the invasions of the Heraclidæ (1104 b. c.), who subjugated the Peloponnesus. Except these, the wars of the Greeks, down to 750 b. c., were much what the quarrels of small semi-civilized tribes are wont to bring about, *i. e.*, wars quite without system. When Sparta and Athens had grown to be substantial nations, military movements came to be more noticeable. But they were still mostly confined to small-war and sieges. The territory of Greece, cut up by natural and political divisions into limited domains, narrowed operations down to this species of warfare. Larger evolutions were out of the question. But small-war was conducted with much intelligence. Sieges were more properly blockades ; fortification relied upon situation rather than art.

The first Messenian War (743–724 b. c.) is worthy of note for nothing so much as the long and excellent defense against the Spartans by Euphaës, king of Messenia. His maintaining himself in his capital during five years of preparation for war, his holding his own against the so-called invincible Spartans in the bloody but undecided battle of Amphæa, and the defense of Ithome, mark Euphaës as a great man. At

Ithome, in a rocky fastness, for eight years, Euphaës kept the best troops of the Spartans at bay, and in the last year beat them in the second battle of Amphæa, but at the cost of his own life.

At this battle of Amphæa (730 b. c.) Euphaës showed a fine conception of battle tactics. The Spartan kings, Theopompus and Polydorus, met the Messenian array in parallel order. The contest was severe. The right wing of each army was defeated. It was anybody's victory. But Euphaës



Amphæa, 730 b. c.

snatched it by a masterly stroke conceived on the instant and in the turmoil of battle. The cavalry on his left had defeated the Spartans in their front and driven them off the field. Speedily recalling them from pursuit,—always a difficult thing to do,—Euphaës led them behind his line of battle over to the succor of his retiring right. Thus supported the right was enabled to rally, and a few bold charges by the Messenian horse decided the day. Euphaës did not profit by the victory; he fell in his moment of triumph.

Aristodemus, who succeeded him, kept up a constant small-

war for five years, in which he maintained his superiority, and finally again beat the Spartans at Ithome, this time so badly that only the excellent discipline of the latter enabled them to regain Laconia with the relics of their army.

But the Spartans, with abundant population and resources, could easily recover themselves, while the Messenians were totally exhausted by their gallant struggle. On the death of Aristodemus the Spartans were able to take advantage of their superior strength and reduce Messenia to a tributary condition.

The second Messenian war (645–628 B. C.) was illustrated by the valor and ability of Aristomenes, under whose leadership the Messenians again rose to cast off the yoke of Sparta, invaded Laconia, beat their oppressors so badly as almost to recover their lost liberties and devastated large parts of the Spartan territory. After two years of disaster the Spartans were more successful, and by taking advantage of the treachery of their allies gained a marked advantage over the Messenians. Aristomenes retired to Ira, a fortress which he could victual from the near-by sea, for Sparta had no fleet. The same conditions had existed at Ithome. In Ira, for eleven years, Aristomenes held himself against the Spartans by able diversions outside the walls and stanch defense within. These long sieges exhibit as nothing else does the lack of engineering facilities of the day. But finally the Spartans, again by treachery, gained entrance into the fortress. Aristomenes was allowed to withdraw, but Messenia was subdued and parceled out by the Spartans.

V.

CYRUS AND DARIUS. B. C. 558-485.

THE great warriors preceding Cyrus are mere traditions. The first to leave lessons for us was the founder of the Persian Empire. The greatest conqueror may not be a great captain. It is *what* the former does which makes him great; it is *how* the latter does it which gives him rank. Cyrus began his campaigns by attacking Crœsus, and was the first to employ a strategic surprise. At Thymbra his battle tactics were novel. Crœsus vastly outnumbered and outflanked him. Cyrus formed his troops in five lines, so marshaled that when Crœsus' wings wheeled in on his flanks he could take these very wings in reverse, and at the same time poured into a gap in Crœsus' line and defeated him. He then turned on Babylon and captured it by diverting the water of the Euphrates, a gigantic work, and following its bed under the walls into the city. Cyrus left the local or civil governments of the peoples he conquered unchanged in the hands of the old satraps, merely retaining the military control himself, a plan later followed with great success by Alexander. Cyrus conquered Asia as far as Scythia beyond the Jaxartes, the natural limit to a kingdom. After him, Darius bridged the Bosphorus and Danube, and moved with seven hundred thousand men against the Scythians of Europe. These, by exceptionally able and interesting natural strategy, forced him to retire.

PRIOR to the age of Cyrus, in the sixth century before Christ, there is to be found nothing in the history of war which yields lessons to the soldier of to-day. Although among the nations of remote antiquity existence was a constant interchange of armed invasion, as famine or the lust of plunder induced one or other to prey upon the territory of its neighbor, yet in their wars we see no principle whatever governing military conduct, except the rule of numbers. Neither the Egyptians, Jews, Persians, Babylonians, Assyrians, nor Indians show anything like a defined military standard of campaign or battle. The conduct of war lacked every

element of system. Great conquerors there no doubt were. Nimrod, the reputed builder of the tower of Babel and of Nineveh, or whoever was his prototype, was no doubt justly regarded by the Jews as the exemplification of temporal power with all its attendant evil. Though we must now admit that both he and his widow, the wonderful Semiramis, were little more than mere names for explaining the traditions of successful wars and the founding of powerful cities, to which condition of nonentity modern research has finally reduced them, still both must be held to represent a line of distinguished predecessors ; and though Sesostris' great conquests, even to Ethiopia, the Ganges and Scythia, as related by the Greek historians, may have been the work of a whole dynasty instead of an individual, there remains the skeleton of a long series of able wars. Whether these famous names of prehistoric times were those of real monarchs or not, no doubt in all ages great warriors have existed and many more been born to blush unseen. For opportunity is the coefficient of genius. But however mighty the deeds of these and other conquerors may have been, great captains in the sense of captains helpful to the military student of our times cannot be found in tradition. From the legends of the conquests of Ninus, Semiramis, Sesostris, we can gather nothing which lends aid to modern war. This is so partly because victory in those ages leaned to the side, not of the heaviest battalions, but of the greatest mob ; partly because history gives us no details of these movements, and tradition is picturesque rather than reliable. It is perhaps indisputable that the actual conquerors whose deeds have been handed down to us under these names were instinct with the same divine afflatus which inspired the conduct of later, and to us greater, captains. No doubt they illustrated all the qualities which go to make up the pattern army-leader. But prior to the time of Cyrus we

search in vain for something akin to the military science of to-day, something which has added to the art of war.

The same thing can be said of most historical conquerors. The greatest of these may by no means rank as a great captain. To overrun vast regions, devastate well-peopled countries, reduce to servitude brave tribes, may constitute a great conqueror. But it is the method with which this is done which makes a great captain. A lesser actor in the world's drama may well be a greater captain. Alexander was a type of both the great conqueror and the great captain. He had transcendent genius; he had fit opportunity to give scope to his genius. He was the greatest of conquerors, because he overran and subdued the largest territory and the most peoples; he was a great captain because he did this with a method which teaches us lessons of incalculable value. It is the purpose of this work to narrate the deeds of those great captains who have peculiarly influenced the art of war, as we understand it to-day. However great men may have been as generals, however valuable their life's work in the world's economy, unless they have made an essential contribution to the science of war, they find no place within the scope of this and succeeding volumes.

Cyrus is not only a historical verity, but we know from the Greek historians what he did, and to a certain extent how he did it. All histories vary,—often to a material degree; nor is this wonderful of the ancients, when we read the conflicting accounts in vogue to-day relating to the wars of the last hundred—the last twenty-five—years. But from the ancient histories we can generally arrive at something like the truth. No one historian can be relied upon in all things. But by diligent comparison of the statements of all, the study of the topography of the campaigns or battlefields, and the estimate of probability as between conflicting statements, a

reasonably exact narrative is possible. Military critics of every age are wont to disagree in many things; but their variations are rarely fatal. The same lessons can be learned from any of them.

Cyrus, of the family of the Acheminidæ, was the founder of the great Persian empire (B. C. 558–529). Persia had been subject to the Medes, and was grievously oppressed. Cyrus deposed Astyages, the Median king, and united Persia and Media under his own sceptre. Alarmed for his safety, Croesus, king of Lydia, which then comprised almost all Asia Minor west of the Halys, entered the lists against Cyrus, and advanced across the Halys into Cappadocia, the most westerly of the Persia-Median provinces, and devastated the rich lands and cities of Pteria. He had as allies the Babylonians, and the Egyptians and even Sparta had promised him support. Croesus was preparing to advance still farther into Persia, when Cyrus, by a rapid march, anticipated him, and met him on the scene of his devastations. An indecisive, wild and bloody battle was fought here, and ended only by night (B. C. 554), after which Croesus retired to his capital, Sardis, not expecting that Cyrus would undertake a winter campaign. Here he endeavored to strengthen




Conquests of Cyrus.

for the succeeding year his bonds with his allies, and procure material assistance.

But Cyrus, full of the ardor which brooks not delay, and acting on that oldest and soundest of military principles, to do that which your enemy least expects, gave his adversary no breathing spell. Winter was at hand. Crœsus, anticipating no further present activity on the part of Cyrus, had unwisely allowed his army to disperse on reaching Sardis. Taking advantage of this error, Cyrus, by forced and difficult marches, came upon him unawares at Thymbra, on the plains not far from Sardis, and utterly defeated him. This is perhaps the first instance on record of those strategic surprises with which the history of great captains is filled, and of which the campaign of Ulm is so notable an example. The capital, Sardis, was besieged fourteen days, and then taken by storm. Lydia was subjected. But, with that politic generosity which great soldiers have so often known how to employ,—unusual in those days,—Cyrus made Crœsus his friend and adviser, and profited much by the latter's knowledge and influence.

One of the earliest instances of excellent battle tactics has been described by Xenophon. It was at this same battle of Thymbra in which Cyrus destroyed the Lydian kingdom. Crœsus is reputed to have had four hundred and twenty thousand men and three hundred chariots; Cyrus, one hundred and ninety-six thousand men, three hundred chariots, and three hundred war camels. Xenophon states that Cyrus had shown great skill in organizing and in victualing his army. The rival forces met on the plain of Thymbra, not far from Sardis. It has been suggested that Xenophon improved in his description upon the actual manœuvres. But if the relation is not a true account of what Cyrus actually did, it describes what Xenophon actually knew how to do, and is equally interesting from this standpoint.

Crœsus proposed to utilize his great numerical superiority, by extending his line far beyond the flanks of Cyrus, and by wheeling in upon these so as to encompass him on all sides. Crœsus' army was in one long line, some say in two, with the cavalry on the flanks. The depth of the line was thirty men, except in the centre, where the Egyptian allies kept their national formation of plying each ten thousand men into a huge square block of one hundred files of one hundred men each.



Battle of Thymbra.

The chariots were in front. Cyrus, aware of his opponent's great numerical superiority, and expecting this inclosing manœuvre,—an almost invariable one at that day,—drew up his army so as best to meet it. He reduced his files to a depth of twelve men, but arrayed his troops in five lines, so as to give the army, with the intervals between the lines, exceptional depth. In his first line were the heavy infantry-men in armor; in the second, the acontists, or dart-throwers; in the third, the archers, who were to shoot over the heads of the other lines; in the fourth line the infantry *d'élite*; and in the fifth, the tower-bearing wagons,—a species of movable tower filled with armed men. Behind all this was the wagon train, in a huge square, within which all the non-combatants were placed. His chariots Cyrus placed, one hundred in front, and one hundred along each flank, and at the rearward

end of the line of chariots he posted a chosen body of one thousand foot and one thousand horse. The camel-corps — archers mounted on camels — was with the latter body on the left.

Cyrus' idea in forming the line so deep was to oblige Crœsus to make a very extensive inward wheel if he expected to inclose his flanks. Such a wheel must of necessity open gaps in the Lydian line, of which Cyrus hoped to be able to take advantage. The wagon-towers made a sort of fortified camp to which he could retire if defeated. Cyrus awaited the onset of Crœsus.

When the Lydian monarch came within proper distance, his centre halted, and his wings began the anticipated turning wheel. As can be well understood, so vast a body could not make this manœuvre without losing touch in many places. When the wheel was about completed, the chariots on the flanks of Cyrus' army charged upon the somewhat disordered wings of Crœsus in front, while the reserves dashed in on their flanks. In a brief time these wings were entirely broken. Meanwhile gaps had also been made between the centre and the wings of Crœsus' army, seeing which Cyrus quickly gathered his best horse and attacked the flanks and rear of Crœsus' centre. This, too, was soon beaten, though the Egyptians fought so stanchly that Cyrus was compelled to make terms with them by which they entered his service.

After the battle of Thymbra, Cyrus left his lieutenants to subjugate the Greek cities on the coast of the Ægean, while he himself undertook the larger task of reducing Parthia, Sogdiana, Bactria, Arachosia, and the neighboring principalities. In this expedition he overran almost as large a territory as did subsequently Alexander the Great. The Sacæ gave him the greatest trouble.

He then turned upon Babylon, and in a two years' siege

(B. C. 539-538) reduced that city and incorporated the Babylonian with the Persian kingdom. It was not properly a siege, scarcely a blockade. The Babylonians were very confident in the strength of their huge walls and derided the besiegers. Cyrus had no battering-rams or catapults; nor does he appear to have understood the undermining of walls. He had to confine himself to erecting walls or mounds and towers higher than and commanding those of the city. But by this means alone he was able to accomplish nothing. Finally, by one of those audacious conceptions which cause the great captain to loom up above his fellows, Cyrus, hearing from deserters that an annual five days' religious festival was about to take place, during which the population would abandon itself to rejoicing and pay less heed to his proceedings, made preparation to divert the water of the Euphrates from its bed. He had shortly before drained the Gyndes; the experience so gained led him to the present idea; and the vast horde of Asiatics which always seeks for crumbs from the table of an army, afforded him the means of executing his plan, by widening the canal which Nitocris had dug for carrying the overflow of the river into the Chaldean Lake. He increased the vigor of the usual operations to divert the attention of the Babylonians, which he succeeded in doing; and, while the population was engaged in revelry, the water of the Euphrates was, in the course of a few hours, so far lowered as to yield a footing to his men under the wall and into the city. The king's son, Belshazzar, left in charge of the capital while King Na-bu-nahid took the field, was surprised in his palace and surrendered; or, according to other authorities, died sword in hand, surrounded by his ministers and attendants. Cyrus' stratagem had succeeded perfectly. Then, with both natural humanity and that supreme appreciation of policy which has always been the complement of the martial virtue of great


soldiers, Cyrus at once arrested the slaughter and promised unqualified amnesty to all who should surrender.

In all his conquests Cyrus was wont to leave the civil government in the hands of the ancient officials of each people, under his own supreme control, keeping a military hold upon the country by suitable garrisons. He was the first to show a broad conception of the best manner in which the elements of a new empire may firmly be consolidated.

Later on (B. C. 538-529), Cyrus extended his conquests to the Scythians, in the territories east of the Caspian Sea. He is said to have thrown a bridge over the Jaxartes, and to have built boats surmounted by towers to aid him in driving away the barbarians from the farther bank, and thus enable him to put over his army.

According to the legend, the Massagetae were as frank and loyal as they were independent and warlike. They first tried to dissuade Cyrus from his purposed invasion of their land; but failing in their negotiations, they offered to withdraw from the river three days' journey and await Cyrus' approach; or Cyrus might do the like and they would cross to meet him. Cyrus accepted the first proposition, crossed, marched onward three days and camped, spreading out a vast store of provisions, wines and Persian luxuries. He then left a rear-guard in the camp and simulated retreat. The Massagetae attacked the camp, routed the few men left there, and fell to enjoying the unwonted good cheer. Hereupon Cyrus returned by a speedy and secret march, fell upon them in the midst of their revelries, and utterly defeated them. The legend may have no value except as indicating the sort of stratagem on a large scale which a general then might be able to practice. It is not very different in principle from some stratagems of modern times. Not long after, it is said, Cyrus fell in battle with these same Massagetae, and his army was totally annihilated.

Darius, son of Hystaspes, the consolidator of the Persian empire (B. C. 521–485), was so great a king that his mere military talent has been overshadowed by his statecraft. Among his great deeds of war is an expedition against the European Scythians north of the Danube. He bridged the Bosphorus, or rather the Greek Mandrocles did it for him, brought his fleet up the Danube from the Ægean, and bridged



Darius' Campaign against the Scythians.

the Danube as well. No doubt both these bridges were laid on boats. His army is said to have numbered seven hundred thousand men. He advanced into the steppes between the Danube and the Dniester. In meeting this gigantic invasion the barbarians showed consummate skill in their defensive scheme. Perhaps no savage nation ever exhibited sounder natural strategy. They were good horsemen and skillful archers, and were brave and warlike. They declined to meet the Persians in open battle, but in lieu thereof kept up a harassing system of partial attacks on the Persian flanks ; they made

constant threats on the Persian rear and line of retreat ; they planned numberless attempts to seize the bridges on the Danube ; they destroyed the crops and filled up the springs. These acts were not done in an irrational manner, but with the greatest forethought. They never so entirely devastated a province as to cause the Persians to turn back, for they desired to lure them on to their ruin. They retired from before Darius through the territory, not of friends, but of lukewarm tribes, so that these, irritated by the burden of war, should be compelled to cast in their lot with the others. They retired in three bodies by three eccentric lines, thus preventing Darius, who desired to bring them to battle, from overwhelming them at one blow, and by this means led him astray. This policy utterly exhausted the vast host of the Persian king in the course of a few weeks and compelled its withdrawal.

It was fortunate for Darius that the Greeks who were left to guard the bridge decided to remain faithful. Miltiades was among them, and advised its destruction so as to deal a fatal blow to the Persians. His counsel did not prevail. The *coup de grace* was reserved for him to give at Marathon. So hot was the pursuit of the barbarians, so constantly and effectively did they harass his rear, that Darius was obliged to resort to a ruse and make a sudden night march to withdraw from their front. The ruse was the leaving of the sick and non-combatants behind with the pack-train, while Darius marched away with all his effective troops. The Scythians saw the campfires and heard the braying of the asses, and naturally supposed the Persians still in camp. This was a barbarous but typical stratagem of the day.

So soon as the Scythians discovered Darius' retreat, they set out by the shortest route for the bridges, purposing to destroy them, or to head off Darius in his attempt to reach them. Darius, ignorant of the way, had retired by the circuitous

route of his advance. The Scythians, having as they supposed induced the Greeks to destroy the bridge, for these custodians did in fact take up that part nearest the north bank as a matter of safety to themselves, were confident that they could intercept the Persians in their retreat. But happily Darius was able to secure his communications with the bridge, and was fortunate indeed to get his army over to the south bank in safety. He had lost eighty thousand men in seventy days. This campaign suggests in many features the Russian campaign of Napoleon, though the latter by no means failed for lack of careful preparation. But the method of the Scythians was in its intelligence somewhat similar to that of the Russians, while Darius had failed from lack of study of his problem, and because he believed that numbers alone sufficed in war. He had made no preparations for victual, nor provided a means of forestalling such opposition as the Scythians exhibited. But though Darius failed in this campaign, he subdued Thrace, and extended his empire to the confines of the Indus. His failure leaves him still with a large reputation as a soldier, added to a still greater one as a king.



Scythian Warriors.

VI.

ARMIES IN THE FIFTH CENTURY B. C.

THE Persian army was divided into active and garrison troops. The whole population was parceled out on a decimal basis, and from this the army was drawn. The body-guard of the king, "The Immortals," was ten thousand strong. The satraps gradually acquired more and more power, grew careless of war and lived in their harems. Mercenary troops were engaged, many from Greece. Cavalry was the most effective of the Persian arms; the foot was numerous but unreliable. Chariots remained in use. Wide, open plains were chosen as battlefields. Tactics underwent no improvement. The Persians were sliding backward in war. In Greece mercenary troops also appeared, and though citizens were still held to service, substitutes were allowed. The best Greek soldiers became professionals and sold their services abroad to whomsoever paid the most. Despite which there was always a kernel left of good native troops. Such was the Theban Sacred Band. The lance of the hoplite grew in length. A new body of light troops, peltasts, was created, much better than the irregular psiloi. The cavalry grew in numbers, but was still far from good. The phalanx was improved in drill and battle-tactics. It was a body perfect for one blow on level ground, or for defense, but was easily disorganized by rough ground, and if broken it was gone. Greek armies were small and carried little baggage. They marched far and stood hardship and rough usage with wonderful constancy. There were several orders of battle, but the parallel was still generally employed. Troops were now paid. After the Peloponnesian war discipline declined. There continued to be much religious ceremonial connected with the movements of armies, and the burial of the dead was demanded by custom. The Greeks were barbarous to prisoners. There was no field fortification, but cities were well fortified. These were usually taken by storm or stratagem. Rams and other siege machinery gradually came into use, with mines, mounds, towers, etc. War on land and war at sea were not so different as they are to-day. The hoplite served on the fleet as readily as on land. Ships were small and put into shore every night. The numerous rowers left small room for soldiers aboard. War ships sought to ram their opponents and then to board them. Naval tactics was simple. In Sparta, Laconians, freedmen, helots and mercenaries crept into the army. In Athens,

the list of citizens freed from personal service grew large. The people allowed small scope to the strategoi; they were under a civil officer's control, to the great loss of ability to act. Cavalry began to improve somewhat in numbers and effectiveness. Athens looked at war more intelligently than Sparta. The latter never saw beyond its material side.

Persians. — The Persian kingdom founded by Cyrus first received a regular military organization from Darius, son of Hystaspes (B. C. 521–485). This monarch divided his territory into twenty satrapies, confided to each satrap only the



Persian Body-Guards.

civil power, while himself appointed and controlled the commander of the military forces. These troops were fed from the taxes collected in each satrapy. There were active and garrison troops. The former were divided into bodies of one thousand men each, and did duty on the borders and along the great highways which traversed the kingdom. They were rigidly inspected, and a grand review of them held each year. The whole kingdom was divided into military districts, with central assembling points in each. The garrison troops

were kept under separate control for the protection of the city fortresses, and were not obliged to assemble for the annual inspection. Their organization was quite apart from the active army, though resembling it in minor detail.

Several corps, each ten thousand strong, served at court. The most noble and brave of the Persians served in a *corps d'élite*, which was kept always at ten thousand men, and was known as the Immortals. These held the first place of honor in the army. The second belonged to a somewhat similar corps of Medes. The satraps and great officials each had his own body-guard, which he regulated himself.

The whole population, like the Jews, was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and ten thousands, and in case of war fresh corps or reinforcements could be raised quickly and effectively. These levies, when made, were apt to be commanded by the large land-owners of the districts where raised, thus preserving the national character of the force. Sometimes, as in Darius' expedition against the Scythians, or Xerxes' against Greece, a general draft of the entire people was made, and the king determined how much each province should furnish in men, material, horses, ships and so forth. Herodotus gives an extended and interesting description of the fifty-six tribes and peoples represented under Xerxes, and reviewed by him in Thrace at the time of his invasion of Greece.

The troops were not paid. During active service they were fed by simply seizing and gathering in supplies wherever found. Provinces through which a Persian army passed were eaten up as by a plague of grasshoppers.

Rank and command were well settled. The chiliarchs, or colonels, who commanded one thousand men, and the myriarchs, or division-generals, who commanded ten thousand, were held in honor. The higher commands were filled by the rel-

atives and favorites of the king. Though the Persians became a luxurious people and lost much of their warlike quality, they were in early days simple, soldierly and brave. They received an excellent training for war. It was only cohesion which the Persian army lacked. But after the days of Xerxes I. († 465 b. c.) they began to fall backwards. The great nobles lived in their harems and more rarely assumed command in person. Mercenary troops were gradually introduced, and to the best of these the safety of the kingdom was confided. This labor-saving system grew fast when it was found easy to raise mercenaries. Asiatics and Greeks were both enlisted. The former made the bulk, the latter the kernel of the Persian armies. The Greek phalangites received pay at the rate of one daricus (a ducat) per head per month, between four and five dollars, in addition to which sum, it is probable, they received an equal amount for rations.

A great source of weakness of the central military power arose when the satraps became more independent and gradually got possession of the armed, as well as the civil control of their satrapies. It was not long thereafter before these satraps became practically independent monarchs, assuming all the power and most of the attributes which properly belonged to the sovereign, and yielding but a nominal fealty. But the Great King retained the power of assembling the army. Thus at the time of the Græco-Persian wars, the bulk of the Persian forces was by the king's orders concentrated in Thrace, Asia Minor and Egypt.

The most effective part of the Asiatic armies was cavalry. In this the Orientals have always excelled. The horse was



Persian Officer.

in the East then, as now, the constant companion of man, and cavalry was the natural arm. The best heavy cavalry was the Persian ; then followed the Median, that of Asia Minor, the Parthian. The nomad tribes furnished an excellent light cavalry, much like the Cossacks of to-day.

The foot was more numerous but less good. The light troops, slingers, darters and archers, were abundant, but had little discipline. The Greek mercenaries furnished the stanchest of the heavy troops. There were as high as fifty thousand in the Persian service at one time. Bodies of native troops were organized in like fashion. Some of the Persians were accoutred in the most splendid manner ; wore scaled armor and carried weapons of the finest description. Chariots, plain and scythed, were in vogue, and camels bearing archers and darters were not uncommon.

There had been no progress in tactics since the elder Cyrus. Organization and discipline in the field were wretched. On the march there was no order. The army camped near water and pasturage, and surrounded the camps with wagons, stockades and earthworks, — sometimes using their shields as a capping to the latter. The higher generals had tents ; the commonalty slept in huts in permanent camps, or without shelter in daily camps. In battle, the Persians, relying on their bravery, preferred to advance straight on the enemy, without resort to stratagem or tactical manœuvres. Wide, open plains were their usual choice for battlefields, on which their numbers, and especially the cavalry and chariots, could act to the best advantage. They formed in a long line so as to lap the enemy's flanks, the cavalry on the wings, the chariots in front. The centre was the place of honor. Here the king took his stand surrounded by his body-guard. On either side were placed the chosen troops, in great squares, always thirty, often one hundred deep, with light troops stationed all about

them and in the intervals. The king gave the war-cry for the day, and at a signal the whole mass moved forward. The Persian army was full of gallant men ; it had for generations been a terror to the Greeks, who feared to face it ; but it was unwieldly from too vast a bulk and from lack of homogeneity and discipline, and was subject to speedy and unreasoning panics. After a defeat a Persian army was bound to lose heavily from lack of ability to rally for defense, and would often disperse so as absolutely to vanish. Destined to act in the plain, the chariots and horsemen and the huge squares were utterly unsuited to hilly countries, and were sure to fall into disorder when subjected to unusual tests.

Regular sieges were unknown. Cities were captured by ruse, treachery, or, on rare occasions, by storm. Sieges were still apt to be very long drawn out.

In campaigns against barbarians, the Persian method accomplished good results. But their mountain tribes always gave them much trouble, and the civilized discipline of the Greeks they could by no means withstand.

In declaring war, the Persian habit was to demand, through heralds, earth and water as a token of submission.

Greeks.—Down to the battle of Platæa (479 b. c.) there was small change in the organization of the Greeks. From that time on, many alterations came gradually about. A number of slaves appeared in the ranks. The first instance of a standing army was the occasion when the Greek cities, during the Persian wars, mutually agreed to keep under arms ten thousand foot, one thousand horse, and one hundred warships. Wars beyond the borders of Greece called for larger forces than had been necessary, and in addition to the citizen-soldier, who had so far been the glory as well as guardian of Greece, large forces of freedmen, slaves, and particularly

mercenary troops, were created. In the Peloponnesian war, and during the period of her greatest splendor (465–429 B. C.), Athens made use extensively of mercenary troops, and other Greek states soon followed suit.

Down to the Peloponnesian war the Athenians had retained their civil and military virtues in full force. But this internecine struggle ruined the population, devastated Greece, and familiarized the Greeks with serving for gold. Pericles found it necessary to pay the troops. The hoplites had nothing left to subsist upon. They had already served for pay in Asia, on a limited scale; but after the Peloponnesian war, the Oriental princes or satraps, Carthage, or indeed any other people or prince who needed them, had no difficulty in collecting large bodies of Greek mercenaries. From this paid foreign service it was but a step to the point where the Greeks were willing to serve in preference him who paid the most. The pay varied from five to twenty cents a day. The best of the Greek population embraced arms as a profession, engaged mostly abroad, and left the poorer material at home. Greek cities themselves had to hire soldiers. The better citizens would no longer serve. They procured substitutes, and the armies, often kept standing, were filled up with wretched stuff. But in most of the Greek cities there remained a better nucleus, a *corps d'élite*, in which alone the highest citizens had a place. Though this was small, it was a leaven. Such was the Theban Sacred Band, or Band of Lovers, which was bound together by ties of affection and oaths of fidelity, and, but three hundred strong, so often saved the day for Thebes. This gallant body was finally cut to pieces at Chæronæa. It would not yield a foot. Every man fell where he stood, sword in hand.

While the armies of Greece were thus degenerating, the schools, in which, in addition to gymnastics, were taught

mathematics and the art of war as then understood, continued to grow in excellence. There was never a lack of well-trained leaders. It was the free-born rank and file which was degenerating, or allowing hirelings to do the duty it should do itself. The bone and sinew of the Greek republics had disappeared.

The hoplites continued to be the favorite troops. Only they were looked on as warriors. Their armament remained the same, except that their shields grew smaller,—from four to two and a half feet in height, while the pike grew longer,—from ten to as much as twenty-one feet, or, as some state, twenty-four feet, which was the sarissa of Macedon. The psiloi served to protect the hoplites as well as to open the battle. The best archers and slingers came from Crete, Rhodes, Acarnania, *Aegina*, and Achaia. The psiloi came from a poor class as of yore, were illly armed and of little consideration. It was reserved for Iphicrates of Athens to



Full-Armed Greek Archer.



Peltast.

better their discipline and condition, and prove their utility in service. After the Peloponnesian war he created a new body, armed with well-poised spears for casting, light but good linen armor, and a small, round shield (*peltē*), from

which they were called peltasts. These troops had in a degree the lightness of the psiloi and the steadfastness of the hoplites. This new arm proved useful, and was shortly imi-

64 RELATIVE STRENGTH OF HEAVY AND LIGHT FOOT.

tated by the other Greek cities. Scarlet or crimson were the favorite colors of the warrior.

The Greek cavalry was either heavy, — cataphracti, bearing long double-ended lances, sword and axe, small shield,

and fully armored, as was also the horse; or light, — acrobolisti, far-shooters, — who were merely light-armed riders and like nomads in their methods. The force of cavalry had been somewhat increased by the time of the Persian invasion to about one tenth the foot. Agesilaus, in Asia Minor,




Cataphractos.

made it for a time one fourth the foot. But the Greek cavalry was essentially poor, though certain leaders, like Epaminondas, managed to get good work out of it. The Greeks were not a nation of horsemen.


The relative numbers of heavy and light foot and cavalry were very various. At Marathon (Herodotus) were ten thousand hoplites, a few psiloi, no cavalry. At Plataea served thirty-eight thousand seven hundred heavy, seventy-one thousand three hundred light foot, and no cavalry. At the opening of the Peloponnesian war Athens had (Thucydides) thirteen thousand heavy, sixteen hundred light foot, and twelve hundred horse, not counting sixteen thousand hoplites to defend the city. Epaminondas had at Leuctra (Diodorus) six thousand heavy foot, fifteen hundred light foot, five hundred horse; at Mantinæa thirty thousand heavy and light, and three thousand horse.

The phalanx had proven so good a formation during the Persian wars that the Greeks sought to improve rather than to change it. The Peloponnesian war furnished the opportunity to do this, and the Greeks had by nature exceptional capacity as drill-masters and organizers. The unit was no longer decimal, but founded on the powers of the number *two*. The

depth of the phalanx was rarely less than eight or more than sixteen men, though it was on rare occasions made so light as four or so heavy as twenty-four. Epaminondas made a column forty-eight men deep at Leuctra and Mantinæa, but this was not the phalanx proper. Generally the eight, twelve, or sixteen deep file was in use. Xenophon puts the average at twelve. By employing any given number of files under a



Ancient Weapons.



Ancient Helmets.


leader, any convenient unit of organization could be made, or detachment formed. The leader stood in front, and there were a number of file closers to keep order in the ranks. The

larger divisions of the phalanx had their ensigns and trumpeters, and each leader had near him one or two men to convey or repeat his orders. The right flank of the phalanx was


called the head, the left the tail, for the phalanx usually marched by the right, and on the right the commander of the phalanx had his station. Small intervals were left between the divisions to allow the light troops to pass through to front or rear. There were many tactical formations of the phalanx for battle known to the Greeks, such as a refusal of the right or left wing and various forms of columns and wedges. Columns of attack were of later origin. Manœuvres were made in measured step to the sound of fifes. The cadenced step was essential to preserve order in a

phalanx with twelve-foot pikes. The pike was practically the only weapon used so long as the phalanx held together. The foremost ranks protended their pikes; the rear ranks leaned them forward on the shoulders of their leaders to break the flight of arrows, or held them erect.

The psiloi, peltasts and horse were set up and employed in many fashions. The psiloi never came to close quarters; the peltasts often did so. The cavalry did not improve much. But the Greeks recognized the uselessness of too great a depth, — such as the Spartans had had, — and the horse was formed in ilēs of files four deep and of a convenient length of rank. If the ilēs were occasionally formed deeper, only the first four ranks attacked



Swords.




Holding Shield.

the balance remained for the moment in reserve. The intervals between ilēs were greater than those in the phalanx. Some of the Thracian and Thessalian and other semi-nomad horse was wont to form in wedge and rhomboid, or lozenge columns for a charge.

The phalanx, as the nucleus, occupied the centre. The light troops might be on the flanks, in front, in the intervals, in the rear, according as the demand was for protection to front or flanks, or for shooting missiles over the heads of the phalanx. Small bodies of psiloi often accompanied the cavalry. They were so active as to be able to follow its evolutions. Their general duties were to cover the phalanx and patrol the camp, seize heights, tear down obstacles, open the battle, follow the beaten enemy with the horse, or cover a retreat. The peltasts in battle were generally on the flanks. The horse was on one or both flanks. The acrobolisti skirmished; the cataphracti were held back for a final effort.

The advantages of the phalanx lay in its cohesion and weight. It was difficult to withstand its impact when the blow was delivered from a short distance and on level ground, or under such circumstances that the formation could remain intact. To break through it by an attack was practically impossible. Only its flanks and rear were weak. But if the phalanx was on rough and uneven ground, or had to march over a distance to the assault, gaps were apt to be rent in the mass, and into these a skillful enemy could pour and destroy the body. There was but one line. The phalanx had no re-



Thessalian Lozenge.


serve to reëstablish a failing battle. Neither the rear ranks of the hoplites could perform this duty, for they were fatigued by the march and battle, and if demoralization supervened, they all the more partook it; nor could the psiloi, as they were not stanch enough, nor armed with hand-to-hand weapons. Though the peltasts might have been so employed, it never seemed to occur to the Greeks to put them to such a use. A reserve was the conception of an individual, not a principle of tactics, with them.

Thus the value of the phalanx lay in the defensive, or in an offensive blow given from a short distance and always in close order. The Greek wars, like the phalanx, generally partook of a defensive character; or rather, from the defensive character of Greek wars very naturally arose the phalangial idea.

The Greek armies were usually small; their baggage-train limited. Their marches were, as a rule, in one column, by the right of the order of battle. Thus the head of column consisted of psiloi, who also acted as flankers. Then came the cavalry and the peltasts of the right wing; then the phalanx. Behind this was apt to be placed the train of wagons and pack-animals, and then came the peltasts and cavalry of the left wing, then again psiloi. Hampered with little trains and small in number, the armies of the Greeks could and did often perform wonderful marches, and sometimes at once went into battle. Fifteen miles was the average march; but the Spartans marched to Marathon, one hundred and fifty miles, in three days, and arrived ready for immediate action, but too late. The theory of marches was not as generally understood and practiced as the theory of fighting. Marches were often carelessly conducted; but some of the Greek generals marched their armies with consummate intelligence. There were no such set rules for the route as for the battlefield.

The Greek orders of battle were: 1. The parallel. In this

the lines marched against each other, front to front, aiming to strike "all along the line" at the same moment. The advantage of this was an equal strength at every point; its weakness that it was liable to be broken in some place by valor or numbers, or by the occurrence of



gaps; or that the shorter line could be outflanked by the longer. 2. The parallel, with one or other or both wings reinforced. The wing, strengthened by a line or column in its front, made direct or obliquely for the enemy, and the rest of the line, less advanced than the troops reinforcing the wing, was covered by light troops. The object was either to crush or surround the enemy's wing, or drive it in upon the centre so as to take advantage of the resulting confusion. Sometimes both wings were reinforced and the centre withheld in similar manner, and other methods of strengthening one or both wings were employed. The weakness of this formation was the possible sundering of wings and centre, which would then lie open to being beaten in detail. 3. The oblique. This in its simple form was a mere variation from the parallel order due to accidents of ground or tactical difficulties; in its best form it was the invention of Epaminondas. One wing was materially strengthened, and fell first on the enemy's wing opposite, in front or flank. The other wing was refused (held back) or advanced more slowly, and from the nature of things in a sort of echeloned order, and thus the line became oblique. As used by Epaminondas, this was the greatest advance in battle tactics ever made at one step. The advantage of this order was that the strengthened wing

Oblique Order,
simple form.

PAY AND RATIONS.

was sure to crush the enemy's flank, and while the whole enemy's army would partake of its demoralization, the centre and other wing which had been refused would remain in good condition for a further blow or for pursuit. It is perhaps the order which has in all ages proven the most effective. It will be described more fully in the battle of Leuctra. All other orders were mere variations of these, and up to Epaminondas' day the parallel was practically the only one used. There was much perfection of detail, but tactical originality was absent.

Rank and command remained the same as at an earlier period. The Thebans had from four to eleven leaders, bœotarchs, who commanded in rotation, and all laid down their office with the year. As already noted, until Platæa the Greek troops served without remuneration. The Athenians first began to pay the troops. The amount varied. It averaged ten drachmas (two dollars) per month for a foot soldier. The cavalry received two, three, and four times as much, according to its grading. The officers were paid twice to five times as much as the men. Thucydides says the soldier received as much for rations as for pay. Pay ceased with war, but the horseman received something for forage during peace, being held to keep his mount available on call.

The troops lived on the country they traversed. With small armies this was no great hardship within the national territory. Victual for several days was not infrequently carried in the baggage-train, or brought by sea to given points. When practicable, armies hugged the sea, to have the support of their fleet. Rations in bulk were sometimes contracted for by the state for delivery at times and places stated.

At their best the Greeks stood hardship perhaps better than any men have ever done. What other has ever marched so far as Alexander's tireless soldier? What retreat can


compare to that of the Ten Thousand? Cæsar's legions came closest to them. In one quality alone is the modern soldier their equal, or superior. The soldier of the last two hundred years has been called on to stand greater decimation on the battlefield, and has cheerfully stood it. But in the other qualifications of the soldier, especially the ability to march far and fast on slender rations, the Greek is incomparable.

Discipline varied much at different times and with different nations, being naturally a reflection of the character of the people, or of the leaders. Down to the Peloponnesian war, discipline and the feeling of honor among the troops was markedly good in almost all Greek states. Military faults were severely punished, grave ones by death, or, what to the Greeks was worse, open branding with dishonor. Rewards were equally pronounced. The commonest citizen might rise to distinction by a signal act of bravery. The leader who won a victory became the worshiped hero of the people. But great rewards were jealously given. Miltiades was not awarded the crown of laurel because he had not won *alone*. The army must have the first reward, the general the next. Booty was largely distributed to both; and booty included prisoners of war, who were ransomed at high prices or sold into slavery. The place of victory was marked by trophies, or piles of weapons, or weapons hung on masts, and by columns with inscriptions reciting the event. Sometimes all Greece would join in recognizing the services of some state,



Victorious Greek.

as in the case of Athens after Marathon, or of Platæa after the battle of that name. But after the Peloponnesian war, the better instincts of the Greeks appear to have been lost, and their military spirit slackened. Disorder and mutinies were not infrequent. Leaders were compelled to purchase the good conduct of the troops by largesses; awful punishments for base or scandalous actions grew in frequency. This showed a slackening in the soldierly bearing. Civil war not infrequently results thus.



The herald was an universally known and respected official among all the ancients. War was declared by a formal accusation of and demand for reparation for certain acts, by a herald. On refusal, a bloody lance and a firebrand were cast by him upon the enemy's soil as a declaration of war and a threat of revenge by fire and sword. Before war or battle many and tedious ceremonials and vows to the gods were universal. The priests and augurs divined from the sacrificial entrails. The practical application of these proceedings lay in the hold it gave the leader on the superstitious feelings of his army. If the victims were pronounced favorable, enthusiasm rose, the warriors took a light meal, and then, to the singing of the pæan and the playing of flutes, marched to battle. A battle-cry, as the phalanx closed with the enemy, was common. At certain periods the phalanx marched to battle in silence, so as the more distinctly to hear the orders, and chanted the pæan when near the enemy, clashing their lances upon their shields and raising the battle-cry when they closed in upon him. The Greeks were a talkative, almost a garrulous people; but under discipline they could be singularly quiet. As fighters they were quiet and determined.

Religion demanded the burial of those slain in battle. For this purpose a truce was usual after victory. The fear of the anger of the gods for refusal of this rite often forestalled the grasping of the fruits of victory. It was the victors who erected their trophies and buried their dead. The vanquished were compelled to sue for the rite of burial. Such a request was, of itself, an acknowledgment of defeat. The bodies or ashes of fallen warriors were sent to their homes, and were there received with solemn ceremonial and given due sepulture.

The Greeks were utterly barbarous in many things. As a rule, among the captives, the men were slain and the women and children sold into slavery. Not infrequently these last also were killed, or even burned, in numbers at a time. Enemies might be annihilated, tortured or used in the most inhuman or indecorous manner, without a suspicion that such an act was reprehensible.

The Greeks did not usually fortify their camps, but relied on situation for defense. The troops were often sheltered in tents, made of hides and carried by the men. The Greek soldier always carried a large blanket-wrap for protection from the weather. This was capable — as the cloak has been in all ages — of being used on occasion for defense.




Use of Cloak as Shield (from a vase).

The field fortifications of the Greeks, or fortified lines for the protection of given places, or to protect the access from harbor to town (as of the Piræus to Athens), were constructed of earthen walls with ditch, palisades or hurdlework, abatis,

or sometimes stone. The Spartans, in 429 B. C., surrounded Platæa with a double wall of intricate construction and great strength, which will be described elsewhere. But works were rarely so elaborate.

The Greek cities were generally provided with thick and high stone walls, the idea of which they borrowed from the East. On these walls, at the angles, or at arrow-shot distance, stood stone towers. Along the top of the wall ran a



Mantelets.

road, protected outwardly by overhanging battlements, so castellated and perforated that the foot of the fortifications and the surrounding country could be reached by missiles. A wide and deep, dry or wet moat lay outside. Inside were one or more citadels in the places most capable of defense, and similarly but more stoutly fortified. In Athens such was the Acropolis; in Thebes, the Cadmæa.

The Greeks took fortified cities by ruse whenever possible. If storm was resorted to, the light troops drove the defenders from the walls with their missiles, while picked heavy troops mounted the walls by ladders, or on the upraised and interlocked shields of the rest (this was called a testudo or tortoise), or broke into the gates. They blockaded cities by

walls of contravallation around and facing the town; sometimes by additional walls of circumvallation built outside and at a suitable distance from the first and facing away from the town, to hold an army of relief in check. In regular sieges they first established camps at appropriate intervals and joined them with works; then cleared the walls of their defenders with catapults or ballistas, built covered ways towards the wall, threw up huge sloping mounds to command it, filled the ditch, which they approached under cover of movable screens and sheds, and undermined the wall, or broke it down with rams. A breach made, it was stormed. But catapults and ballistas were apparently not known until the Peloponnesian war. The catapult — or cannon of the ancients — was a species of huge bow, capable of throwing pikes weighing from ten to three hundred pounds over half a mile. The ballista — or mortar — threw heavy stones, or flights of arrows, or other substances, with accurate aim to a considerable distance.

Rams were at first mere iron-pointed beams handled by men. They were later swung in heavy framework, and hung on ropes or chains. They were generally placed in covered buildings mounted on wheels, which were then slowly pushed up against the walls by men with levers.


Mines were commonly opened from a distance and dug to a point under the walls, and were there sustained by wooden piles. The chambers were filled with combustibles, and being set on fire, they baked, crumbled and dropped the earth, and thus the heavy wall above it.



Hand Ram.

Movable towers of several stories set on wheels came into use as an easier means of overriding the walls than mounds. They were built at a distance beyond range of missiles, and rolled up by men. The lower story often held the ram.

The besieged used converse means of defense. They constructed wooden shields against the besiegers' fire, threw down the ladders of the storming parties, poured hot water or boiling oil or pitch upon them, and rolled heavy stones from the walls. They made sorties to destroy the besiegers' works, to reëstablish communications with the outside world, or to cut



Breach in Wall.

their way out. They raised the walls, built curtains or half-moons inside a breach, countermined to destroy the enemy's mines, and set his works on fire by arrows tipped with tarred tow, or by fire-pots cast by the catapults, or by other similar means.

Sieges were very laborious. The defense was apt to be desperate, for the capture of a city resulted in the slaying or selling into slavery of all the inhabitants. Terms were rarely made, or if made were often violated. Sieges were therefore long in duration, and cost enormously in men and treasure. Good faith in ancient war was not universal. A pledge was by no means sacred. Heralds alone were inviolate, and not always they.

Fleets.—War at sea and war on land were much less different in olden times than to-day. All Greek soldiers were more or less sailors; all generals were equally admirals.

In the heroic days fleets were used merely for piracy. As commerce grew, piracy decreased. The best period of the Greek marine was from the Persian wars to Alexander's day. Themistocles was the founder of the Athenian navy. Until the fall of Syracuse, Athens was preëminent at sea. The Greek fleets always played a great part in war.

The irregular and rocky coast, as well as the sharp and sudden storms of Greece, necessitated the use of small craft. Ships of war were propelled by oars, using sails only as an auxiliary means. They were long and shoal, with one, two or three and more banks of oars. There was but small space except for rowers and soldiers. They could carry little victual and water, and had to be accompanied by transports or else keep close to shore. They landed, as a rule, every night, and the troops disembarked and camped. During storms the ships ran great danger of shipwreck, or the fleets of dispersion. Transports and merchantmen used sails more than oars, and were in shape very much like tubs. They were called *round*, as men of war were denominated *long*, ships. Each term was descriptive of the craft.

As the best citizens preferred service as hoplites or horsemen, only the lower classes, freedmen or slaves, were left for the fleet. But in times of danger much of the infantry served aboard the vessels. The duties were simple and could be easily learned. The triremes had from one hundred and fifty rowers upwards, and carried forty to fifty and more hoplites. Sea-fights were apt to occur near shore. Fleets were mobile and could readily manœuvre. In order of battle they kept as close together as ease of rowing would permit. The great effort was to ram the enemy's vessels amidships, for which purpose each Greek trireme had an iron prow. Or if its rudder could be broken, a vessel was at the mercy of the adversary. Boarding was the common resort, in which both warriors and oarsmen took a hand.

The methods at sea and on land were much the same. Fleets and armies were wont to sustain each other, even to the extent of using their men and artillery in common; *i. e.*, the fleet would come close in shore, disembark its quota and take part in the action. In sieges of cities on the seaboard, which were common, both worked together.

Sparta. — Sparta's system remained substantially the same from the time of Lycurgus down to the Peloponnesian war. But rivalry with Athens and the necessity of possessing a fleet, if Sparta would arrest her competitor's preponderance in Greece, changed the habits of centuries. Money became essential to conduct war against wealthy Athens, and money brought into Sparta those things which soon drove out the ancient national simplicity. And this all the more speedily from its novelty. The armies now no longer contained citizens alone, though these were still the kernel; but the Lacedemonians, freedmen, helots and mercenary troops composed a large part of it. The free population was divided into five classes, from which the ephors called into service in war as many as were needed, according to age. Cleombrotus, at Leuctra, had in the ranks the citizens from twenty to thirty-five; after Leuctra, those up to forty were called in. The number of freedmen who gradually crept into service was large. Agesilaus had three thousand in Asia. The helots were called in only in cases of grave danger, as before Mantinea. The kings still held the command, but came more and more under the control of the ephors. The latter held the real power, and went on occasion so far as to displace the kings from command. The troops were not yet on a paid basis, excepting the helots and mercenaries; but the kings and their staff or suite were victualled. Up to the close of the Peloponnesian war the Spartans were sparing of their

rewards, and retained the severity of their punishments, such as death and loss of honor; while some criminals were clad and treated like slaves, and had half their head and beard shaven; and burial was refused to cowards. After the Peloponnesian war, discipline declined and the state was often forced to resort to largesses to encourage the troops to those exertions they had been in the habit of yielding as of course.

The citizens still formed the body of the hoplites. Each of the five classes put on foot one or more mores or regiments of five hundred to one thousand men. Each hoplite had one or more psiloi under his control and often several helots or servants. The Laconians, freedmen and sometimes the helots served as light troops. These became more and more numerous. At Platæa they outnumbered the citizens seven to one.

The cavalry remained poor. Citizens disqualified from service in the heavy foot entered the cavalry, which was used mostly for scouts and patrols. Agesilaus somewhat increased its numbers and efficiency. One mora or *ilē* from Scirus and vicinity, where horses were abundant, was of markedly better character, and was not infrequently used in battle, where it more than once decided the day. And there was a body of three hundred *hippeis* selected by the ephors, who were a cavalry *corps d'élite*. The horse now rode in four ranks, a great improvement over the former eight.

The Spartan foot stood in from eight to twelve ranks. The manœuvres were performed in cadenced step to the sound of fifes, and though very simple, were excellently devised. But by neglecting the arts and sciences, the Spartans remained stationary, and did nothing toward improving the art of war in a theoretical sense. They could not look beyond courage and the details of tactics. They still employed the manœuvres enumerated in a former chapter. But the wedge, pincers,

and such other tactical movements were useful rather on the drill-ground than on the battlefield.

Athens.—Athens, after Marathon, which redounded to her greatest honor, rose rapidly in power, and the tendency towards democracy brought about many changes. Citizens from twenty to forty were still subject to military duty, but were permitted to procure substitutes. The list of citizens freed from military duty grew large. Aliens, freedmen and even slaves gradually crept into the ranks, the latter mostly in the fleet. Auxiliary troops from allied or tributary nations and mercenaries increased in proportion to the citizen-soldiers. The forces of Athens were large, especially at sea; and during the height of her power the conduct of her leading citizens and of the troops was uniformly patriotic and brilliant.

Ten strategoi commanded the forces,—one for each tribe (*phylē*),—and were selected by lot or vote. At the expiration of a year they laid down their command, and rendered an account of their doings to the people. They were often re-elected. Phocion served many successive terms. Such men as Themistocles and Aristides were constantly re-elected. If the people were not satisfied (and the Athenians were singularly ungrateful and unreasonable) the strategos was mulcted in a fine; failing payment of which he and his children after him were cast into and kept in prison.



Greek Army Leader.


The proper men were often not the ones who were chosen strategoi. The ever-shifting command and the natural disagreements between

the leaders frequently prevented Athens from securing the results of otherwise good management. Recognizing this difficulty, it was finally decreed that most of the strategoi should remain in Athens to attend to the victualing of the troops and the general business management, while one of the archons (polemarch) should accompany the army, and keep up communication between the strategoi at the rear and front, and preside at the council of war. The polemarch had also specific military duties, and commanded a wing of the army — usually the right. Sometimes, on occasions of great danger, the most celebrated general or citizen was chosen commander-in-chief with extraordinary powers. Alcibiades was thus honored. Under the ten strategoi were ten taxiarchs, who were a sort of aide-de-camp, but with specific duties and command. The taxiarchs looked after victual, camps, the order of march, weapons, and so forth. Each strategos also had one or more heralds.

Rewards and punishments were practically the same as with other states. Those who avoided military duty by false pretexts were dressed in women's clothes, and exhibited in public; cowards were excluded from religious ceremonials and conventions of the people. Culprits were forbidden to marry; even their families joined in disgracing them; and they were subjected to cuffs and insults in public, which they might not resent.

The Athenians, owing to their greater luxuries, were the first in Greece whose army fell into slackness and weak discipline. The Athenian army consisted of ten chiliarchias (or regiments), one for every tribe, of one thousand or more men each, commanded by a chiliarch or colonel, and under him captains and file leaders. Each hoplite had a servant or arms-bearer, who retired to the rear in action. Of cavalry there was, previous to the Persian invasions, a force of but ninety-

six men, which number later grew to one thousand or twelve hundred, about one tenth the foot, and was divided into two



Hoplite.

hipparchias (regiments) under two hipparchs and ten phylarchs. The richest and best fitted citizens served in the cavalry. Rigid examinations of physical strength and financial ability to support the cost of cavalry service were required. But this arm none the less remained very mediocre. The Athenians were seamen, not horsemen.



Cataphractos (from a vase).

To the Athenians belongs the credit of first making war something more than a mere physical science. The keen wit of Athens elevated all which it touched, and among the other arts war gained something of value from her brain tissue. This gain took the form of marked improvements in tactics and in fortification and sieges; and still more of a broader intelligence in the conduct of war, and an appreciation of its intellectual character.

A more detailed account will be found in a later chapter of the military organization of Macedon. The Greek and Macedonian systems were analogous, and much of what is said of the one applies to the other.



Armor of Greek Chieftain.

VII.


MILTIADES.—MARATHON. B. C. 490.

DURING the Persian invasion of Greece, at the battle of Marathon, occurred one of the early tactical variations from the parallel order. Miltiades had but eleven thousand men; the Persians had ten times as many. They lay on the seashore in front of their fleet. To reach and lean his flanks on two brooks running to the sea, Miltiades made his centre thin, his wings strong, and advanced sharply on the enemy. With his wings he scattered the Persian array; as was inevitable, the deep Persian line easily broke through his weakened centre. But Miltiades had either anticipated and prepared his army for this, or else seized the occasion by a very stroke of genius. There was no symptom of demoralization. The Persian troops followed hard after the defeated centre. Miltiades caused each wing to wheel inwards, and fell upon both flanks of the Persian advance, absolutely overwhelming it, and throwing it back upon the main line in such confusion as to lead to complete victory.

NOT many years after his Scythian expedition Darius, son of Hystaspes, invaded Greece, and his army was defeated at Marathon. On this occasion we find one of the first and most marked illustrations in a pitched battle of what to-day we call grand tactics. From now on we shall see something akin to an advance in the art of handling troops. Battle tactics would naturally come into existence before strategy. The latter, as a science, was not yet dreamed of. Many great captains had to show the world what strategy was before its maxims could be guessed.

At Marathon Miltiades acted on a sensible and definite tactical plan of battle. He was one of the ten strategoi, and his turn had come to take sole command. But the others were equally divided in opinion as to the advisability of fighting. Miltiades pleaded with the polemarch Callimachus to give the

casting vote in its favor. This was done, and, with the ardor not uncommon to great souls, Miltiades resolved to stake the fate of Athens — which was then the fate of the civilized world — on the issue of this one battle. He was to fight on historic ground, sacred to Hercules, the scene of the exploits of Theseus, and the rout of the invader Eurystheus, near the fountain of Macaria. There can be no doubt, though his words have not been preserved to us, that this large-hearted man made use of all these, by the Greeks, religiously credited traditions in a manner to inflame every man with the valor which conquers or dies. For at this time the Greek soldier



Plain of Marathon.

harbored a hearty dread of the Persian, and by no means understood his own strength. Miltiades had but eleven thousand men, of whom one thousand were Platæans. Datis and Artaphernes — the former was the real chief — had more than ten times the number. But the Greeks were more heavily armed and well disciplined, and they had the highest of all motives to bear themselves as men; the Persians

were lightly armed, and though the better classes of the army were personally brave, the bulk of the rank and file had small notion of fighting except under the influence of the lash.



Soldier of Marathon.

They were, moreover, recruited from every part of the huge Persian empire, and had none of the *esprit de corps* so strong among the Athenians. There was no cohesion in the Persian army; a panic would be surely fatal. But the Greeks did not know all this. To them the outlook was desperate.

The Persian hosts were drawn up in a deep body on the plain extending upward from the seashore. Their heavy baggage camp was farther up the coast. Their fleet had partly been beached in their rear. It is probable that at the moment of attack a portion of the Persian force had been reëmbarked for a projected attack on Athens.

The Athenians were on the slope of the hills a mile or so away, having protected their flanks by leaning them on natural obstacles, and by some abatis or palisades. They had lain here nine days, awaiting the Persian initiative. Miltiades had concluded that safety lay in taking the offensive himself, and finally Callimachus' vote came in to decide in favor of his opinion. In the attack on the enemy, which Miltiades had determined upon, the Greeks ran the most imminent risk from the enemy's cavalry, of which they themselves had none; for this, if skillfully handled, might fatally turn their flanks. Miltiades saw that he must act with the greatest speed when the moment arrived, and take the Persians, if possible, unawares. He had not enough troops properly to fill a front by any means as wide as that of the Persians, and was thus compelled to alter his usual formation. He made his centre thin,—probably


four men deep,—and thus gained in length of line, while he kept his phalanx of the usual depth of eight men in both the wings. In his advance upon the Persian line he was able to rest both his flanks on two brooks which ran down towards the sea.

This use of obstacles was very uncommon, if not quite unknown, at his day; and its employment here shows that quality in which the great captain always excels,—the adaptation of means to end; the ability to utilize his resources to the very best advantage.

Themistocles and Aristides commanded the centre. If the troops here were sparse, they were yet well led. The Plataeans were on the extreme left. In this order, and choosing a moment when the enemy was apparently not anticipating an attack, Miltiades moved down upon the Persians. His men were all in good training, and though the distance between the lines was the best part of a mile, Miltiades had concluded that by an advance at the double quick he would run a lesser risk, even if he brought his men into action a trifle winded, than he would by advancing slowly and giving the enemy time to bring his cavalry into action. Moreover, the phalanx would be a much shorter time under the fire of the Persian archers and slingers. This course, then, he took, and in a few moments from giving the command to move forward at a run, the Greek army, still in good alignment, struck the Persian first line, which on seeing the attack had rapidly formed, but which was, no doubt, much startled by the audacity of the manœuvre.

Miltiades had calculated rightly. He had forestalled the use of the cavalry by the Persians upon his flanks, and had the strong moral advantage of the offensive. On the wings, where the phalanx was in files eight men deep, the struggle was decisive. The enemy, after a brilliant resistance, went to


pieces under the Grecian spears, beyond the hope of rallying. But in the centre, which was strung out and weak, the Persians and Sacæ, despite a brave opposition, broke through and drove the hoplites back. The Greeks fought for every inch under their splendid leadership, but the mass of the enemy had too much momentum. Slowly but surely they were



Before the Battle of Marathon.

pushed to the rear, nor could they be steadied and a new line formed until the foot of the hill was reached whence they had started. Here a stand was made, and here too came Miltiades' opportunity. He had no doubt foreseen the probability of just this turn in the battle; or if not, he seized it with the genius of the born captain. With true military *coup d'œil* he gauged the proper moment. The preconcerted or a well-known signal was given by the trumpets, and the two Greek wings, having routed the Persians opposed to them, without losing their steadiness, wheeled their serried ranks

right and left in upon the mass of struggling Oriental soldiery which had driven back the centre and was following hard upon. This splendid manœuvre not only disconcerted the enemy, but put him at the mercy of the Greek phalanx. The Persian van, thus taken on either flank, was compromised. Only the efforts of isolated bodies were possible, and



Greek Manœuvre at Marathon.

these could effectuate nothing. Demoralization spread. The victory was complete. The enemy was followed to his ships. Here the conflict was still more severe and the slaughter enormous. There fell six thousand four hundred Persians and but one hundred and ninety-two Greeks. The battle had been won by crisp tactical skill and discipline, against enormous odds and equal individual bravery.

Herodotus devotes small space to the battle of Marathon. He states that the centre was defeated and followed up by the enemy; that the wings won a victory; and that then Milti-

ades, allowing the Persians to fly, united both wings and fought with those who had broken the centre. No other conceivable manœuvre than the one narrated seems to coincide with and satisfy these statements and those of other authorities. In order to unite the wings the victorious Persian centre must first be defeated. There is little doubt that what has been described is what occurred.

The great disproportion in losses which we constantly meet with in ancient battles can best be vouched for by pointing to the well-known losses at such battles as Crécy and Agincourt, in later days. The same thing is always found in the conflicts of disciplined with undisciplined troops, and in ancient times — and often in the Middle Ages — the defeated army suffered terribly after ranks were broken and during the pursuit. Annihilation was wont to follow a defeat.

Miltiades capped his work by marching speedily back to Athens, which he divined from certain signs to be the destination of the Persians. They had naturally guessed the city to be disgarnished of troops, and had at once set sail thither. He reached Athens just in time to forestall its capture.

The Spartans, whose religious rules would not allow them to open a campaign before the full moon, started too late, and by three successive marches of fifty miles a day arrived at Marathon the day after the battle had been won. Grievously chagrined, they returned to Sparta.

This victory shows, prior to the days of Epaminondas, the most brilliant of the variations from the parallel order of armies then uniformly in vogue. The battle exhibited a set and well-digested manœuvre promptly and intelligently executed in the heat of action. Whether Miltiades prepared for the manœuvre, or conceived and used it on the spur of the moment, it equally redounds to his honor.

This and the succeeding battles and campaigns herein nar-

rated by no means purport to describe all the instances of military skill which are worthy of notice prior to Alexander's day. They are rather types which show how the art of war gradually advanced, and what its condition was when the great conqueror began his wonderful career. Many noteworthy events have of necessity to be omitted.



Xenophon.

VIII.

BRASIDAS. B. C. 424-422.

THE Peloponnesian was not a great war. It was a war of exhaustion and of small operations. There were but half a dozen battles in twenty-seven years. But it shows instances of far-seeing strategy. Such was the seizure of Pylos, whence the threat of incursions on Sparta's rear obliged her to relax her hold on the throat of Athens. The siege of Plataea is peculiarly interesting as affording us the first detailed glimpse into ancient siege-methods; and it was one of the earliest instances of a complete, though crude wall of contravallation and circumvallation, and of something like systematic operations. This war bred some good generals. At the battle of Olpæ Demosthenes cleverly made use of an ambuscade to win an otherwise lost battle. Brasidas was the man who came nearest to showing the moral and intellectual combination of the great soldier. His speech to his troops when confronted by untold numbers of barbarians is a model. It has the true ring of the captain. His marches through Thessaly and Illyria and his defeat of Cleon at Amphipolis were admirable. He it was who first marched in a hollow square with baggage in the centre, and showed what fighting in retreat should be. In this he was the prototype of Xenophon. The siege of Syracuse, too, among its long and intricate details, furnishes us with two of the best known and wisest maxims of war.

IN the century succeeding Marathon there can be traced a constant if not rapid growth of the military art. This is shown not so much in the rise of distinguished captains as in the ability of the lesser lights to govern themselves by the success or failure of their predecessors, and thus gradually aid in shaping warfare into a system. In the far-seeing wisdom of Themistocles preceding the battle of Salamis (B. C. 480), we recognize the broad and self-poised reasoning of which is bred the soundest strategy. In the operations of the several campaigns of the Peloponnesian war, although the Greeks then practiced almost exclusively a defensive system, there

may be found an occasional lesson. But many such must be passed over unnoticed throughout all history. The Peloponnesian was not a great war. There were but a half-dozen battles in twenty-seven years, and only one decisive one, *Ægos-potami*. It was a war of exhaustion.

The siege of Platæa (B. C. 429–427) is interesting in that we have in its story the first detailed account of any siege of antiquity, and can therefrom learn the methods practiced. In




Pylos, B. C. 425.

this light it is more important to us than because a mere handful of men held the Spartans at bay for nearly two years. Thucydides tells us that the besiegers began by surrounding the town with a line of palisades; but that when the siege operations showed no signs of success, they resorted to a careful blockade and built two walls sixteen feet apart, one facing toward the town, one outward. The detail on duty held this double line; the bulk of the forces camped outside. The space between the walls was roofed in to protect the troops

against the fire of the enemy and the weather. Thus the two walls became one, with a double parapet. Towers surmounted the wall at intervals, and commanded both sides. Large ditches were dug on either side with drawbridges thrown across them. Previous to this we find no methodical plan of siege works.

The Peloponnesian war bred some good generals. Of these probably Brasidas, the Spartan, should hold the first place as a military man, though Athens developed the greatest statesmen. Pericles' conception of the plan on which Athens should work,—a defensive war on land, an aggressive war at sea,—and the words Thucydides puts into his mouth, are full of wisdom. The foresight of Demosthenes in seizing Pylos (b. c. 425), by which he threatened so dangerous an incursion on the rear of Sparta that he at once compelled her not only to relax her hold on the throat of Athens, but sue for peace, is part and parcel of the very best of strategic ability. Demosthenes also won the battle of Olpæ (b. c. 425) by



Olpæ, b. c. 425.

the clever use of an ambuscade. He hid in a wooded valley a force of four hundred hoplites and light troops, beyond his own right, hoping by a surprise to demoralize the Lacedæmonian left, which outflanked him, in case it should gain the advantage. What he anticipated occurred. Eurylochus turned

his right, but at the proper moment the men in ambush debouched from hiding and fell upon Eurylochus' rear. So effective was this diversion, that although the right of Eurylochus' army won a decided success, it became compromised by the defeat of the left, and Demosthenes scored a victory.

The siege of Syracuse also furnishes us numerous lessons for which there is no space, as well as two of the best maxims known to the science of war: "The most certain means of conquering is to fall unexpectedly on your enemy;" and, "No greater damage can be inflicted on the enemy than by pressing him there where you have become certain he dreads it the most." There is space to do no more than instance a march and a battle of Brasidas, in illustration of what was best in the warfare of that century.

Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, together with some revolted Thracian cities and Sparta, had joined in a treaty against Athens, which city had long held the supremacy in the north. The march of Brasidas through Thessaly to join Perdiccas in Macedonia (B. C. 424) gives proof of a man with the moral element singularly and beautifully developed. Brasidas had none of the narrowness of the Spartan. He was not only a clear-headed soldier, but he was a clean man, who accomplished his tasks as openly and honorably as he fought his way bravely. The population of Thessaly was allied to Athens and inimical to Sparta. Brasidas must march through Thessaly to reach Macedonia. At the head of his four thousand men he made a series of forced marches with such rapidity and skill that he forestalled opposition. Before the people of any one section had met and determined to oppose him, Brasidas would have already passed by their land; and when he was once arrested on the march by armed resistance at a defile through which he must pass, he persuaded his would-be adversaries that his mission was peaceful and advantageous

to them in a manner, and with an eloquence, which illustrates



March of Brasidas, B. C. 424.

one of the happiest faculties of the soldier, and one most rarely possessed.


In his retreat from Illyria, whither he had undertaken a campaign with the Macedonians, Brasidas showed remarkable skill. Perdiccas had deserted him, decamping suddenly by night with his entire force, in abject terror at the compro-

mised situation in which he and Brasidas found themselves, leaving Brasidas with but a handful of men to encounter a vast host of barbarians who were following up his retreat. The position was one to try men's souls; but such was the influence of Brasidas over his men that not the remotest demoralization was shown, nor loss of discipline. His speech to them, pointing out their superiority over the barbarians, despite their small numbers, both in courage, discipline and every manly quality, and the certainty of beating them if they but stood together, is a model for every soldier. Here first we find a general telling his men that the civilized warrior need have no fear from untold numbers of barbarians, trite as the saying is to-day. On the march the hoplites were formed in a hollow square or oblong, the light-armed troops and baggage in the centre. This appears to have been a new device with Brasidas. A number of active and brave young soldiers were selected and stationed in an outer rank, or where

they could quickly quit their places without disorganizing the body, so as to act as flankers, sally out and fall upon the barbarians whenever they came forward to the attack. Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen hoplites, formed the rear-guard. So soon as the command to march was given, the barbarians would begin their attacks. But there was not the slightest breach of discipline. At each onset the column halted, the flankers came out and they and the rear-guard made short work of the Illyrians. The march was then resumed. After two or three attacks the barbarians found that their losses were so severe that they had best be cautious, and a little additional punishment induced them to desist entirely from direct attack. But they only shifted their ground to ambuscade. On one occasion they stole a march ahead of the Greek column toward a height at the mouth of a defile which the phalanx was obliged to pass, proposing there to fight the Greeks at a disadvantage. But Brasidas was constantly on the alert. He saw the purpose of the enemy. Taking his rear-guard quickly in hand, he put it at a double-quick, and headed straight for the height; and though the Illyrians reached the place before him, they could not form readily enough to resist the onset of the hoplites. Brasidas drove them away, killing a number, and seized the mouth of the defile. The Illyrians, throughout the entire retreat, had been so roughly handled that they now gave over the pursuit entirely. In his ascendancy over his men, and his conduct under most trying circumstances, Brasidas may fairly be called the prototype of Xenophon.

The defeat of Cleon by Brasidas at Amphipolis (B. C. 422) further illustrates the rare qualities of this soldier. After his march to Macedonia and his campaign in and retreat from Illyria, he returned to the vicinity of this city, which he had taken some time before. Amphipolis is on the river Stry-

mon, situated on a hill, round three sides of which the river flows, necessitating a wall on but one, the east side. Brasidas had his camp on Mt. Kerdyllium on the other bank of the Strymon, connected with the city by a bridge. Cleon



Amphipolis, b. c. 422.

had been sent by Athens to oppose Brasidas, and had landed at Eion on the seacoast a few miles below. Desiring to reconnoitre the town, he advanced along the road, right flank in front, to a position on the heights east of Amphipolis. He had no idea whatever that Brasidas would attack him, for he

could plainly see his camp on the other bank of the river, as well as the city on the hill, and was advancing in loose and careless order. But Brasidas had made up his mind to attack the Athenian, whose heedless formation he had been watching to good advantage. Cleon perceived the march of Brasidas from his camp into the town, but still anticipated no attack. By and by a commotion was visible within the gates, and Cleon became aware that he was in danger. Still he supposed that Brasidas would do what was usual in those days, emerge from the gates, form in the regular order in front of them, and advance his phalanx to the attack. Though he was in much larger force and vastly better equipped than Brasidas, Cleon determined to retire, and faced his column about, so as to march it back left in front, but still was not careful to ploy his column into close order. The left wing was marching somewhat ahead, the centre and right at intervals behind. Brasidas, who had a perfectly clear idea of the advantage of doing what your enemy least expects, and had no thought of merely doing the usual thing, had been quietly waiting with a picked force of one hundred and fifty men under his own command behind the gates. He had pointed out to his men the careless formation of the enemy. He addressed to them words of glowing encouragement, and fired them to their task. Then in serried ranks, this small but determined body, not a man of whom but was worth a host, suddenly rushed from the gates, fell upon the flank of Cleon's centre, which was marching quietly along the road, and threw it into the utmost confusion. The left in the advance, instead of turning to the assistance of the centre, was so taken by surprise that it at once fled towards Eion. The right retired to a position on the hill. At the same moment another and larger body emerged from an upper gate, and advanced against the right, taking it in reverse. Cleon himself fled, but was slain in his flight.

The right resisted manfully, but uselessly. Over six hundred Athenian hoplites were slain, and the whole army utterly demoralized. The Spartans lost but seven men killed. Brasidas was fatally wounded. The contrast between the two commanders in character as well as in ability is noteworthy.

There are many things in the career of Lysander, the victor of Ægospotami, which stamp him second only to Brasidas, but his exploits, like those of many other able men, must be omitted here.

The Peloponnesian war was limited in its military scope. Political means were as much employed as warlike. To seduce an ally from the enemy or rouse sedition in his capital was as important as to win a battle. Statesmanship overrode military ability. Campaigns were usually raids, having some side-issue for object. The war was conducted more at sea than on land. Small war and sieges covered all the land operations. The Peloponnesian war was essentially a little war, though on a large scale and over a large territory and with mighty interests at stake; and it was characterized by unusual cruelty and unnecessary devastation. It produced great men, dishonest men, and weak men, and the influence of all was marked in its conduct. Pericles, Demosthenes, Brasidas, Gylippus, Lysander, Cleon, Alcibiades, Nicias, each impressed his own character for good or for ill on some part of this long-drawn-out conflict. Had it not come to a close when it did, Greece might have gone to pieces as a factor in civilization.

IX.

XENOPHON.—AGESILAUS. B C. 401–394.

THE soldier of greatest use to us preceding Alexander was unquestionably Xenophon. After participating in the defeat of Cyrus the Younger by Artaxerxes at Cunaxa, in which battle the Greek phalanx had held its own against twenty times its force, Xenophon was chosen to command the rear-guard of the phalanx in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand to the Sea; and it is he who has shown the world what should be the tactics of retreat,—how to command a rear-guard. No chieftain ever possessed a grander moral ascendant over his men. More tactical originality has come from the *Anabasis* than from any dozen other books. For instance, Xenophon describes accurately a charge over bad ground in which, so to speak, he broke forward by the right of companies,—one of the most useful minor manœuvres. He established a reserve in rear of the phalanx from which to feed weak parts of the line,—a superb first conception. He systematically devastated the country traversed to arrest pursuit. The whole retreat is full of originality in the operations of every day. After the lapse of twenty-three centuries there is no better military text-book than the *Anabasis*.

Alexander had a predecessor in the invasion of Asia. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the assistance of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, unjustly oppressed by the satrap Tissaphernes. He set sail with eight thousand men, landed at Ephesus, adjusted the difficulties of these cities, and, having, with consummate ability, conducted two successful campaigns in Phrygia and Caria, returned to Lacedemon overland,—a long, toilsome and dangerous march. On the way he won the battle of Coronæa by an admirable display of tactical ability.


CYRUS the Younger, second son of Darius II., proposed to dispute the kingdom with his brother Artaxerxes. He invaded Persia (B. C. 401) with an army of Asiatics and thirteen thousand Greek auxiliaries. The latter were a fine body of men, much above the ordinary class of mercenaries, of whom Greece had furnished vast numbers for many years.

They marched from Myriandrus to Thapsacus in twelve days, at the rate of nineteen miles a day. Their commander was Clearchus. The battle of Cunaxa, fought by Cyrus against Artaxerxes, is interesting as showing the discipline of which a Greek phalanx was capable, when compared with the heterogeneous troops of Persia, and as being the initiation of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand. Artaxerxes had an army said to be nine hundred thousand strong — probably an exaggeration ; while Cyrus had, including the Greeks, nearly one hundred thousand. These two armies were marching toward each other, and came together near the river Euphrates.

On learning of the approach of the enemy Cyrus drew up his army. The phalanx was on the right, leaning on the river, some distance in front of the camp. A small body of one thousand horse supported it. Cyrus, with a body-guard of six hundred horse, was in the centre. The Asiatics were on the left. Artaxerxes advanced in order of battle. His enormous force, with its left on the river, so far overlapped the line of Cyrus that its centre was beyond the latter's left flank. As the Persians marched on in silence and with measured tread Cyrus rode his lines, encouraged his men, and bade Clearchus attack the centre, where Artaxerxes, with his six thousand cavalry, had stationed himself, knowing that success at that place meant certain victory. But Clearchus was loath to leave his position near the river, as this protected his unshielded side ; for the shield was carried on the left arm, and a phalanx always felt more concern for its right than its left flank. He therefore practically disobeyed orders, but he promised Cyrus to hold firm.

As the Persian army came within about half a mile, the phalanx advanced, striking their pikes upon their shields, and shouting their martial pæan. So redoubtable did they appear that the cavalry and chariots in front of Artaxerxes' left wing

did not even await their attack, but melted away before the Greeks came within an arrow flight. The phalanx, instinct with ardor, advanced in good order upon the main body of the left wing, defeated it and pursued it some two miles.



Battle of Cunaxa, B. c. 401.

Meanwhile Artaxerxes, seeing how far he overlapped Cyrus' left, ordered his right wing to wheel round upon it and take it in reverse; and the cavalry on the Persian left had attacked the cavalry which had supported the phalanx, had driven it back, and had made its way to the camp.


Cyrus had held his body-guard in hand watching devel-

opments; but when he saw the success of the phalanx, he desired to do something worthy to rival it, and projected his horse with so much *élan* upon the large body surrounding Artaxerxes that he dispersed it at a blow. Unfortunately his horsemen followed on in pursuit, leaving Cyrus with but a few of his intimates, or “table companions,” around him. With these he charged on Artaxerxes in person, and wounded him indeed, but himself fell in the onset. The right wing of the Persians had meanwhile manœuvred round upon Cyrus’ left, which, thus compromised and learning of the death of its leader, sought safety in flight. Both the Persian right wing and the cavalry set to pillaging the camp. Artaxerxes, seeing the rout of his left wing, rallied his right wing, which had thus made a complete wheel to the rear, and led it against the phalanx.

Clearchus had now completed the destruction of the Persian left wing, and had faced about to attack whatever other part of the enemy might be in his front; and as in moving back near the river he saw the new array of the Persians, he backed up against it, and obliged Artaxerxes to file to the left to face him. The phalanx then once more advanced on the enemy, and drove them off the field and to the hill on which is situated the town of Cunaxa. From here Clearchus retired to his camp. Not till then did the Greeks hear of the death of Cyrus. But one phalangite was wounded, though this body of thirteen thousand men had defeated an army at least a score of times greater. This battle illustrates the superiority of the phalanx over the no doubt brave but undisciplined soldiers of Oriental nations. But its success and meagre loss must not be taken as a measure of what was usual.

The Greeks were now compelled to make their way out of the country as best they might. Clearchus and some of the

other generals having been treacherously murdered in a parley under safe conduct with the enemy, new ones were chosen in their stead, and to the lot of Xenophon fell the rear-guard, while to Cheirisophus fell the van. Nothing like this famous retreat is known in the world's history. Xenophon is the father of the system of retreat, the originator of all that appertains to the science of rear-guard fighting. He reduced its management to a perfect method. More originality in tactics has come from the *Anabasis* than from any dozen other books. Every system of war looks to this as to the



March of the Ten Thousand, 401 B. C.

fountain-head when it comes to rearward movements, as it looks to Alexander for a pattern of resistless and intelligent advance.

Necessity to Xenophon was truly the mother of invention, but the centuries since have devised nothing to surpass the genius of this warrior. No general ever possessed a grander moral descendant over his men. None ever worked for the

safety of his soldiers with greater ardor or to better effect. In this retreat a number of entirely new schemes were put into practice by him. The building of a bridge on goat-skins stuffed with hay or stubble and sewed up so as to be water-tight is here first mentioned, though Xenophon does not claim its invention, and we shall see Alexander using this device constantly. Xenophon originated the advance by breaking forward by the right of regiments or companies instead of in line, in order to overcome bad ground or to maintain a better alignment,—one of the most useful of minor manœuvres. But it is in the method he displayed that he principally instructs us.


Parts of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand were a running fight for days. Xenophon began by organizing a small cavalry force and a body of slingers, both essential to meet the similar arms of the enemy. He was always at the proper point. The Greek order of march was apt to be careless and much strung out. Xenophon taught his men that a column of march well closed up could not only more easily force its way through the enemy, but that it was far safer in retreat because occupying so much less space. His opponents had no missile-throwing engines, and could not attack from a distance. So when the pursuing forces reached his rear, he had with his dense column to waste no time in concentrating before he was strong enough to attack; meanwhile by a slight skirmishing resistance, or a smart onset with his rear-guard, Xenophon enabled the main column and baggage to gain much ground, and could then quickly rejoin it. In well-closed order he reduced to a minimum the danger of flank attack. Across plains Xenophon marched, like Brasidas, in hollow square, with baggage and non-combatants in the centre, but in passing through the mountains — a succession of defiles — he changed the formation to one more compact, and always

kept his rear-guard posted on some convenient eminence to protect the filing by of the phalanx. Before allowing the head of his column to enter a defile, he threw forward his light troops to seize the heights commanding its mouth, and these he held until the column had filed by. On this retreat also was first shown the necessary, if cruel, means of arresting a pursuing enemy by the systematic devastation of the country traversed and the destruction of its villages to deprive him of food and shelter. And Xenophon is moreover the first who established in rear of the phalanx a reserve from which he could at will feed weak parts of his line. This was a superb first conception. Something like reserves had been theretofore known; but nothing so nearly approaching our modern idea. These things all seem simple now, but we have been twenty-three centuries learning them, and to-day Xenophon's *Anabasis* is one of the best of military text-books. On this retreat it was first demonstrated how much the Persian empire lacked homogeneity and hence strength. What Xenophon actually did showed Alexander what he might, by persistent and intelligent activity, even with a meagre force, accomplish.

It is impossible to convey an adequate idea of the fertile and ingenious schemes of Xenophon by the mere relation of one or two incidents. But even this brief narrative of earlier exploits will serve its end after a fashion, by exhibiting the status of military science when Alexander ascended the throne of Macedon. Very many instances of able tactical battle manœuvres existed before his day, and one or two affairs of Xenophon's will give a partial idea of the resources, activity, good judgment and courage of which the *Anabasis* is full. To read Alexander's campaigns in the light of the *Anabasis* explains many obscure details.

The Greeks, about midway on the march, had just emerged,

after much danger and many wounds, from a defile in the Carducian mountains, through which they had been obliged to fight their way, and through which the van under Cheirisophus had hurried so rapidly that it had left Xenophon almost in the lurch with the rear-guard, when they saw, as they descended into the valley, another defile in their front, the



Capture of Carducian Defile, 401 B. C.

heights commanding which were held by the enemy in force. The Carducians were brave, alert and well-armed. Their bows were nearly a man's height in length, with arrows over three feet long. To advance seemed a hopeless task; but the native guides, of whom they always had several, informed them that there was no other road across the range. Perhaps there is no greater test of a general's capacity, as there is certainly none of his patience, than to procure suitable guides through an enemy's country, and to decide whether these guides are leading him aright or astray. Xenophon had, in a combat in the defile just passed, captured two Carducians, who, he was convinced, must be more familiar with this particular region than his other guides. He interrogated them,

at first separately. The one obstinately denied the existence of any other pass. Xenophon put him to death in the presence of the other. This one then confessed that there was another equally good pass, which, being little known, would probably not be held in force. By means of this pass the position of the barbarians at the main gap could be turned, and it contained but one position which might have to be forced.

Towards night Xenophon dispatched two thousand volunteers to surprise the newly-discovered pass, under conduct of this guide, whom he bound, and who saw reward or death facing him on either hand. A heavy rain then falling tended to conceal this manœuvre from observation. In order still further to divert attention from it, Xenophon made a feigned attack in the front of the defile held by the enemy, with his main body. The Carducians received him with confidence in their ability to destroy his army. They felt certain that they had him entrapped. One of their means of defense was the rolling down the mountain slope of huge stones upon the Greeks. This they continued to do all night. Xenophon left a small party at this point, with orders to keep up active demonstrations, and retired with the bulk of his force to camp, to allow his men to rest. Meanwhile the two thousand volunteers reached the side pass, and had no great difficulty in driving from it the small body of barbarians who held it; and having made their way to the rear of the main pass, at daylight, under cover of the morning mist, they boldly pushed in upon the astonished Carducians. The blare of their many trumpets gave notice of their successful détour to Xenophon, as well as added to the confusion of the enemy. The main army at once joined in the attack from the valley side, and the Carducians were driven from their stronghold.


The army entered the hills through both passes,—Xeno-

phon through the second one, which the two thousand had forced. The enemy, however, still had a considerable body of troops in the defile, where they successively occupied each commanding eminence; and at three of these the Greeks were obliged to halt and to assault in regular form in order to force a passage. They were always careful to so attack as to leave the barbarians a means of retreat; they were not strong enough to risk a battle *à outrance*. Each captured height was then occupied by a suitable force and held until the long column of troops, baggage, wounded and women (for a large number accompanied the army, as was not unusual in ancient and mediæval warfare) could file by. In retiring from each position the Carducians were sure to harass the rear of the defenders, who, at intervals, were obliged to face about and drive them away. The enemy kept at the heels of the Greeks every mile of the way. Xenophon was the soul of every encounter, at the front as much as at the rear.

On approaching the river Centrites Xenophon found that the satrap of Armenia had occupied its farther bank, while the Carducians were still pressing upon his rear. The road on which they were marching crossed the river at a ford, but the water was high and the bottom full of rolling and slippery stones, so that in crossing the men could not hold their shields in such a manner as to protect themselves from the showers of arrows and darts shot by the Armenians. The attempt was made, but, owing to the large force opposing them, was abandoned. Xenophon with the rear-guard was out, holding the Carducians in check. The situation was desperate, and the army passed the night in grave anxiety. But Xenophon, whose spirit was elastic and hopeful, had a dream — or pretended to have it — as of shackles falling from off his hands, and at daybreak bade his comrades not despair. And true enough, early in the morning, some men

discovered another and better ford higher up the river by about half a mile. To this the army marched. But the Carducians, as well as the Armenians on the other bank, followed up the movement.

Arrived at the upper ford, Xenophon, who always was the



Crossing of River Centrites, 401 B. C.

most daring, discreet and therefore controlling spirit, though only equal in command with the others, arranged to have Cheirisophus pass over first. He kept himself in fighting trim, and with a sufficient body to hold the Carducians in check. In order to relieve Cheirisophus from the opposition of the Armenians on the other bank, Xenophon, with a large body, made a feint to move down again to the lower ford, as if the Greeks were about to give up the attempt to cross at the upper one. The Armenians, fearing lest they should be taken between two fires if Xenophon crossed below, as well as be cut off from the main road, set out in haste for the lower ford, leaving only such a body of troops opposite Cheirisophus as he could readily force. Thus disengaged, Cheirisophus was enabled to cross and gain a foothold on the other shore. Here he drew up his troops in phalangial order, for there was a large body of Armenians on the hills somewhat back from

the river. Seeing that Cheirisophus had secured a foothold, Xenophon speedily retraced his steps, and made preparations to follow.

The Carducians, now perceiving their opportunity, began to press in upon the Greeks very seriously and in vast numbers. To meet this attack Xenophon sent word to Cheirisophus to order his archers and slingers to return part way across the ford, and remain in the water where they could cover the crossing. Then, instructing the troops to make their way over as rapidly as possible, he put himself at the head of a few chosen hoplites and advanced out to meet and impose upon the Carducians. These, who were never able to stand the attack of the Greeks, kept at a respectful distance, but used their missiles freely. When nearly all the troops were over, Xenophon, in order to clear his front, sounded the charge, moved upon the Carducians at a run, and dispersed them in terror. Then, before they could recover themselves, he turned about, retired quickly to the river and crossed. The archers and slingers remained to see the heavy-armed well over.

After this admirable fashion was conducted the entire retreat. The army as an army was saved. But out of thirteen thousand Greeks who fought at Cunaxa, only six thousand lived to see the Euxine, and to cry, "The Sea! The Sea!" In fourteen months these men had marched upwards of four thousand miles in two hundred and fifteen marches, or about eighteen and a half miles a day when afoot.

The Persians had degenerated. "The empire of the great king is powerful from extent of territory and sum of population; the great distances and dispersion of forces make it feeble to whomever conducts war with promptitude." "Persia," said Xenophon, "belongs to the man who has the courage to attack it." No doubt Alexander had read and pondered this remark.

Agesilaus.—Alexander the Great had a predecessor in the invasion of Asia. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, in what is called the Sparto-Persian war (B. c. 399–394), went to the assistance of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which had been unjustly oppressed by Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, for their share in the expedition of the younger Cyrus. Circumstances prevented Agesilaus from finishing his labors, but he showed the way, conceived the project, and no doubt Alexander's own more gigantic imagination benefited by what he did, as his spirit of rivalry urged him on to exceed even Cyrus in his conquests.




Route of Agesilaus, B. c. 396–394.

Agesilaus left Sparta by sea with eighty-three hundred men and six months' victual, and landed at Ephesus. Having adjusted, with commendable discretion, the troubles of the Greek cities, he apparently prepared to march into Caria, where Tissaphernes had advanced to the plains of the Maeander to meet him. But Agesilaus had no cavalry, and did not propose to accommodate Tissaphernes with a battle on a

terrain which was particularly suited to this arm; and in lieu of advancing to Caria he directed his march into Phrygia. His manœuvres here were much to the purpose, but finding that horse was indispensable in a campaign in Asia, he returned to Ephesus for winter quarters, and while here raised and equipped an excellent cavalry brigade. When spring came Tissaphernes made every effort to divine the purpose of Agesilaus. The Spartan king gave out that he should march again into Phrygia. Tissaphernes understood this to be an effort to lead him away from Caria, and remained on the Maeander plains, as before. But Agesilaus, having thus misled his adversary, was as good as his word, and advanced toward the Pactolus, where he met and defeated a large body of cavalry. Such methods of misleading an enemy have been most successfully practiced by all great leaders.

Tissaphernes followed him to Sardis; but so frightened were his followers at the successes of Agesilaus that they assassinated the satrap, and paid the Spartan king thirty talents to march out of this satrapy into Phrygia. This he did, devastating the province, and wintering at Dascyllium. Here he made large preparations for a campaign into Persia. But Persian money excited intestine troubles in Greece, and Agesilaus was constrained to march towards home. He chose the overland route which Xerxes had followed. He was obliged to fight his way through Thessaly, and gave signs of great ability by the manner in which he handled his cavalry, to him a new arm, against the Thessalian horse, then the best in Greece. In Thessaly Agesilaus heard of the defeat of the Spartan fleet at Cindus. With consummate prudence, in order to prevent demoralization in his ranks, he announced to his army a brilliant victory. He then attacked the Thebans and their allies, and under the influence of the enthusiasm

which prevailed he beat them at Coronæa (B. C. 394). In this battle he showed a marked capacity for tactical direction. When the lines met, Agesilaus on the right of the Spartans drove in the enemy's left, while the Theban right defeated Agesilaus' left, and advanced as far as the baggage camp. Agesilaus, so soon as his hands were free, wheeled the wing under his command sharply against the Thebans, and according to Xenophon, who was with him, the most terrific combat known in Greek history then took place. The Thebans, ployed into a square, were able, though with heavy loss, to cut their way through the Spartan ranks and join their defeated comrades; but they left the battlefield and victory to Agesilaus. The study of these and other campaigns of Agesilaus furnishes excellent matter for the military man. He is selected rather as a type of the best generals of the time than because he was prominent beyond all others. Agesilaus reigned forty-one years, to the glory of Sparta. All his campaigns were noteworthy.



Coronæa, B. C. 394.


X.

EPAMINONDAS. B. C. 371-362.

ASSOCIATED with one of the most notable tactical manœuvres—the oblique order of battle—is the immortal name of Epaminondas. This great soldier originated what all skillful generals have used frequently and to effect, and what Frederick the Great showed in its highest perfection at Leuthen. As already observed, armies up to that time had with rare exceptions attacked in parallel order and fought until one or other gave way. At Leuctra Epaminondas had six thousand men against eleven thousand of the invincible Spartans. The Thebans were dispirited by many failures; the Lacedæmonians in good heart. The Spartan king was on the right of his army. Epaminondas tried a daring innovation. He saw that if he could break the Spartan right, he would probably drive the enemy from the field. He therefore quadrupled the depth of his own left, making it a heavy column, led it sharply forward, and ordered his centre and right to advance more slowly, so as not seriously to engage. The effect was never doubtful. While the Spartan centre and left was held in place by the threatening attack of the Theban centre and right, as well as by the combat of the cavalry between the lines, their right was overpowered and crushed; having defeated which, Epaminondas wheeled around on the flank of the Spartan centre and swept it and the left wing from the field. The genius of a great tactician had prevailed over numbers, prestige and confidence. At Mantinæa, nine years later, Epaminondas practiced the same manœuvre with equal success, but himself fell in the hour of victory.

THIS great Theban, above almost all others, has stamped his name upon the military art as one of the world's early tacticians. To him is due the invention of a manœuvre to the use of which many generals, and Alexander and Frederick peculiarly, owe a number of their victories,—the well-known oblique order of battle. Up to his day, as already noted, all battles had been fought in parallel order, or in some variation of the parallel. The “two fair daughters” Epaminondas left behind him were the brilliant victories of Leuctra and Mantinæa, in both of which he put this manœuvre into use.

At Leuctra (B. C. 371) Epaminondas had a force of about six thousand men. By some it is stated as high as eight thousand. The Thebans were in a dispirited condition. Fortune had not smiled upon them. They lacked self-confidence. The Spartan army was about eleven thousand strong, and in the best of heart and



Battle of Leuctra, B. C. 371.

discipline. When the armies came into presence of each other, Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, drew up the Lacedæmonians in the usual phalangial shape prescribed by generations of usage and success, of twelve men in depth, and with the cavalry in front. He expected, as usual, to fight in parallel order and all along the line. Cleombrotus was not a man of force or originality. His own position, with his chief officers, was at the post of honor, the right. The Spartan idea was to swing round its wings into concave order when the battle should have been engaged, and thus inclose the Theban flanks. The fact that Cleombrotus was on the Spartan right Epaminondas well knew, and he determined to make up for his numerical weakness by a daring innovation.

We do not know whether Epaminondas had long ago thought out this manœuvre, or whether it was the inspiration of the moment. His phalanx on the right and centre consisted probably of eight men in a file. But thirty-two of the files in his left wing he made forty-eight men deep, thus forming the first narrow, deep column of attack of which we have any knowledge. On the left of this column and in a line with it marched the Theban Sacred Band under Pelopidas. Here again was a master's conception in thus protecting the

weak point of a novel formation. His centre and right were instructed to advance more slowly, and were thus thrown back, refused, so as to make practically an oblique angle with the Spartan line. Like all inventions, the first oblique order of battle fell far short of its perfect echeloned formation at Leuthen under the masterly tactical dispositions of Frederick. But the conception was there, distinct, unquestioned, and it is probable that the line had a certain echeloned character. The position implies as much.


We can scarcely avoid assuming that the refused wing of Epaminondas advanced in a sort of echeloned order. It is stated that at first that entire part of the line which was refused was brought into an oblique position by a short right wheel, while the column on the left advanced straight forward. This would certainly bring the army-front into the proposed position; but in order to continue its advance towards the enemy the refused line must then march obliquely to the front. It could not strike the enemy effectively when thus advancing, and the natural thing was to allow successive syntagmas or morēs to move into a line parallel to the enemy before they approached too closely. This would naturally echelon the line. Epaminondas' merit lay not in the details, but in the masterly conception of the effect he could produce by an oblique order. Frederick's attack at Leuthen is celebrated for the brilliant and precise execution of the oblique order. As with all inventions, the one originated, the other perfected, the idea. But quite apart from the details of the manœuvres, the main fact remains that for the first time in the history of war an enemy's line was to be struck on one flank by a formation oblique to itself, and by a deep column of attack.

All the effect desired was produced. No amount of tactical nicety could have improved upon what Epaminondas did on

this field. His small body of horse was, like the Spartan, in front, but only covering the centre and partly the right. It was less in number, but as soon as the battle opened it at once proved superior to the Spartan horse, and drove this force back in great disorder on the line of battle, in which it created no little confusion. Under cover of this wavering in the Spartan line, Epaminondas pushed forward his column towards the Spartan right, ordering the horse to keep up a hearty skirmishing along their front. The column he led in person, and we can imagine the tremendous momentum with which this compact body of fifty men deep, with their long spears and heavy shields and armor, struck the Spartan line. The fighting was desperate. The Lacedæmonians, surprised at the unusual Theban formation, instead of completing their concave manœuvre, extended their right to receive Epaminondas' column. This, if anything, weakened their line at the key-point. But they had not been familiar with defeat, and offered their wonted stubborn resistance. They would not yield.

Epaminondas, after heroic efforts, proved too strong for even Spartans. Cleombrotus was killed, together with a number of his lieutenants. The Sacred Band took the confused mass of the Spartan right in flank, and completed its destruction. Meanwhile on the Spartan centre and left there had been little or no fighting. Not ordered forward, because the right could not advance, and not being attacked by the Theban centre and right, which, thus refused, was practically in reserve, this portion of the Spartan army was at a loss what to do. Finally, when the right had been entirely annihilated, and the Theban column, elate with victory, wheeled and opened an attack upon its flank, it melted away in its uncertainty, and the whole Lacedæmonian army sought safety in flight to its camp. Only the hoplites of the right and the

cavalry had been engaged, and yet the pride of generations of victories, the vaunted irresistibility of the Spartan phalanx, had been blown to the winds. The genius of a great tactician had prevailed over numbers, prestige and confidence. Xenophon's saying was here well illustrated, — "Especially in war, a surprise may turn into terror, even with the stoutest."



Mantinæa, B. C. 362.

At Mantinæa Epaminondas put the same brilliant manœuvre into practice. On this field the forces were larger, between twenty thousand and thirty thousand men on each side. It is possible that Epaminondas somewhat outnumbered the

Spartans and allies, but this is not certainly known. His army was at this time in most excellent condition and spirits, though partly composed of confederates not entirely reliable. The Spartans and allies lay in the valley of Mantinæa. This valley lies substantially north and south, is about twelve miles long and seven or eight wide in parts, but at the centre it narrows down to about a mile. Opposite this narrow place the Spartans had camped and drawn up their line. Epaminondas was at Tegea at the southern outlet. He proposed to march upon the enemy, who apparently were waiting for him.

This time it is quite apparent that Epaminondas had his battle plan as crisply wrought out in his own mind as Frederick had his, modeled upon it, at Leuthen. He left Tegea, marching left in front, with his best troops leading and the least reliable in the rear. He marched at first straight towards the Spartan camp. The enemy drew up in line to meet him. When within two or three miles, he filed off to the left and skirted the foothills, marching along them as if to get in upon the Spartan right flank. His purpose was to mislead the enemy as to his intentions. The Spartans stood in line of battle, watching his every movement. The histories do not state that they made a right wheel in order to face the new position of Epaminondas, but there can be little doubt that this was what they did. It was the natural thing to do. They expected an attack, and no other theory conforms with the rest of the relation. One is often called on thus to fill a hiatus in the inconsistencies or omissions of the ancient authors.


The Theban Sacred Band headed the march. Epaminondas had the rest of the Thebans and Boeotians, who were behind the Sacred Band in the column and thus formed the left wing, so ranked by lochoi that by a simple file to the

right there would be formed on the left of the line the same deep column which had given him the victory at Leuctra. The lochagos or captain remained at the head of his file, and special officers stood in the front rank, each noted for his bravery. The rest of the line was marching, so that a simple face to the right, or at all events a very similar manœuvre, would bring them into the usual phalangial formation. The right flank of the allies was held by the Mantinæans and Arcadians; the centre by the Lacedæmonians, *Ælæans* and *Áchæans*; the left by the Athenians. Their cavalry was on both wings.

Epaminondas proposed to surprise his enemy. It is altogether probable that the allies were not aware of just how they had been defeated at Leuctra. It has always taken much time for the average general to grasp the keen devices of the great captain. This is one reason why the success of great captains is so marked. They cannot readily be copied. At all events the allies were not cautious. Epaminondas, having got into the position he purposed to occupy, now put into practice a clever ruse. He ordered his men to ground arms, as if for camping, and took such other steps as convinced the enemy that no attack would be made by Epaminondas on that day. The men in the allied army were allowed to disperse; and though the semblance of the line of battle was preserved, many of the soldiers took off their armor, and the cavalry unbridled their horses. While this was going on Epaminondas completed his dispositions, still ostensibly going into camp. The ruse was carried out with consummate skill. Opposite the allied horse he placed on his left a body of his own horse, mixed with light infantry to give it stability. Opposite the Athenian cavalry on the other flank he also placed some squadrons. And fearing that the Athenians might fall upon the right and weak flank of his column as he advanced, he stationed a small but chosen force

near his right upon a hill, in such a position that they could take the Athenians in rear if they attempted such a manœuvre. His heavy column he proposed to drive through the enemy's right as at Leuctra. The rest of the army was ordered, when the signal was given, to advance more slowly, the right last of all; in other words, in a sort of echelon.

Having thus quietly completed his preparations, issued instructions and no doubt encouraged his men by the promise of speedy victory, Epaminondas gave the order quickly to



Mantinea, B. C. 362.

take arms. The sight of this unexpected intention to give immediate battle took the allies absolutely by surprise. The battle signals were sounded, the men armed and rushed into their ranks and the line was speedily formed. But it could not have had the firm consistency of that of Epaminondas, so carefully and steadily marshaled by its wonderful leader. It must have lacked the confidence engendered of the captain's cheering words to prepare the men for combat; the strong tension of expected battle.

Meanwhile the Theban column bore down upon the allies with intuned pæan, serried files and hearts of oak. On its left, formed also in deeper column, charged the horse. This struck the allied cavalry first and bore it back. Immediately after, the remorseless column, headed by the Sacred Band, struck the allied right like the shaft from a catapult. The blow pierced the line, but the stern resistance of the Mantinæan hoplite was not so quickly overcome. The column, like a ship plowing into a head-sea, all but reeled in its onward motion. But the soul of the impetus was there. Epaminondas headed the column again, pike in hand, and fiercely led it against the still resisting foe, determined to crush his line. The struggle was sharp but decisive. The deep column of the Thebans pressed on. The Mantinæans, in firm opposition, fell in their tracks, but the column still made headway. The Theban centre and right advanced in due order, but found no serious resistance when it reached the allied line. The victory was won, but at a heavy price. In the charge headed by the brave Epaminondas, this great captain was wounded by a spear in the breast, of which, shortly after, he died. The victory was less decisive than it would have been had he lived; but it yielded peace with honor.

The manner in which the cavalry was used both at Leuctra and Mantinæa to sustain his oblique order shows that Epaminondas' conception of the value of this arm was clear, as his ability to use it was marked.

XI.

PHILIP AND MACEDON. B. C. 359-336.

THE kings of Macedon had long been vassals of the Great King, but after the Persian wars the country began to approach Greece in its tendencies. The government was not unlike a modern constitutional monarchy. Philip, Alexander's father, was a man second only to his son in ability. He found Macedon a small kingdom, and made it the most important and the most thriving state in Hellas. He married Olympias, princess of Epirus, and from her Alexander inherited his imagination and superstitious habit, as from his father his crisp common sense. Alexander was manly and precocious, and when eighteen commanded the left wing of the Macedonian army at Chæronæa,—the Grecian Waterloo,—where by obstinate charges at the head of the Thessalian horse he destroyed the theretofore invincible Theban Sacred Band. Philip was in consequence of this victory elected autocrator of Greece, and made preparations himself to invade Asia; but he was murdered, and Alexander took up his work, having secured the throne by vigorous and rapid assertion of his rights, and by putting out of the way all possible claimants.

ALEXANDER I. of Macedon had been a Persian vassal. But the country had regained its freedom on the final retreat of the Persians (b. c. 478), and thenceforward began to approach Greece in its tendencies rather than the East. This Alexander was called by Pindar the Philhellenic. Archelaus († b. c. 399) was the next king of note. He did much to raise the country's prosperity by building roads, fostering commerce, instituting public games like those of Greece, and by copying whatever a more advanced civilization could teach him. He was pronounced by his contemporaries the richest and happiest of men.

After Archelaus, the Macedonian throne passed through several kings, there being considerable difficulty in determining their respective rights; might and popular suffrage being

always factors in the election. Three sons of Amyntas II. († b. c. 376) successively occupied the throne : Alexander II., Perdiccas III., and Philip II., who is commonly known as Philip of Macedon, and was father of Alexander the Great. Philip had been regent during the minority of his nephew Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III., but the dangerous wars in which Macedonia was involved with the surrounding barbarians called him to the throne, or at least gave him the opportunity of ascending it (b. c. 359).

Philip of Macedon, thus invested with the crown at the age of twenty-three, was in every sense a worthy progenitor of Alexander the Great. He had, during a three years' life as hostage in Thebes, received the best Greek education and training, and had studied the tactics of Epaminondas, as well as caught, by personal intercourse, the inspiration of this great man's genius for war. He had become thoroughly familiar with the Greek methods, and was intelligent enough to recognize both their strength and weaknesses. He was a strict disciplinarian, but more than a mere martinet. He copied from the army of Cyrus, and profited well by what had been done by Epaminondas and Iphicrates of Athens, as well as what had been taught him by the experience of his own numberless campaigns ; and by improving on the Greek organization and armament, he introduced and perfected a disciplined and steady body of men such as the world had not yet seen. As the creator of an army organization he has perhaps never had an equal. His most prominent idea was embodied in the Macedonian phalanx. By means of his admirable army, and the aid of able and equally well-trained generals, among whom Parmenio held the chief rank, he subjugated Illyria, Pæonia and part of Thrace, captured many towns, and made constant encroachments in the direction of Greece ; seized on the mines of Thrace, from which every

year he took considerable money, and showed a clear conception of the rôle of conqueror. Out of a petty country of uncertain boundaries, Philip created a kingdom extending from the Euxine to the Adriatic. He was constantly at war with Athens. Not the least of his merits is the debt literature owes to his restless pertinacity and greed of power in the *Philippics* of Demosthenes.


Philip married Olympias, daughter of the king of the Molossi. Olympias was of the royal house of Epirus, which claimed descent from Achilles, while Philip traced his lineage to Hercules. Philip had met Olympias at the Samothracian mysteries. She was a woman of a high-strung nature, superstitious, semi-barbarous in her cast of mind, and is said to have been fond of tame snakes and of magic incantations. She became later in life repulsive to Philip. The night before her marriage it is related that she dreamed that the lightning fell upon her and kindled in her a mighty fire, which broke forth and consumed everything within reach. Despite the unintelligent nature of her character, Olympias always retained a large measure of influence over her son.

Three lucky things happened to be reported to Philip, who was at the siege of Potidæa, upon the same day: that Alexander was born; that Parmenio had beaten the Illyrians; that his horses had won the chariot race at the Olympic games. As it happened, the temple of Diana of Ephesus was burned on that day also.

It was of Philip's marriage with Olympias that was born Alexander, the third Macedonian king of his name (July, b. c. 356). He was precocious in physique and in intellect, and had so early advanced in manliness that, when he was but sixteen years old, and Philip had left him at Pella, the capital, as regent while he was absent besieging Byzantium, Alexander not only conducted the business of the state discreetly,

but put down the revolt of a tribe of the Thracians and took one of their towns, which he rechristened Alexandria,—the first of a long series so called.

Philip had gradually insinuated himself into Greek politics. He got himself elected to the Amphictyonic council, and finally chief of the Amphictyons, Sparta alone dissenting. As captain-general of the Greeks he proposed to invade Asia, as his son did later. This claim to universal leadership was, however, demurred to by the Athenians, under the powerful eloquence of Demosthenes, and by the Thebans, both of whom feared Philip's dangerous encroachments in Boeotia. War ensued. The Athenians and Thebans advanced to Chæronæa, in Boeotia, fifty thousand strong. Philip met them with thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse.



Chares and Lysicles commanded the combined Athenian-Theban army. The former was ignorant, the latter rash. Philip had brought with him his son Alexander, then a youth of eighteen, and had intrusted him with the command of the left wing, aided by older generals, while he himself commanded the right. For many hours the event of the battle was doubtful.

Philip's horse was defeated early in the day by the vigorous onset of the Athenians. Lysicles rashly ventured to follow up this yet dubious advantage by a pursuit conducted in the visionary belief that victory had thereby been won. But Philip retrieved his loss by the vigorous use of the phalanx. The long spears of the Macedonians bore down everything. The battle was re-established at this point, and the splendid energy of young Alexander, shown in his determined charges at the head of the Thessalian horse,—in which he proved already that power to use cavalry which was always one of his strongest points,—enabled the Macedonians at this moment to overcome the enemy's right, where in the van of the allied array fought the Theban Sacred Band, so long the right arm of brave Epaminondas. This band of lovers, bound together by oaths of fidelity and ties of personal affection, died to the last man where they stood. Philip was enabled to break the ranks of the enemy's left, while their right took to flight before enthusiastic Alexander. Sharply advancing his centre at this juncture, Philip completed the defeat. The allies were irretrievably beaten. It was the Grecian Waterloo. The loss of the Athenians was one thousand killed; of the Thebans an equal number. Placing the lowest estimate on the wounded of eight to one,—twelve to one would be nearer the truth,—the loss in killed and wounded was thirty-six per cent. Philip's loss is not given. It has been suggested that Philip had designed to try the oblique order by the right, but that the impetuous ardor of Alexander in throwing forward the left, which was intended to be refused, had prevented his carrying out the manœuvre he had learned from Epaminondas. This assumption, however, rests on but a slender basis.

Philip was extremely moderate after this victory to all but the Thebans. He wisely approached the rest of the Greeks

with an open as well as a strong hand. He had abundant common-sense, and found no difficulty in being elected *Hege-mōn*, or autocrator of Greece. This was immediately proclaimed at Corinth.

The spirit of the victory at Chæronæa grew by what it fed on. Philip now saw his way clear to Oriental conquests, and sent a large force to Asia, which he intended later to follow in person. His generals, Parmenio and Attalus, were already on the ground, fomenting among the Grecian colonies revolt against the Great King. But his preparations were thrown away. Philip did not long enjoy the distinction of autocrator of Greece. His reign came suddenly and lamentably to an end.

Philip had married several wives, having repudiated Olympias on the allegation of infidelity. Olympias retired to the protection of her brother, the king of Epirus. Alexander sided against Philip. He always clung with respectful love to his mother, though recognizing her peculiar weakness. Quarrels ensued. At the marriage banquet of Cleopatra, the last wife, a toast was proposed by Attalus, Cleopatra's uncle, with the hope expressed for a speedy and legitimate issue. "Dost thou then call me a bastard?" quoth Alexander, and hurled a goblet at him. Philip started up in rage, drew his sword and rushed at his son; but intoxication, wrath and his Chæronæa wounds rendered him unsteady, and he fell prone. "Here is the man who proposes to cross to Asia, and he cannot cross from one couch to another!" was the sneering comment of his son.

Alexander conducted his mother to Epirus and thence went to the court of Illyrium. Attalus was promoted and loaded with honors. Alexander's young friends, among them Harpalus, Nearchus, Erigyius and Laomedon, Ptolemy, son of Lagus, Philotas and others, whom we shall see later among

his celebrated generals, had either been before or were now banished. But a reconciliation was finally brought about between father and son through Demaratus of Corinth, who was bold enough to tax Philip with desiring peace in Hellas and making war in his own family. To conciliate Alexander, the brother of Olympias, Philip gave him his daughter Cleopatra, Alexander's sister, to wife. At this marriage-feast Philip was treacherously murdered (B. C. 336) by Pausanias, in revenge, it is said, for a grievous personal injury at the hands of Attalus, which Philip had refused to redress; but the act was no doubt secretly instigated by Olympias. Though often suggested in the modern crusade against Alexander, the crime is in no wise traceable to this prince.

Of the known accomplices, the Lyncestian Alexander was the first to salute Alexander, son of Philip, as king. This promptness secured him his pardon; for by such timely aid our Alexander was enabled to forestall the arts of the partisans of the young prince who had been born to Philip and Cleopatra, and to take possession of the throne.

At the moment of Philip's murder, Olympias, as if in anticipation of the event, was near at hand. The sympathizers of Philip against Alexander naturally held him too to have been cognizant of the conspiracy. Some believed that he could not have been legitimate; that this alone could account for his father's hate and new marriage. Others were of opinion that Philip's young son by Cleopatra should be king. Others again held that Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III., was the rightful heir. But while all these factions argued, Alexander acted. The partisans of Cleopatra's son were distant and not alert; Amyntas was a quiet, unknown lad. Alexander had already stamped himself upon the pride of the nation. The people sympathized with his persecution; the army, proud of the youthful hero, was his to a man. Facts

*But while we may accept
Michael's conclusion -*

as well as acts were all in favor of our Alexander. His Lyncestian namesake, as before said, saluted him king, and he was readily accepted by all but the usual crowd of grumblers and malcontents ; and these speedily subsided or were suppressed. For there was in Macedon no rule of succession definite enough to be respected. Attalus and Cleopatra and her son, as well as the murderers of Philip, were put to death. This apparent — so-called inexcusable — cruelty was a matter of necessary personal safety with Alexander. That such an act was in the regular course of proceeding in those days explains, if it does not palliate it. Indeed the act was no worse than Macchiavelli advocates in "The Prince," as the *duty* of a ruler who wishes to secure his throne. Alexander was no worse, he was better than his times ; but there is no claim that he in any sense approached perfection, except as a soldier. Amyntas had perhaps a prior right to the throne, had he been in a position to assert it and to do justice to the growth and power of Macedonia ; he also was put to death, ostensibly for conspiring against Alexander. The simple facts, rather than the discussion of the right or wrong of these political executions, — murders, if you will, — concern us here.

Though but twenty years old, Alexander was both mature and self-poised. No sooner seated than he proved himself every inch a king. He began by reviewing the army. "Though the name has changed, the king remains," quoth he, and the power, order and aspirations of the king and country were kept intact.

Philip had found Macedonia a small state ; he had raised it to be the greatest nation of the world, excepting only Persia ; and as the centre of civilized power Macedonia was the more important factor in the world's economy.

Neither Philip nor Alexander were Greeks. The Macedonian stood midway, as it were, between the despot-ridden

Persian and the free and equal Hellene. He was a rugged peasant, owning the land he tilled, and no doubt exercising many rights of local self-government of which we do not hear. But he was liable to military duty. It is under Philip that we find the condition of the peasantry rising to marked excellence, and the fact that the Macedonian army was, in its civil capacity, a sort of popular assembly, shows that the instinct of liberty was supreme. The Macedonian kingdom seems more nearly to approach a constitutional monarchy than any other of the day.

All Philip's surroundings had grown step by step with his power. Their dignity may have been sometimes marred by excessive drinking, a habit which was hereditary in the land ; but no part of Greece had so superb or polite a court, such magnificent feasts and games. Except in Athens in the age of Pericles, the world had as yet exhibited nothing which of itself was so complete in intelligent and solid splendor, combined with perfectly managed business-methods, as Philip's court and country. Pella is said to have astonished even the Athenian envoys. Looking at his every side, Philip was one of the broadest-minded, strongest and most able monarchs who ever reigned. It is only by his own son, before whose all but superhuman successes everything shrinks into insignificance, that Philip is surpassed. Says Theopompos, "Take him for all in all, never has Europe borne such a man as the son of Amyntas."

XII.

PHILIP AND HIS ARMY. B. C. 359-336.

ALEXANDER found ready to hand the standing army, unequaled in excellence, which his father had created. Philip had seen what he had to encounter and had armed his hoplites with the sarissa, a pike twenty-one feet long, so that the Grecian phalangite could not reach his line. The Macedonian phalanx was the ideal of shock tactics. Its unit was a lochos or file of sixteen men with its sergeants at the head and rear. Sixteen files made a syntagma or battalion of two hundred and fifty-six men under a xenagos or major. This was the fighting unit. Four of these were a taxis under a strategos or colonel. Sixteen taxes made a simple phalanx of four thousand and ninety-six men. The grand phalanx contained four of the latter, and was carefully officered, much in the style of a modern army-corps. The hoplites were pezetæri, the sarissa-armed, and hypaspists, a more select body, armed with one-handed pike, sword and shield. Slaves accompanied the phalanx, and carried arms and rations for the heavy troops. Half as many peltasts or light infantry were attached to each phalanx, a quarter as much horse and a quarter as much irregular foot,—psiloi. These numbers varied. A grand phalanx all told had some thirty thousand men. In parade order a man occupied six feet square; in battle order three feet; in close order one and a half feet. The phalanx drilled much as we do to-day. Discipline was rigid. The heavy cavalry was Macedonian, Thessalian and Greek; there was abundance of light cavalry drawn from barbarian allies. The cavalry unit was an ilē of sixteen files of four men each. Eight ilēs made a hipparchy, under a hipparch, the equal of a strategos. The drill and discipline of the cavalry was perfect. One choice ilē of cavalry and one choice taxis of hypaspists were each called the agema, or body-guard of the king. The Macedonian heavy horse (cavalry Companions) was a splendid body, and on it Alexander relied for his stanchest work. The Thessalians stood all but as high. In line of battle the phalanx held the centre; the cavalry was on the wings; the light troops in front of the line, or in rear or on the wings as dictated by circumstances. The right was the post of honor. Here Alexander took his station with the Companions. The army was capable of making enormous marches, and stood unheard-of hardships. Philip and Alexander organized and used batteries of ballistas and catapults, which were, within their limits, as effective as modern artillery, and more easily moved. There is evidence that

the quartermaster's and commissary departments were very skillfully organized and managed. The Greek camp was round or elliptical, and picket-duty was regularly performed. There was military music, and insignia were carried in lieu of colors. On the march, which was usually right in front, a van and rear guard and flankers were employed. Minor tactics was highly developed, but battles were wont to be decided by a single shock. One line of battle was usual, but Alexander constantly made use of reserves. Level ground was essential to the phalanx, and therefore always chosen for battle; but Alexander got exceptional work out of his phalanx on any ground. Philip organized a corps of pages, young men of family who lived near the king's person, and learned the profession of arms in camp. This was practically a military school,—a movable West Point. The word of the king was supreme law; but the Macedonians had apparently the right to demand that they should be consulted with regard to many matters; and councils of war were common.

THE heritage of Alexander the Great from his father, Philip of Macedon, was the same which came to Frederick the Great from his father Frederick William, to wit: an army organized, armed, equipped and disciplined in a better fashion than any which existed at that day.

It was Philip who first gave shape to the army, transforming what was a mere manhood duty of service, or obligatory militia system, into a standing army, which rose under him to number forty thousand men. This was the first instance in which a free people subordinated itself to a military autocracy whose head was the king. It was this which made Macedonia the superior of Greece, which had lost its old habits of personal service, and now depended largely upon mercenary soldiers, or upon volunteer service and substitutes. Personal service, unless coupled with the discipline and methods of a standing force, makes an army of volunteers rather than of regulars. In former days the Greeks had had what came very close to the best discipline attained by a standing army. But the phalanx had gradually lost its cohesion. One might compare the Greek troops of the days of Philip to our own volunteers in the early stages of the Civil

War, as against troops like the Prussian infantry of our own times. Later in the war many of our American volunteers had been hardened into a perfect equivalent of the best regulars. No doubt the Greek habit of relying on voluntary service made for true freedom, as our own organization rather than that of the Prussians yields the greatest good to the greatest number; but as a military machine Macedonia with its standing forces was far ahead of the rest of Greece.

When Philip was elected to the throne (B. C. 359) to succeed his brother, Perdiccas III., the Macedonian infantry was composed of raw and ragged material, mostly hide-clad shepherds, armed with wicker shields and ill-assorted weapons. It was a rabble rather than an army. The cavalry was better, in fact the best in Greece, where horse had not been much in vogue, and had been drilled to charge in compact order, and with a short thrusting pike as weapon. Still it could not be pronounced satisfactory.

Philip saw that cavalry would not suffice; he must have infantry to meet the solid ranks of the Theban, Athenian and Spartan phalanx. The foot-soldier, with whom he had by his Theban education become familiar, was the one who, under Epaminondas' skillful tactics, had broken the theretofore invincible array of the Lacedæmonians. Philip must build up an infantry which could break the Theban formation. The Greek hoplite had been armed with a large oblong shield, a sword and a one-handed pike, perhaps six to eight, rarely ten feet long. In close combat he pushed his enemy as well as defended himself with his shield, which was sometimes provided with a knob or spike, and used his pike or sword as occasion demanded. Philip invented the sarissa or long two-handed pike, which protruded so far beyond the front rank that the Greek hoplite could not reach his enemy so as to use his shorter weapons; and by this device he over-

came the Grecian phalanx. At the battle of Chæronæa the front rank of the Theban hoplites fell to the last man. With his phalanx thus armed, Philip brought Greece to his feet, and enabled his son Alexander to reap from the start the fruit of his wonderful military genius.

The army for war was raised : first, from the Macedonian people, as a kernel ; second, from tributary tribes,—Thessalians, Thracians, Pæonians, Triballians, Odryssians, Illyrians and others ; third, from allied nations, such as the Greeks ; fourth, from mercenary troops; Greeks and others. The Thessalians were really allies ; but they were under a Macedonian chief, as were also the Greek allies.

We have no details as to the formation of the Greek phalanx until Thucydides and Xenophon, the latter of whom first describes it with satisfactory accuracy. There was considerable difference between the phalanx of Xenophon and that of Alexander. In fact, at all periods there were material variations in the formation, arms and drill of the phalanx, but a detailed description of the Macedonian phalanx will suffice to explain that of the other states.

To Philip is due the credit of organizing the whole Macedonian military establishment ; Alexander in no material manner changed what he inherited, but only expanded the system, so as to make room for the introduction of new elements in the East, and to create *cadres* of sufficient size to treble the strength of the army. He was wise enough to recognize that he could not better the results of his father's wonderful capacity for organization. But he used the army in a fashion his father had never dreamed of doing.

The Spartan and the Athenian phalanxes have already been described in a partial way ; they were superb of their kind ; but the Macedonian phalanx will always remain in history as the ideal of shock tactics. It was numerically

much larger than the Greek phalanx. Its weight can be gauged by a simple comparison. In the French tactics of 1887 about seven men, including reserves, go to every metre of front line. In the Macedonian phalanx, including light ^{LOCHACOS} troops, twenty-eight men went to about every metre, and close together from front to rear. This depth made its impact in good order irresistible.

^{URAGOS.}
Lochos.

The unit of the phalanx was a lochos or file of sixteen heavy infantry men, hoplites, whose chief, the lochagos (sergeant), was the front-rank man. The second man was one who received double pay, and the third and last men extra pay for gallantry. The last man, or file-closer, was a sort of second sergeant, called uragos. Each lochos was numbered from right to left.



Hypaspist.

These hoplites were either hypaspists (shield-bearing guards) or pezetæri (foot-companions); the former held the right, or post of honor, of the phalanx, though apt to be used as a separate body and placed in other parts of the line; the latter, being the ordinary rank and file, had the left of the phalanx. The hypaspists were of a better class, served voluntarily, and the most valorous of their number were the agema (royal footguards), always under a noted chief. The rest were called "the other hypaspists," and were organized in bodies of five hundred men, later of one thousand, each under a chiliarch. The hypaspists were trained for hand-to-hand fighting and quick evolutions, and though wearing full suits of armor were more lightly armed than the pezetæri. They car-

ried the one-handed pike (xyston), sword and large shield. They are sometimes called argyrapspids, though this name is also given to another body of peltasts.



Kausia.


In the early armies what might be called the aristocracy had served as hetairai, companions, comrades-in-arms, already known in the times of Homer. They were the descendants of the few who had clustered about the original conqueror, and were more properly a class bred of wealth acquired by ancient service near the court than one of hereditary title; and in Philip's

army included probably many of those families which had been reigning ones in their own uplands until subjugated



Greek Helmets.

by Macedonia. The pezetæri, or "foot companions," had originally been the infantry body-guard of the king, but had gradually been expanded into a much more extensive body and had become, under Philip, the ordinary heavy infantry. In similar fashion the word "guard" is in many countries still applied to ordinary infantry regiments. The pezetæri are said by some authorities to have worn the hereditary kausia, or broad-brimmed felt hat; but by others the kausia is stated to have been later adopted by the king as a distinguishing




Coat of Scale Armor.

headgear. At all events the pezetaeri wore in battle a helmet, a cuirass or breastpiece and greaves or leggings. Little is said about foot-gear. It was probably the usual sandal or boot. They bore a spear, the sarissa, which, according to Polybius, was fourteen cubits, or twenty-one feet, long (the drilling spear being two cubits longer, thus making the enormous length of twenty-four feet), a shield of such size as to cover the entire person of a kneeling soldier, fixed to hang over the shoulder so as not to monopolize the left arm, and a short, straight, cut-and-thrust sword. The shield was apt to be decorated; often with some bird or beast or emblem of the soldier's natal city. The sarissa was held six feet from the butt, which was loaded so as to balance, and thus protruded fifteen feet in front of the

soldier. The first five ranks couched their spears, the others held them erect, or else leaned them on the shoulders of the rank before them. Only great individual strength, supplied by constant practice in the gymnasium, and steady drill could render the phalanx able to execute the manœuvres called for. Some of the best military critics have doubted the accuracy of Polybius in this particular, and have sought to read *feet* for *cubits*; but there is no good reason to doubt the




Sarissa Bearer.



Greaves.



Sandal.



Boots.

fact as stated, particularly in view of the length of spear carried by other nations and of the results attained by the sarissa-armed phalanx.

Grote has discussed this point at length.

Four of the above-described files, or lo-choi, made a tetrarchia of sixty-four men, a platoon as it were, with


a tetrarch or lieutenant, who also stood in front of the right-hand file. Two tetrarchias made a taxiarchia, or company of one hundred and twenty-eight men, under a taxiarch or captain. This body was sometimes called a taxis. The best men, it will be seen, were in front and in rear and the

least reliable in the centre of this company.


The rank of sergeants in the front of the company was like the tempered steel edge of the axe. Two taxiarchias or companies made a syntagma, or xenagia, or battalion of two hundred and fifty-six men. This was a body sixteen men square, the Macedonian tactical unit; and its chief, the xenagos, or syntagmatarch (major),

had an uragos (there seems some duplication of terms in the name) or second major, whose position was in the rear; an adjutant; a color-bearer, who also gave certain orders by raising or lowering the ensign; a herald, who had other besides the usual work attached to his office, and a trumpeter. These various officers provided an abundant number of file-leaders and file-closers, and each had specific and well-defined duties.

Four syntagmas formed a chiliarchia, or a taxis, under a chiliarch, or strategos (colonel), making a force of one thou-



Shields.



Taxiarchia
(close order).


sand and twenty-four men, equivalent to one of our regiments. "Taxis," like our own word "division," is a much

misused term. It is not infrequently employed by the old historians as an equivalent of "detachment," of whatever size. The numbers of all these bodies were of necessity very elastic and fluctuating, and, as in all armies in active service, the taxes were frequently all but destroyed. Sixteen syntagmas, or four chiliarchias, constituted a simple phalanx, which was thus

A grid of 100 hand-drawn musical notes, likely eighth notes, arranged in a 10x10 pattern. The notes are drawn in black ink on a white background. The grid is centered on the page.

Syntagma (open order).

made up of four thousand and ninety-six hoplites; in addition to which there were attached to it a regular complement of cavalry and light troops. It was our modern brigade, so to speak, and was under command of a phalangiarch, or brigadier-general. There was also a double phalanx (division)




Simple Phalanx.

of eight thousand one hundred and ninety-two men, and a "grand" or quadruple phalanx (army-corps) of sixteen thousand three hundred and eighty-four infantry. Each had its peculiar chief, the diphalangiarch and tetraphalangiarch. But these names are rarely used. The term "strategos" covered a multitude of titles; and Arrian, whose *Anabasis* is generally followed in this work, like the other historians, gen-

erally refers to bodies by the proper name of their commanders,— a much more convenient term.

Slaves, who accompanied the phalanx in great numbers, carried the rations, and often arms, of the heavy cavalry and infantry, which weighed from sixty pounds upwards ; though at times these camp followers must have been vastly reduced in number by incidents of the service, as they now and then were by direct orders, in which case the hoplite was remitted to carrying his own arms and rations.

Pezetaerus, with Sarissa couched.



Behind this heavy sarissa-armed infantry (*pezetæri*) there were ranked, as a rule, half the number of peltasts, in files eight deep, thus occupying the same front space. The reader shall be spared the names of the peltast subdivisions and commanders. The organization resembled that of the phalanx. The peltast was a light infantryman, half way between


the psilos and the hoplite, originated by Iphicrates of Athens, bearing a small shield (*peltē*), short pike and sword, and wearing a broad metal belt, which protected the abdom-

inal region. The hypaspists are sometimes classed as peltasts, but they were more properly an integral part of the phalanx. At all periods there appear to have been differences in the arming and discipline of portions of the light troops, but they remained substantially the same. The peltasts are commonly called targeteers. The Agrianians, who were among the very best of Alexander's troops, came near to being peltasts, though usually classed with the light troops.

That part of the hypaspists or shield-bearing guards known as the agema was essentially a *corps d'élite*, — the infantry body-guard of the king. The hypaspists generally were more available for some services than the pezetæri,

Casting a Javelin with a Twist. quicker and handier than these and yet steadier than the bulk of the peltasts or light troops. They were good for attacking and holding heights, forcing fords, supporting cavalry and in important night-watches and attacks. They could do the duty of either grade, as called on. The hypaspists in Alexander's army were under command of Nicanor, son of Parmenio, of whom we shall see more.

In front of the taxes of hoplites in a simple phalanx were one thousand and twenty-four psiloi, — slingers, archers or darters (acontists or javelin-throwers), who acted as skirmishers. On the wings were, under drill-regulations, two groups of heavy horsemen (cataphracti), with sword and lance, sometimes javelin and battle-axe, and a small round shield, helmet, greaves and spurred boots. But



Greek Sandal and Spur.

Alexander varied their position according to circumstances. The numbers of cavalry and light troops were elastic.

The normal strength of the grand phalanx all told was :—

Hoplites or heavy infantry	16,384 men
Peltasts and psiloi, say	8,192 men
Horse, heavy and light	4,096 men
	28,672 men

Or with officers, etc., about 30,000 men, having all classes of troops.

There were other subdivisions of the phalanx, each with its appropriate chief. But like the smaller details of tactics, the minutiae of rank and command do not here concern us.

To summarize, the grand phalanx was divided and officered as follows :—

Lochos or section of 16 hoplites under a lochagos or sergeant.

Tetrarchia or platoon of 64 hoplites under a tetrarch or lieutenant.

Taxiarchia or company of 128 hoplites under a taxiarch or captain.

Syntagma or battalion of 256 hoplites under a syntagmatarch or xenagos or major.

Taxis or chiliarchia or regiment of 1,024 hoplites under a chiliarch or strategos or colonel.

Simple phalanx or brigade of 4,096 hoplites under a phalangiarch or brigadier-general.

Double phalanx or division of 8,192 hoplites under a diphalangiarch or major-general.

Quadruple or grand phalanx or army corps of 16,384 hoplites under a tetraphalangiarch or lieutenant-general.


With cavalry and light troops this made an army of 28,672 men under the king or commander-in-chief, or especially thereto commissioned officer, generally one of the somatophylaxes or intimates of the king.

It goes without saying that this was only the organization of the phalanx. In the field both numbers and subdivisions were constantly changed by losses or for convenience of handling. And it will be also noticed hereafter that when Alexander reached Asia, and incorporated Oriental soldiers into his army, he made changes not always consistent, as they are narrated, with this technical organization. But Philip's army remained practically unchanged.


In parade or open order each phalangite occupied a space of about six feet square, with sarissa erect. In close or battle



Shields in Open Order.



Close Order.




Synapsism.

order — the usual field formation — each occupied a space of three feet square, left foot advanced, so that the interval on his left was to a certain extent covered with his shield. The first five ranks advanced their sarissas, the eleven others



Syntagma in Perspective.


held them erect or leaned them on the shoulders of their file-leaders, in which position they arrested many missiles. The



Syntagma in Perspective.


front rank sarissas thus protruded fifteen feet; the second rank, twelve feet; the third, nine feet; the fourth, six feet;

feet; the fifth, three feet beyond the front alignment. With the drill-sarissa of twenty-four feet in length, those of six ranks would protend in front of the alignment. The points were slightly depressed. In defensive order, or to attack intrenchments, a tortoise, or synaspism, was formed. The men



Position of the Sarissas of a Lochos.

stood close together, each occupying but one and a half feet square, the front rank covering their bodies with their shields, the other ranks using them to form a roof over the heads of all. This synaspism, or tortoise, was so strong that archers and slingers could march over it to shoot their missiles, and we shall see heavy wagons rolling over the formation without harm to the soldiers. To repel an attack the hoplites kneeled on the right knee and leaned the shield against the left knee, the edge on the ground. This was a device of Chabrias, the Athenian.



Circle in Drill.




Concave Line.



Convex Line.

It is probable that Epaminondas had brought the drill of


the heavy infantryman to a high state of perfection; while Iphicrates had done an equal duty by the peltasts. But this was still improved upon by Philip and Alexander. In their drill the Macedonian phalangites were taught to form a circle, small or large, for the same purpose as infantry to-day forms



Embolon, or Wedge.

a square; to advance the wings so as to make a concave line to envelop the enemy's flank; to refuse the wings so as to make a convex line to resist front and flank attacks at the same time; to form a wedge or boar's head, which

had but three men in the front rank and then gradually widened to thirty-six men in the sixteenth rank, and with eight ranks of an equal number of files as a base; and to form pincers, so-called, to receive and check the wedge formation. This was the exact converse of the wedge, and was a forma-



Koilembolon, or Pincers.


tion whose centre was withdrawn in wedge form. A column of any kind more deep than wide was also apt to be called a wedge.

The phalanx could wheel and half-wheel to the right and left, or wheel completely to the rear. Countermarches were made by files and by ranks. Ranks were doubled from open order by the even number man of each file stepping into the interval on the left of his file-leader.

Ground was taken to the right and left on the centre. Files were broken in two and the rear half marched into the intervals. The men broke by sections to the right and left to take order of march. The infantry was also drilled in a certain manual of arms, and in facing and marching to either flank, and to the rear, at different paces. There were numbers of other manœuvres and formations.

A lochos was forty-eight feet deep, in common or battle order. When each one occupied three feet front, a taxiarchia would take up twenty-four feet, a syntagma forty-eight feet front, or say fifty feet. This would give two hundred feet to the chiliarchia or regiment, not counting intervals, about which the information is very contradictory. A simple phalanx of infantry, without its cavalry, and placing the psiloi and peltasts in front and rear, would thus cover a front of eight hundred feet, and a grand phalanx three thousand two hundred feet, say three fifths of a mile.

Commands were given by the voice, by trumpets, and by signals of a standard, sword or spear. A raised standard meant advance; a lowered standard meant retreat; a lance held erect and still was a demand for parley. There appears to have been a code of signals by smoke, which Polybius says were not at all uncertain.




Formation with Broken
Ranks and Files.

Philip introduced the strictest discipline. Punishments were summary. In 338 B. C., two officers of high rank were cashiered for introducing a female lute-player into camp against standing orders. This exclusion of women was not common, however, in ancient armies, nor could it be continued by Alexander when in the East.

Alexander employed more cavalry than any one up to his day, and handled it better. No one has ever surpassed his cavalry tactics. Epaminondas had but one tenth of his force mounted. Alexander had one sixth to one quarter. This he found essential in order to cope with the great and admirable force of cavalry in the Persian army. For cavalry was the choice arm of the Asiatics, and it was very skillful.

The cavalry, as a rule, was composed of Macedonians and Thessalians, who were heavy horse, and Thracians and Ætolians,

ILARCHO



Ilê of Sixty-four Horse
(close order).


who were light horse. Its unit was the ilē, or company of sixty-four men, in sixteen files, four deep, which was the equivalent of the syntagma; eight ilēs were a hipparchy, under a hipparch, who ranked with a strategos; two hipparchies an ephipparchy, the equivalent of the small phalanx; two ephipparchies a wing, the equivalent of the double phalanx. When sixty-four ilē or two wings were



Deep Square.



Thracian Wedge.




Reverse Wedge.

together, they formed an epitagma of four thousand and ninety-six men, which was the allowance for the grand pha-

lanx. But so much was not always present, nor always kept in one body. This was the technical formation; but there were exceptions. The ilēs of Companion cavalry num-


bered up to two hundred and fifty men each, and the chiefs held a peculiar rank. The changes in the cavalry made by Alexander in the East were also on a different basis. The army here described is Philip's army. This Alexander modified without changing substantially that in it which made it so efficient. It was a disciplined army, and discipline cannot be described in words ; it is only shown in deeds.




Rhomboid with Mixed Files.

Alexander vastly improved his cavalry over what was theretofore known.


It marched in columns of fours; it formed a solid square of eight men front to charge in small bodies; it formed in wedge or triangular bodies, charging apex or base in front as occasion demanded; it charged occasionally in rhomboid or lozenge form. This was the Thessalian column, and had the advantage of facing readily in four directions. The cavalry is frequently spoken of as charging "squadron by squadron" when fighting superior forces, but the exact tactical meaning of the phrase is not apparent. Perhaps it was an echeloned order. As a rule, the cavalry was on the flanks of the phalanx, to protect these weak points.



Square with Mixed Ranks.



Square.



Square with Mixed Ranks.



Cavalry Companion.

The cavalry was of three classes. First came the heavy Macedonian horsemen, each of whom was accompanied by a mounted servant or squire, and originally by two or three slaves, though Philip, and again later Alexander, found it necessary to cut down this number to one. They were volunteers, the best men of the nation.

It was Philip who had formed this body of young nobles, and taken the greatest pride in giving them the highest military as well as the most enlightened polite education and training. They thus became fit both for command and for statesmanship and diplomatic service. They wore helmet and complete scale-armor, and carried a shield, thrusting-pike and sword. The horse had head-piece and breastplate, also of scale-armor. These were the so-called cavalry *hetairai*, Companions or brothers-in-arms. The first squadron constituted the royal body-guard. The *hetairai* were constantly competing under the eye of the king for glory and reputation. They were his right hand. No Asiatic cavalry could

ever stand their shock, no infantry resist their onset. Alexander's battles were uniformly decided by them. The marches they could execute were well exemplified in the pursuit of Darius, when they made three thousand three hundred stades — three hundred and sixty-six miles — in eleven days, under a burning sun, and part way across a desert country without water. The cavalry Companions were under Philotas, the hipparch, son of Parmenio and brother of Nicanor, who commanded the hypaspists. Eight of these *ilē* accompanied Alexander into Asia, severally under Clitus, Glaucias, Ariston, Sopolis, Heracleides, Demetrius, Meleager, and Hegelochus, each some two hundred or more strong. Clitus' *ilē* was the agema of cavalry, which Alexander was wont to lead in person.

There appear to have been sixteen *ilē* in all, from sixteen districts, each varying from one hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty men. The value of this body in action, like



Ilē of Hetairai of 225 Men.


the Theban Sacred Band, was, owing to its wonderful martial qualities, out of all proportion to its limited number.

From these "Companions," or from the "Pages," were, as a rule, selected all the officers for promotion or detail or civil dignities. The Companions also constituted a sort of tribunal for the trial of certain military offenses, as well as a species of council of war. Whether this was confined to the agema, or not, is not known. But the Companions were a strong power in both army and state, as well as unquestionably the social leaders in the society of the court.

The Thessalian horse was also heavy, and in efficiency ranked all but with the Macedonian. Some of its ilēs contained the aristocrats of Thessaly. Calas, son of Harpalus, commanded this body. Good throughout, the ilē of Pharsalus had the most repute. In company with the Thessalians generally fought the Grecian auxiliary cavalry under Philip, son of Menelaus, but as separate corps.

Next to the Companions and Thessalians came light cavalry carrying sword and javelin. These were mostly mercenary troops. Later Alexander made a special body of sarissophori or lancers. Just wherein they differed from other pike-carrying horsemen, unless that the lance was longer, is not known.


Third were the dimachias (two - fashioned fighters), light dragoons, who could engage either on foot or mounted. They had light defensive armor and shields, swords and a lance which they could use for thrusting or casting. They opened the combat and pursued the broken enemy. These



were a sort of mounted peltast, midway between heavy and irregular cavalry. They seem to have fought much as our own cavalry did in the civil war. Some of the dimachias carried bows.

The light cavalry was especially recruited among the allies. Alexander used to mix archers and sometimes targeteers, *i. e.*, peltasts, or sometimes even shield-bearing guards with his

horse. These footmen proved useful in checking disorder, and the archers were so active as to be able to keep up with the horse in all their marches and evolutions.



Greek Headstall.



Greek Headstall.

The cavalryman had no stirrups, nor were the horses shod. The manner in which the horses got through the long winter and mountain marches proves that their feet were very sound and the animals extremely hardy. The rider sat on a blanket held by a circingle.

Some of these blankets look like a species of saddle-tree. The drill was largely adapted to give the man the strength of seat which the modern saddle with stirrups lends. Of course he could not stand in his stirrups to cut and thrust as the modern cavalryman does; and was accordingly somewhat handicapped. But so was the enemy, and the drill made him strong and active. Despite, or perhaps by reason of, these drawbacks, the cav-




Rider from Frieze of Parthenon.

alryman had a good seat. There is nothing as perfect in equestrianism as the seat of the riders on the frieze of the Parthenon. There must have been perfect riders or this piece of art could not have been produced.

Philip had kept a reserve of veterans, a sort of "Old Guard," the early pezetæri, ready to act at the decisive moment. By some authorities many of the members of the agema which went over to Asia are said to have been veterans of sixty to seventy years. Alexander preferred to use his Companion cavalry as an old guard. This, composed of the sons of the first families of the land, drilled and exercised from their youth up in all the habits of war, always responded to his demand. The agema was more richly and fully armed than the rest, and each individual enjoyed the king's confidence.

Alexander's cavalry does not appear to have ridden boot to boot. The men were ranked slightly apart, but nevertheless kept good alignment. Just how much space man and horse occupied in the ranks cannot be given. Usually a cavalryman occupies ten feet by forty inches. The depth of the ilē of four to a file was probably not far from the same as the lochos, say fifty feet. How much front it occupied is not certain. Given six inches between horses, the ilē would take



Simple Phalanx.

up some sixty feet, the hipparchy four hundred and eighty feet. With its full complement of cavalry, one hipparchy on each flank, in say two lines, the simple phalanx would cover something like a quarter of a mile, the seven thousand foot occupying less than two thirds the space; the one thou-

sand horse one third. It was, however, rare that the phalanx was worked in this fashion.

The light horse comprised Macedonians, Pæonians under Aristo, and Odryssians, who won great credit for efficiency with Agatho as their leader. The Macedonian lancers were under Amyntas, the Lyncestian. All these were called *prodromari*, — fighters in front, skirmishers. Finally, there were in Asia numerous bodies of irregular light troops, both foot and horse, slingers, archers and javelin-throwers. These were used much as the Austrians used Pandours in the Seven Years' War, or as the German Uhlanen or the Russian Cossacks are to-day. Of the light foot the Agrianians, who were javelin-throwers from the Mount Hæmus region, under command of Attalus, were the most important and numerous; and the Thracian javelin-throwers, Sitalces commanding, were equally useful and steady on all occasions. These were the flankers of the army. Famous archers came from Crete. Clearchus was their commander at the outset; but the chiefs mentioned were often subject to change on account of death or wounds. The archers thrice lost their chief in battle.

There were, to resume, four classes of infantry. First, the *pezetæri*, or foot companions, who bore the sarissa. Second, the hypaspists, or shield-bearing guards, with sword and *xyston*, or one-handed pike. Third, the peltasts, a well-organized and substantially armed light infantry. Fourth, the *psiloi*, or irregular lightly-armed foot, archers, slingers and darters. Of cavalry there were, first, the cavalry Companions and the Thessalians and some Greeks, all heavy armed. Second, the light-cavalry, well-armed mercenary troops. Third, lancers and dimachias, or horse-bowmen. Fourth, irregular nomads, armed in any manner.

Light troops had, until Philip's day, been of little use or repute in Greece. They had been raised from the poorer

population, and being illly armed and not subjected to much discipline, were never apt to be steady or reliable. It remained for Alexander to put them under strict discipline, use them on the service to which they were peculiarly adapted, and thus make their worth apparent.

There is nothing definite known as to the rate of pay. Cyrus paid the hoplites under Clearchus a daric, about four dollars, a month. Demosthenes, in the Philippics, refers to the pay of a foot soldier as being ten drachmas (= two dollars) a month. There was an arrangement between the Athenians and the Argives to pay a drachma of Ægina a day to each horseman, and three oboli for a foot-soldier, twenty-seven and thirteen cents respectively. A man who lost a limb in war received an obol (four cents +) a day. Sinope and Heraclea offered Xenophon's men one stater of Cyzicus a month. Seuthes offered them the same sum, which is five dollars and fifty cents. Others offered a daric (four dollars) a month per man. Droysen makes a detailed calculation, suggesting that the monthly pay of the Macedonian horseman was three hundred drachmas, about sixty dollars; of the allied horseman two hundred and fifty drachmas, about fifty dollars; of the pezetæri one hundred drachmas, about twenty dollars; of the light-infantryman eighty-four drachmas, about seventeen dollars; and adds a similar amount to each for rations. From olden time it was the habit among the Greeks to give the soldier a sum equal to his pay for rations. But these sums are manifestly too high. Alexander may have distributed largesses to his men to this extent or more; but that the regular compensation was anything like so much appears doubtful. The daric a month seems nearer the truth; or perhaps Droysen's figures are intended for the annual stipend.

When the entire army was drawn up in line of battle, though indeed the order was much varied in the field, accord-

ing as the conditions varied, the phalanx occupied the centre, the several taxes or brigades by rote from right to left, under their respective chiefs. It was a precedent that these brigades should change their order in line by a certain rule from day to day, or at other short periods. On the right of the phalanx were the hypaspists, the agema holding the right of their line. Again, on the right of these were the eight squadrons of Macedonian cavalry, changing order in similar fashion from day to day. Then came the light troops, lancers, Pæonians, Agrianians and archers, of the right wing, to act as flankers and skirmishers and to cover the right flank as well as to open the attack. On the left of the phalanx, if not on duty to protect the camp, were apt to come the Thracian javelin-throwers, in the place corresponding to that of the hypaspists of the right, farther on the Grecian contingent of horse, then the Thessalian horse, then light troops such as Agatho's Odryssian cavalry. The demarcation between the right and left wings was the junction of the third and fourth brigades of pezetaeri.

This order was by no means a cut-and-dried rule. Alexander was peculiarly happy in tactical formations, and shifted his troops according to the work to be done. In line of battle the phalanx was sometimes divided into right wing, left wing and centre. Each wing was in two sections, with intervals through which the skirmishers who opened the combat could retire. But there appear to have been other intervals in active service. The post of honor of the phalanx was the right. Here the general took his stand, not merely to direct, but to lead the battle as the most valiant of the combatants.

Philip, and after him Alexander, thus greatly improved the organization and discipline of the phalanx, which was based on the Greek model. For the purpose of opposing what it


then had to oppose, it was as nearly perfect as possible. It was taught before all things to attack, never to wait attack. The heavy foot and peltasts were drilled to fight by shocks, and the several bodies or brigades moved independently and with intervals of twenty to forty feet between small phalanxes, mutually supporting each other, and thus making up for the want of reserves. The cavalry especially attacked with extraordinary speed and *élan*,—Alexander was Frederick's model in this,—relying upon impetus just as the phalanx did on weight, and when broken was always able to rally and renew the charge again and again. The light foot and horse had no special place, but filled up the intervals between the heavy bodies and protected detachments and the exposed flanks of the phalanx by restless activity.

The marches were conducted with a rare appreciation of *terrain* and troops, and the distances continuously covered were often enormous.

A The entire grand phalanx rarely fought as a body, but usually the several sections or divisions fought separately, each being called a phalanx. Occasionally one section was placed by Alexander behind another as reserve, or to deepen the column. A section or sections could be in reserve, faced to the rear, or to right or left, as at Arbela. One of Alexander's most prominent qualities was the ability to make quick dispositions suitable to the occasion and quite outside ordinary tactical usage. For instance, on Pelium plain in Illyria, in a narrow and mountainous region, he formed the phalanx one hundred and twenty men deep. Arrian calls this *cuneus* or *wedge*. After crossing the Danube Alexander formed square, with archers and slingers in the centre, much as Brasidas and Xenophon had done. No doubt he borrowed the idea; but what Alexander borrowed he bettered. At Arbela he formed two flying wings with consummate skill and

effect. At the Hydaspes he detached a cavalry force about Porus' right flank with equal foresight and results.

The artillery of those days was much improved by Philip and later by Alexander, who was the first to construct the machines, and to mount them on wagons in such a manner as to be able to march them in company with the army as our field artillery does to-day. Up to this time these military machines had only been used in sieges. Having them at hand, Alexander made constant use of them at defiles, against field-works, in crossing rivers, and in many sudden emergencies. Philip and Alexander consolidated the artillery into batteries, and Philip had one hundred and fifty companies on foot and twenty-five reserve batteries in his arsenals.




Catapult.

The catapult was the invention of the Syrians, according to Pliny. It was a species of huge bow, mounted on a platform. The propelling force was usually a twisted cord or gut applied to the arms of the bow. The bowstring was tightened by a windlass and released by a spring. The catapult shot huge iron-pointed arrows or pikes weighing from ten to three hundred pounds, which had considerable penetration. It may be called the cannon of the ancients. It was capable of carrying nearly one half mile, and was accurate up to five

hundred paces. Some were so arranged as to hurl a flight of leaden bullets instead of an arrow.

The ballista originated with the Phœnicians. It threw stones up to fifty pounds weight and over, and was the mortar of the ancients. The missile could be cast about half a mile. The ballista consisted of a stout beam or arm of wood whose



Ballista.

one end bore a spoon or bowl in which was held the stone, while the other end was secured in a twisted cord or gut mounted in a timber frame. Being brought backward against the twist to a nearly horizontal position by a windlass, and the stone or other projectile placed in the spoon or bowl, the arm was suddenly released and flew upward with great power. Its motion was suddenly arrested by an upper transverse beam, or by cords fastened to the frame-work. The projectile left the spoon at this point and could be directed with considerable accuracy. Red-hot balls and fire-pots were also hurled by the ballista, and sometimes infected corpses were thrown into a city to spread disease. These engines were really very effective; in some respects as much so as our modern artillery. In the hands of Alexander, the Macedonian engines were frequently of as great use as a battery is to-day. In transporting these machines the Macedonians carried only the


essential parts, for the heavy timbers could be cut and fitted in any place where trees were accessible. A horse or mule could transport the essentials of one ballista or catapult such as they were when perfected by Alexander's engineers.

We know nothing about the baggage or wagon train, but it must have been much what it is to-day, except that pack-animals were more common than wagons. Horses had to have forage and soldiers rations then as now, and we do not hear that Alexander's men carried twenty days' victual, like Cæsar's legionaries, on their persons. They had basket-work haversacks, and their rations consisted of salt meat, cheese, olives, onions and corn. At one time there was, according to Philip's orders, a porter for every ten phalangites, and the hetairai or cavalry Companions always had servants. Philip is said to have first taken from the infantry their baggage-wagons and cut down the horseman's servants to one, and he often marched his men with full complement of equipment, baggage and provision, even in summer heat, thirty miles a day as a mere matter of training. Headquarters must necessarily have had certain facilities for doing business. That there were provost-marshals we know, and there are one or two references which sound as if there was a regular field-hospital service. All this demanded transportation.

The quartermaster's and commissary's as well as engineer departments we read little about. But there is evidence of their wonderful efficiency in everything which Alexander did. The system was the creation of Philip. Pella, at Philip's accession, was a place of small pretensions. At his death it had become a great capital, whose war department must have been as carefully managed as the best of to-day. Such a military machine was an entire novelty in the then world, as wonderful in that era as to-day Prussia's perfect organization would be if it were the only regular army and the rest

of the world had but militia, such as is possessed by our own States in America.

The Greek camp was constructed with great care. It was usually round or elliptical in shape. It had streets which met in the centre, where also was placed the headquarters. Slaves, of whom, as we have seen, a great number always accompanied the army, were set to work to dig a trench about the camp so soon as it had been located, and threw the earth up into a rampart about six feet high. This wall was usually defended by entanglements, *trous-de-loup*, crow's feet, and a species of abatis.



Greek Camp.

Picket duty was strictly performed, but the guards were not placed at the distance of our pickets from camp. Posts of fifty hoplites each surrounded the camp, from which a line of sentinels was sent out. These sentinels passed from hand to hand a bell to show that they were on the alert. Officers, accompanied by torch-bearers, made prescribed rounds, also ringing a bell. Sentinels appear to have challenged this officer much in the same manner which obtains with us. A password, apt to be the name of a god, was exchanged between patrols and sentinels.

On the march the phalanx moved, with few exceptions, right in front. Martial music, mostly pipes, was usual. Each syntagma had its own trumpeter, but just what a Macedonian band may have been like we are left to conjecture. The cadenced step was practiced more than nowadays. With the sarissa, a cadenced step was a *sine qua non* to keep the ranks unbroken.

In the face of the enemy the soldiers were wont to chant

the pæan. At certain times the phalanx advanced in silence, so as the better to give heed to orders, then intuned the pæan as they neared the foe, and closed with him shouting the battle-cry. Every old soldier remembers the inspiriting nature of a battlefield cheer. It will ring in his ears throughout life. Alexander's men raised so terrifying a shout, as they advanced to the attack, that its effect upon the enemy was sometimes prodigious.

A vanguard and rearguard of light troops, infantry and cavalry, were usual on the march, often sustained by the heavier hypaspists. The artillery, baggage and elephants, if any, marched in rear of the phalanx. Rations in bulk were carried on beasts of burden or by slaves in the train. The trains must have been very extended. But the East was densely populated, and Alexander habitually lived on the country, much as Napoleon did, though we do not note the consequent loss of discipline in the Macedonian ranks which was prevalent in the French armies under Bonaparte.

Many of the most usual and effective manœuvres on the battlefield of to-day have come down to us from the Greeks. As we have seen, Epaminondas showed us the value of the oblique order and the value of the column of attack, and Xenophon distinctly describes an advance in columns by the right of companies (or regiments) to overcome ground which would be apt to break the solidity of a line of battle. There are numberless others. The tactical works about the Greek armies are quite detailed and intricate, and show as great intelligence in grand and minor tactics as appears in the treatises of any age. It remains, however, a fact that most battles were fought in simple parallel order. The Greek tacticians knew more than their generals could apply.

Battles were intended to be, and were usually, won by a single shock. For an impact, or as a line of defense, on level

ground the phalanx was irresistible. The habit in attacking the enemy was first to throw forward the archers and slingers in skirmishing order, sustained by the light cavalry, perhaps on the flanks. This attack was followed up by putting in the targeteers and hypaspists, and last the phalanx and heavy cavalry. But Alexander often gave his first blow with the Companions. After the light troops had opened the combat they filed off to the left and right, or passed through the intervals and uncovered the phalanx. The music then sounded, the pæan was chanted, and to its inspiriting strains the phalanx advanced in cadenced step.

In each phalangial subdivision there was apt to be an insensible movement to the right because each man had his own left side protected by his shield and endeavored to hug the protection afforded by the shield of his right-hand man. This naturally resulted in the right flank often becoming somewhat advanced; and, no doubt, one reason why the commander's station was on the right was the desire to control this edging tendency. Some authors have ascribed to it the origin of the oblique order, which was so valuable to Alexander in nearly all his battles. We shall recur to this question of the oblique order frequently. We know that Alexander was familiar with Leuctra and Mantinæa, where the manœuvre was by no means dependent on this tendency.

As a rule, but one line of battle was formed. The depth of the phalanx rendered a second one impracticable, and moreover there were rarely enough troops, with the great depth, to make a line of sufficient length, if many were to be left in reserve. Especially was this so in Alexander's case, who fought such greatly superior forces, which could readily extend beyond and turn his either flank. Still Alexander frequently had reserves. Arbela, for instance, is an exception to the general rule, dictated by the peculiar circumstances. Here Alexan-

der had a partial first line of light troops, a second of the phalanx, and placed a third in reserve to protect the rear, and to wheel to right and left to cover the flanks. The cavalry on the right and the troops on the left were likewise in three lines. As a habit Alexander placed the bulk of his horse where he proposed to make his most serious attack, and not by any hard and fast rule.

It was usual at this early period for level ground to be selected as a battlefield, and on such ground each army was formally marshaled and marched against the other. But by Alexander's time the art of war had advanced beyond this simple array, and a few other tactical manœuvres had come in to take their place. We shall see how much Alexander himself taught the world in this branch of the art, as well as how he gave it the first lessons in the passing of rivers at the Granicus, the Pinarus and most memorably at the river Hydaspes. What he showed the world of strategy was, however, lost on all but such captains as Hannibal and Cæsar.

In retreat, in presence of the enemy, the Greeks were wont to march in a circle or square, with the slaves, women, booty and baggage in the centre. A vanguard, rearguard and flankers were thrown out.

The Greeks usually constructed on a field of victory, from the spoils of the enemy, a monument to commemorate the victory. This was a religious rite due to the manes of the slain.

The Macedonians had an excellent system of signals, by beacons at night and standards by day. They appear to have been able to convey information with accuracy and great speed.

The corps of "pages" was perhaps the first institution which may be said to have been an embryo military school, — a by no means incomplete West Point. From these pages came eventually all the higher officers. They were youths

of high extraction, who surrounded the person of the king, waited upon him, brought him his horse, stood watch at his bedside at night, did his confidential errands, sat at his table, studied the art of war while thus serving at court or at headquarters in the field and became personally known to him. They underwent the same kind of training which is usual at modern military schools, and their places were far from being sinecures. They were so hard-worked in Asia that many of them died. Alexander usually pushed his subordinates hard. He himself was capable of unremitting labor, and he required it of others. These pages, after a certain number of years' training, were gradually appointed, according to their merit or the confidence of the monarch, to moderate commands, and from these positions were in the way of success as their ability and courage won it. They might rise to be chosen somatophylaxes, of whom there usually were seven, and who were like adjutants-general, or prominent aides of the king, or army leaders ; they might fail and never gain promotion beyond a modest rank. In line of battle these pages served as a part of the hypaspists. In Asia they were under command of Seleucus.

In the army of Alexander, the following may be given as the successive ranks from the king down. Philip had introduced the graduated system of rank and command, and of advancement strictly according to merit.

1. Alexander, king and commander-in-chief.
2. Parmenio and Antipater, army commanders immediately under Alexander. Among the noble families clustering about Philip, two were prominent. Of one of these Parmenio, Philip's (and later Alexander's) oldest and most trusted lieutenant, was the head ; of the other, Antipater. The first, in the Macedonian economy of Alexander's reign, represented the military, the other the civil government.

Antipater was left in Macedonia as quasi-regent; Parmenio accompanied the army to Asia. He stood to Alexander somewhat in the same relation as Meade to Grant in 1864. But Alexander habitually commanded the right, Parmenio the left wing in person.

3. The seven somatophylaxes (confidential body-guards), general officers who were placed in command of large detachments for special service, or who held important commands to which they might be appointed by the king, or acted as *aides-de-camp*.
4. Tetraphalangiarch, or commander of a quadruple phalanx.
5. Diphalangiarch, or commander of a double phalanx.
6. Phalangiarch, or commander of a simple phalanx of four thousand and ninety-six hoplites.

These three titles were more descriptive of command temporarily enjoyed than of a rank as distinct as lieutenant-general, major-general or brigadier-general of to-day.

7. Chiliarch or taxiarch or strategos, colonel of infantry, and hipparch, colonel of cavalry.
8. Xenagos, syntagmatarch, major of foot. Just how high in rank the uragos, or second major of the syntagma was, is not clear.
9. Taxiarch, captain.
10. Tetrarch, lieutenant.
11. Lochagos, sergeant.

There were officers of cavalry, whose rank was assimilated to the last four; and the light troops were similarly officered throughout.

The word of the king was supreme law. But it was common to summon councils of war from time to time to decide matters of great moment. Just how far these were required by law or precedent does not appear, but they were constantly called as if a matter of rote. In such councils

the officers of given rank, whether of Macedonians or Greeks, auxiliary or mercenary, Thracians or Agrianians, Odryssians, or Pæonians, were all present and had equal right to be heard and considered. But it is probable that the Macedonians had higher rank and more influence in such councils, and the opinion of the somatophylaxes, for instance, would be apt to bear greater weight. But Alexander invariably, excepting at the Hyphasis, carried his point. His persuasiveness was always equal to the respect and affection of his subordinates.



Philip of Macedon, from a coin.

XIII.


THE ART OF FORTIFICATION AND SIEGES.

THUCYDIDES' account of the siege of Platæa gives us the first insight into ancient methods. The art of sieges was less developed than that of fortification. The earliest means of attacking walls was by scaling ladders, or by mounting on a tortoise of shields. Then came walls of circumvallation and contravallation, mounds to override the walls, towers, sheds and mantelets, rams and engines to cast heavy missiles and break down the walls, and mines. The mounds and towers were often of extraordinary size. The besieged used converse means. They made sorties, shot burning missiles to fire the siege works, built half moons behind breaches in the walls, and countermined. The various devices exhibited great ingenuity. Field fortifications were rare.

PRIOR to the Peloponnesian war the art of attacking cities had not risen to any great height. Thucydides' relation of the siege of Platæa gives us the first detailed account of the operations then usual. Alexander gave to the art a marked impetus. Of all acts of war sieges allow the military art to approach most closely to the other arts and sciences; that is, call for the employment of more of the arts which chiefly are of use in peace. The methods of a siege, if the garrison cannot be starved out, are either to scale the walls or to make breaches in them which can be carried by assault; and it is essential to do the latter with as little exposure to the enemy's fire as possible. The besieged, on the other hand, must seek to destroy the besiegers' means of accomplishing this, and to inflict what loss they can on them as a means of driving them from their purpose.

The earliest means of attacking walls was by scaling-ladders. These were first used at the siege of the Seven against

Thebes, and Campaneus, one of the kings and their inventor, is said to have lost his life in falling from one of his own ladders. A later means was the tortoise, made, as has been already described, by joining together bucklers, or shields, above the heads of a massed force, on which a second party could



Scaling-Ladders.


stand to scale the walls or form a second tortoise for the scalers. But these crude methods soon gave way to more regular means, which aimed at making a defense against sorties from within and against relief from without, at erecting a shelter from the enemy's fire and at organizing vigorous measures of attack.

A wall of contravallation to inclose the town or fortress and keep the garrison within its defenses was first built; then out-


side this a wall of circumvallation at a suitable distance and facing outward to prevent a relieving army from interfering with the operations of the besiegers.

In front of the wall of contravallation mounds were erected, from which the walls of the town could be attacked. These were gradually thrown up under the protection of movable screens or sheds, or, as they also were sometimes called, tortoises. One common form of shed was a roof built of and sustained by heavy beams, covered with clay or tiles and fresh skins and other materials calculated to resist fire, and mounted on wheels. Two lines of sheds were sometimes built on a slightly converging angle up to a certain distance from the wall, and then the lines united. The front of these sheds towards the enemy was protected by hanging on them blankets made of rawhides and twisted ropes.

The mound itself was constructed of earth, stones, trees, sometimes trestlework, the whole filled in with earth and stones or any material which could be quickest got together and would bear the weight of the towers which were to be advanced. The mound had a gradual slant upwards towards the wall, but as erect a face as possible at the ditch. Upon or beside this mound, during erection, smaller towers were placed from which the besiegers could be attacked with arrows, darts and stones, and prevented from interrupting the




Tortoise.



Fort, Tower, Mound, Mantlets and Mine, with Section showing Construction.

work. From this mound, when completed, the ditch could be filled up and the walls could be demolished with battering rams and other devices. The besiegers had the advantage of the mound for their engines, whereas the engines of the enemy were usually on the ground inside the walls of the town, whence their aim was by no means so accurate. But often mounds of equal size were built inside by the besieged to get a better chance for their fire. The rapidity with which these mounds could be thrown up to an extraordinary height is most astonishing, even when we consider that the whole army worked at them, and that often the entire population of the surrounding district was pressed into the service. Cæsar made a mound at Avaricum in twenty-four days, which was eighty feet high and three hundred and thirty feet wide, and had towers at each side. Sylla is said, at the siege of Massada, to have made a mound two hundred and eighty-six feet high, and to have surmounted it by structures one hundred and fifty-five feet higher. These figures may possibly fail somewhat of accuracy. They sound exaggerated even when we remember the walls of Babylon. But the enormous size of these structures is well established.

Instead of mounds, towers alone were often built, as they could be more quickly constructed. The size of these seems equally fabulous. They are said to have been sometimes twenty stories in height, and the ordinary towers had ten stories. The carpentry in them must have been wonderful. Each story was filled with armed men, and had loopholes from which these could shoot missiles at the besieged on the walls. These towers rested on a number of wheels, very broad and solid, and required many hundred men to move them. Demetrius Poliorcetes, at Rhodes, according to Diodorus, had one made by Epimachus of Athens, which was seventy-five feet square, one hundred and fifty feet high, and



Tower with Drawbridge and Ram.

rested on eight wheels whose felloes were six feet wide and heavily ironed, as was also the tower. It took three thousand four hundred men to move it, working no doubt in relays. These towers were of course pushed forward very slowly and probably by levers applied to the wheels from the inside. Plutarch says that it took a month to move a big tower two hundred and fifty paces. Diodorus states that they could be moved one thousand paces in less time. The raising and moving of buildings to-day explains to a certain extent how all this was done. The towers contained reservoirs of

water to quench fires which the besieged might set. Generally the battering-rams were slung in the lower story; the engines stood in the middle ones; the soldiers occupied the upper stories. While the tower was being advanced, the men in the several stories kept up a constant fire of arrows, javelins and other missiles upon the besieged who occupied the walls, to prevent their interference with the operations of the siege; and from this tower, when near enough, bridges hinged thereto, and sometimes concealed, were dropped upon the walls. Over these bridges the besiegers marched to the assault. Towers were often made on permanent foundations, and not infrequently of brick.


Rams were at first long bars of iron, or beams pointed with iron, which were handled by the soldiers. Pliny recognizes the ram in the story of the horse of Troy. Thucydides clearly describes one at the siege of Samos in the Peloponnesian war. Next came the idea of suspending the rams in a framework and moving them to and fro by manned ropes, thus getting the advantage of impetus. Later they were mounted on wheels running in tracks. This latter kind averaged fifty feet long. Demetrius is said to have had two, each one hundred and twenty feet long. They were often loaded at both ends so as to deliver a heavier blow. They needed many men to operate them, as they often weighed hundreds of tons. To transport one mentioned by Diodorus required three hundred pairs of horses; to operate it fifteen hundred men, including the relays.

While the besiegers were engaged at undermining the walls of the town, the besieged were busy undermining the terrace or mound and the towers of the besiegers. Having no explosives, they were obliged to make chambers large enough to weaken the entire structure. The roofs of these chambers were sustained by beams, and when completed, they were

filled with combustibles and fired. This consumed the supporting beams, further weakened the earth, walls or terrace, and dropped the structures erected above.

Mining and countermining were extensively carried on. Subterranean fights were not unusual. Certain means of discovering the position of mines by the sound of metal vessels in their vicinity were practiced, and great ingenuity and no little scientific ability were displayed in both attack and defense.

To shelter the men who protected the works in front of the




Mantelets.

walls, or who advanced to the assault of a breach, the Greeks used mantelets, both portable and mounted on wheels, as well as the rolling galleries or sheds above described.

Alexander's engineer, Diades, was the inventor of a huge hook or "crow," swung upon a high vertical frame, by which the upper stones of a wall could be seized and pulled down. He also invented the telenon, which consisted of a huge upright mast, across which was hung a yard or boom, and on one end of this a basket or car capable of containing a number of soldiers. This car was raised or lowered by means of ropes attached to the other end of the boom. By this device, a party or forlorn hope could be raised to the height of the wall, clamber upon it and attack its defenders.

In defending a town, the besieged adopted every means by which the access of the enemy's soldiers could be prevented. They had forked poles with which to push away the ladders which the besiegers placed in position; they were supplied with vessels which they could speedily heat so as to pour boiling oil, or pitch, or red-hot sand upon the scalers; or else

materials which rendered the air impure were thrown down upon the besiegers' works. The mound was often undermined as fast as built. A second wall, or curtain, or half-moon, was sometimes built behind the place selected by the enemy for operating a breach, so that he found himself confronted with new labors so soon as he had completed the first. Towers were raised on the walls to dominate those of the besiegers. Efforts were unremitting to set the work of the




Telenon and Mural Hook.

besiegers on fire, by casting inflammable arrows with the catapults and fire-pots with the ballista. Walls were protected against the rams by aprons calculated to deaden the blow. These were made of wool mattresses, ropes and other soft material. The rams were seized and picked up by huge tongs operated from the wall, or were broken or unhinged by weights dropped on them from above.

Sorties were constantly made to endeavor to burn the works and disturb the besiegers. Apparently the ancients were as fertile in resources as we are to-day in the matter of sieges, and if their artillery was less powerful than our own, their

machines nevertheless were capable of doing remarkably efficient work.

Field fortifications were rarely employed by the Greeks. These were usually confined to the defense of defiles, and, except to surround the camps, were never used in the plains.



Pent-House and Ram picked up by Tongs.

Indeed, the Greek camps were by no means so admirably fortified as they were in later centuries by the Romans. Still, the Greeks in front of Troy fortified their camp, and on one occasion it saved them from disaster, and there are many later instances of temporary intrenchments. But their use, as we understand them to-day, was unknown.

XIV.

ALEXANDER AND GREECE. B. C. 336.

PHILIP had for years harbored designs of an expedition against the Persian monarchy, but did not live to carry them out. Alexander succeeded him at the age of twenty. He had been educated under Aristotle. No monarch of his years was ever so well equipped in heart and head. Like Frederick, he was master from the start. "Though the name has changed, the king remains," quoth he. His arms he found ready to hand, tempered in his father's forge. But it was his own strength and skill which wielded them. The Greeks considered themselves absolved from Macedonian jurisdiction by the death of Philip. Not so thought Alexander. He marched against them, turning the passes of Tempē and Callipeukē by hewing a path along the slopes of Mount Ossa, and made himself master of Thessaly. The Amphycitionic Council deemed it wise to submit, and elected him autocrat in place of his father.

IT was in the midst of such a circle and such a government that the youth of Alexander was spent. From his infancy the superstitious blood of his mother coined in his mind the stories of Hercules and Achilles and Bacchus, while the practical sense of his father led him to look upon the earth and water which his ancestors had been compelled to bring to the Persian king as injuries to be avenged. The glorious story of Marathon and Salamis taught him that the few with soul-stirring common purpose are stronger than the many who lack cohesion or leaders; and the destruction of the holy temples and tombs of Asia Minor by the ruthless servants of the Great King roused his righteous indignation to the highest pitch. The boy's shoulders bore a man's head, and his father's splendid exploits, coupled with what Philip looked forward to accomplish in the future, made Alexander fear that there would be nothing left for him to conquer. His

mind was alert and inquisitive beyond his years. So, when Persian ambassadors once came to the Macedonian court, it was natural that this boy should inquire of them about the armies and topography of Asia, the resources and wealth, the laws and customs, the government and the life of the peoples; but the ambassadors were none the less astounded. No wonder Philip was proud of his son and heir.

Alexander's early education was presided over by Leonidas, a relative of his mother, and an austere man. His special pedagogue was Lysimachus, who indulged in superstitious lore and in unwise flattery, and bred in the youth a half belief in the divine origin of Peleus and of Achilles, from whom he claimed descent. He was afterwards more fortunate; for "Aristotle, who conquered the world of thought, gave instruction to him who should conquer the world itself" (B. C. 345-4). From this great man Alexander gained all that was wisest and best; and what he thus learned never forsook him. It was well that the teaching of this philosopher should fall on such fruitful soil. It was sad that the pupil should, later in life, lose his trust in his great preceptor and friend.

Alexander inherited his enthusiastic nature, his deep wealth of sentiment, his truly heroic soul, from his mother. From his father he took his physique, his power of reasoning, his cool judgment, his infallible penetration. Vigor and quickness of movement, a bright and intelligent look and a full, round, strong voice distinguished him in action. At rest he was gentle and pleasing, and possessed a peculiarly moist, expressive eye. He wore long and curly hair. He is said to have had a trick of habitually inclining his head over the left shoulder, a thing at one time much imitated by the dandies of Greece. He was agreeable in person, and very temperate in his pleasures. In sports and gymnastics he easily excelled all, but cared little for professional athletes. The

story of Bucephalus is probably no myth. No one, from Plutarch's narration, had apparently been able to control the high-strung beast, mainly because he had been treated with indiscretion. Alexander, however, observant of the animal's peculiarities, by intelligent kindness and fearlessness bestrode and managed him with ease. Bucephalus served him stanchly and affectionately from that day till the battle of the Hydaspes, where he died, gamely pursuing Porus.

Bucephalus had been brought to Philip for sale. The price was thirteen talents. He must have been a celebrated horse at that time to command so much. But no one was able to mount him on account of his rearing and plunging. He was being led away, when Alexander asked for leave to try him. The lad was laughed at, but his entreaties finally prevailed.

"Alexander immediately ran to the horse, and taking hold of the bridle, turned him directly towards the sun, having, it seems, observed that he was disturbed at and afraid of the motion of his own shadow; then letting him go forward a little, still keeping the reins in his hand, and stroking him gently when he found him begin to grow eager and fiery, he let fall his upper garment softly, and with one nimble leap securely mounted him, and when he was seated, by little and little drew in the bridle, and curbed him without either striking or spurring him. Presently when he found him free from all rebelliousness and only impatient for the course, he let him go at full speed, inciting him now with a commanding voice, and urging him also with his heels." (Plutarch.)

In his mental equipment Alexander was equally strong; he enjoyed all manner of intellectual friction. In strength of character few in the world's history have been his equals, none his superior.

It was thus that Alexander the Great grew to manhood. We have seen how he came to the throne. Once fairly seated,


he speedily showed that though his father had forged the tools he found ready to his hand, he himself could wield them with a suddenness, boldness and decision of which Philip was probably never capable. No man was ever in so full a sense the leader of an army. He fought with it, commanded it, and handled it in an almost superhuman way. Always an absolute example to men and officers, he asked nothing from high or low that he was not able to do far better himself, and willing to undertake.

He made no mistake in his political beginnings. He continued his father's ministers in power, and committed none of the blunders associated with youth. But his position was critical. On the death of Philip the Greeks claimed to be absolved from Macedonian jurisdiction. Athens at once prepared for war and built herself a fleet. Thebes attempted to eject the Macedonian garrison from the Cadmæa. The smaller cities were in a ferment. Sparta, as we know, had never submitted. Philip, anticipating nothing of the kind, had divided his army, and Parmenio was in Asia with a large part of it. The northern tribes were becoming unruly. In fact, the Illyrians rose in active revolt. Thus from north, east, west, south, danger stared Alexander in the face. Moreover, as we have seen, Attalus, uncle of Cleopatra, under pretense of getting the kingdom for her son by Philip, was really conspiring to seat himself upon it, and being, with Parmenio, in joint command of the army of Asia, he relied on his influence with the troops to accomplish his design. Everything looked desperate. Alexander's friends advised him to compromise with Greece and seek for peace with Attalus. But Alexander was made of no such stuff. He had already waded through much blood; security could be had by no other path, nor had he been taught to recognize a better. He at once sent to Asia and caused Attalus to be executed for treason.

This was safely accomplished by his general and intimate, Hecataeus, who, with a fresh and faithful body of troops, passed over to Asia and joined Parmenio.

This gravest of his dangers put aside, within two months from the death of his father Alexander marched on Thessaly, with a force said to have been equal to that which Philip commanded at Chæronæa. He

determined to exhibit his power to those who believed that there was no more Philip. His route lay along the coast towards the Penæan passes. The main defile of Tempē as well as the minor one of Callipeukē was strongly held. To attack them was more than hazardous; it would plainly be futile. Ossa rises in steep rocky masses south of the pass of Tempē. From the sea, however, the slope of Ossa is more gradual than



March into Thessaly.

along the Penæus. With that fertility of resource and active embracing of difficulty which was always his marked characteristic, Alexander, unknown to the enemy, hewed himself a never-yet-trodden path along the slopes of Ossa on the seaside, blasting a foothold for his army where it could not otherwise make its way, and turned the Thessalian force in the passes. He was thus master of the situation, and his bold intelligence had made him master of Thessaly. But he desired to keep this country friendly, for the Thessalian horsemen made the best cavalry in Greece, and he needed above

all things horse in his projected Persian war. With the plausible generosity which he could so well display,—and Alexander's promise was always sacredly redeemed,—on convening an assembly, he persuaded the Thessalians to give him all they had granted Philip, and if necessary to help him as against the rest of Hellas. Not only Thessaly, but other tribes which had Amphictyonic votes Alexander thus gained, and speedily made his way unopposed through the pass of Thermopylæ.

Here he convened the Amphictyonic council and was declared *Hegemōn* (captain-general) of Greece, as had been Philip before him. Thebes and Athens sent no representatives; but on Alexander's moving on Thebes, both cities hastened to agree to the terms of the Amphictyonic decision. Alexander was glad to accept this tardy acknowledgment. He caused the vote to be repeated at Corinth, where implacable Sparta alone was absent, preferring the isolation of independence. Alexander continued his march into the Peloponnesus to exhibit his strength, but undertook no operations there. Autonomy was assured to each Greek state.

Alexander had ascertained the mood of Greece, and had for the moment calmed it. All the wealth, intellect and power of Greece had joined to simulate honor to the bold young king. Diogenes alone waited for Alexander to come to him, and then requested as his only desire that Alexander would stand a trifle out of his sunlight. "By Jupiter, were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes!" said the king. The danger from east and south had been overcome, at least for the moment. Alexander returned before winter to Pella.

It is clear, says Freeman, that both the great Macedonians really loved and revered Greece,—Athens above all. To humble her politically was an unavoidable part of their pol-

icy ; but they always kept themselves from doing her any wrong beyond what their policy called for. They felt as Greeks, and they had no temptation to destroy what they claimed as their mother-country. They had clearly no wish to swallow up Greece in Macedonia, but rather to make Macedonia, as a Greek state, the ruling power of Greece. Such was undoubtedly the aim of Philip, and it was that of Alexander too, till, from the throne of the Great King, he may have learned to look on both Greece and Macedonia as little more than corners of his empire, nurseries of his most valiant soldiers.

Matters being thus smoothed over, Alexander could foresee the possibility of carrying out his Persian project. Parmenio had so far not accomplished much in Asia Minor ; but his presence and position there had forestalled any invasion of Macedonia by the Persians, and might be said to cover Alexander's flank in any campaign he should be compelled to make against the Thracians. This was at least a negative gain. There remained but to be secure of lasting quiet at home.

Macedon was well equipped. The people, as we have said, enjoyed equal rights, and were to a man liable to military service when called on. The soldier was citizen ; the citizen, soldier ; the soldier a regular. There was no conflicting interest. If a king was no general, his Macedonians could exercise suitable control over him. If the king was a Philip or an Alexander, the respect and admiration of his citizen-soldiers gave him a power all the more worth having. And the courage and discipline of such a body, combining the virtues of both the volunteer and regular, was on a plane much higher than that of the soldier of the rest of Greece ; immeasurably higher than that of the soldier of Persia.

XV.

THE DANUBE. B. C. 335.

THERE remained the task of quieting the northern and western borders, a work Philip had ably begun but had not lived to finish. The tribes along the Danube had risen *en masse*, and those in the mountains of Illyria had banded together. They had heard of the death of Philip, and knew not Alexander. The king headed for Mount Hæmus. Here the barbarians had drawn up in front of the only available defile, and had disposed their wagons in such fashion as to roll them down upon the phalanx. By so arranging his men that they could form lanes through the ranks to allow some of the wagons to pass, and by ordering the rest to form a tortoise and permit the wagons to roll across it, this singular danger was averted. The enemy was then attacked and dispersed. Beyond Mount Hæmus the Triballians endeavored to get around to his rear, but Alexander turned on them, and in a sharply contested battle at the Lyginus signally defeated them. At the Danube he met his fleet, which had been ordered from Byzantium to and up the river. Most of the tribes had taken refuge on an island in the river. Alexander sought to drive them out; but the steep banks and rapid current prevented his so doing. He then crossed the Danube — an able performance — and inflicted due chastisement on the Getæ. This was followed by the surrender of all the rest, including the refugees on the island. Alexander's borders to the Danube could be deemed secure.

BEFORE Alexander could start on his expedition against Persia, he saw that he must reduce to subjection some of the savage tribes on his own borders. These tribes had been in part subdued by Philip, in part received as allies, in part punished whenever they attempted inroads on Macedonia, and thus held in temporary check. Now the Illyrians, under Clitus, whom Philip had in bloody conflict pushed back of Lake Lychnitis, and the Taulantinians from the coast near Appolonia and Dyrracchium, under their chief Glaucias, and the Autariatians from the valleys to the north of these latter, all rose *en masse*. But even more dangerous were


the Thracian Triballians on the Danube, with whom Philip had had a far from successful bout, in which he had been wounded. And beyond these tribes lay others, “fearful robbers even to robbers themselves,” all of whom were liable to join in any insurrection or raid which might be begun by those nearest the Macedonian frontier. These tribes had been quelled, but not thoroughly subdued, by Philip. And now, in a second uprising, no halfway measures would do, if Alexander expected to absent himself from Macedon for years.

Greece was tranquil; spring afforded suitable conditions for mountain warfare; the time was ripe. Parmenio had been recalled from Asia, where a lieutenant still remained, and was left in Macedonia to guard it against Illyrian incursions, while Alexander set forth to teach these Danube barbarians the lesson which Philip’s wound had prevented his giving them *au fond*. Antipater, meanwhile, was given the civil government at Pella in charge.

There were two roads open to Alexander: following the course of the Axius up its passes through the land of the faithful Agrianians; or easterly along the coast through the domain of the free Thracians, up towards the valley of the Hebrus and across Mount Hæmus range to attack the Triballian question from the east. He chose the latter route, as it led through the land of the uncertain-minded Odryssians, whom he could probably conciliate on the way. He ordered a fleet from Byzantium to repair to its mouths ready to ascend the Danube, on which river he proposed in due time to meet it. Early in the spring he started along the route with the purpose of settling the troubles at the Danube and afterward those on the Illyrian borders once for all.

From Amphipolis he marched to Philippi and northward along the Nessus and over the Rhodope mountains toward

Mount Hæmus,—now the Balkans. The foot of the range he reached in a march of ten days. Here the Thracians had prepared to meet him on the southerly slope at the entrance to its passes. The defile he attacked we can probably identify




Danube and Pelium Campaigns.

as the principal pass in the Balkans, north of Adrianople, later known as Porta Trajani.

The barbarians had adopted a very intelligent means of meeting the phalanx, whose power they had good cause to dread. Armed only with dagger or hunting-spear, and with a fox or wolf-skin for headgear and covering, they could not

for a moment resist the Macedonian close array of pikes. But they had collected all their wagons and chariots, and formed them as a rampart in their front in such manner that, as the phalanx advanced to the attack, the wagons could be rolled down upon them, and by breaking the ranks enable them to attack the Macedonians in individual combat with some chance of success. The denser the phalanx, the more dangerous the wagons, they rightly argued. But Alexander was equal to the occasion. He knew that this was the only available pass, and seeing what the barbarians were proposing



Mount Hæmus.

to do, he ordered the phalangites, where the ground would permit, to open lanes at the proper time by closing files to right and left, and thus allow the descending wagons to pass, when possible. Those who could not thus step aside to avoid them he bade to lie down, and, by holding their shields above them and locking them together tortoise-fashion, to allow the wagons to roll over the thus improvised bridges. This defense, as strange and ingenious as the means of attack, the Macedonians put into practice as they marched up toward the foe; nor was a single man killed by the rolling wagons.


When this really dangerous attack was happily avoided,

the phalangites advanced, with loud cries, upon the enemy, already disconcerted by the failure of his well-laid scheme. Alexander detailed his archers forward from the right wing to fall upon the flank of the Thracians as they moved down upon the forward-marching phalanx, while he himself, with his own body-guard, the hypaspists and some Agrianians, moved by a circuit about their right. Aided by the diversion of the archers, the phalangites reached the enemy's line and made quick work of the half-armed barbarians. Even before Alexander could finish his circuit, the battle was over, and all who had not fled had fallen. Some fifteen hundred were killed, and the balance dispersed in the woods and ravines of the mountains. All their women, children and baggage were captured, and sent to the markets of the seacoast under Lysanias and Philotas, son of Parmenio, to be sold for booty.

Alexander crossed Mount Hæmus in safety and moved down the easier northern slopes into the valley of the Triballians, and across the Lyginus, now Jantra (or it may have been, as claimed by some authorities, the Oscius), about three marches from the Danube. Syrmus, their king, in anticipation of Alexander's arrival, had sent the women and children for refuge to an island in the Danube, called Peucē, not easily identified but probably near and below modern Widdin, to which the Thracians had also fled and King Syrmus had himself repaired. When Alexander had crossed the Lyginus and was moving toward the barbarians on the Danube, he found that the main body of the Triballians was marching back on the former river as with intent to seize the passes in his rear. By a sudden countermarch, Alexander surprised them at eventide as they were going into camp.

The Triballians retired into a woody glen near the river, difficult of access. Alexander marshaled his army for attack.

He led the phalanx in person, but took the precaution to throw out a curtain of archers and slingers, hoping to draw the barbarians from their retreat into the open. These light troops advanced and gallantly forced the attack. The over-eager Triballians could not be restrained from rushing out to engage in a hand-to-hand conflict, and had small difficulty in



Battle at the Lyginus.


pushing the light troops back. This easy success induced them to advance still farther, and gave Alexander the opportunity of sending Philotas with an *ilē* of cavalry to charge in on their naked right wing, which had advanced beyond their main line. Heraclides and Sopolis he sent with other two *ilēs* of horse to attack their left, while he himself, with the phalanx, preceded by cavalry, advanced straight upon the barbarians. So long as the attack was confined to skirmishing the Triballians were not to be overcome, but when the dense phalanx pushed in upon them, and the horse came to close quarters, riding them down bodily by mere weight, they were

broken and driven back, with a loss of three thousand killed, into the ravine. The uncertainty of night prevented the Macedonians from pursuing. The rest of the Triballians fled in all directions. About fifty of Alexander's men were killed. The wounded are rarely mentioned in ancient narratives. They averaged eight to twelve for one killed.

Alexander turned again to pursue his former track. Three days after, the army reached the Danube, probably some way below the island of Peucē. Here he was joined by the fleet which he had caused to be sent with provisions from Byzantium to meet him. Filling the vessels with archers and heavy troops, he sailed up to the island, which Syrmus had put in a state of defense. But though he essayed a landing he found that he could make no headway, for the ships were small and could hold but few armed men beside the rowers; the banks were high and well patrolled, the current, penned in by the narrows, was very rapid and hard to stem, and the defense was stout. Alexander was obliged to withdraw, for the moment foiled.


But on the other side of the Danube were the Getæ, who had assembled to the number of four thousand horse and over ten thousand foot to oppose his crossing, and appeared to be ready to make common cause with the island forces (mid-May, b. c. 335). Alexander determined to dispose of the Getæ first. The barbarians naturally believed that if Alexander attempted to cross it would be only after many days' preparation, and that they could attack the successive parties as they reached the northern bank. Alexander's obstinacy always rose with opposition, and he determined to cross at once, foreseeing that if he beat the Getæ the island would probably surrender at discretion. He utilized the fleet; he collected a number of boats made of hollow logs, "dug-outs," so to speak, which the inhabitants used for fishing, trading,

moving to and fro, and for occasional bits of piracy, and which were found in numbers all along the river; he filled the hides which the soldiers used for tent-coverings with hay,



Method of Using Skins.

tied them closely together and upon these either constructed rafts, or used them to float the men in swimming. The latter was an ancient custom. By means of all these devices and an activity which with Alexander was always abnormal, he



Getæ and Syrmus.

managed to put over during a single short summer night fifteen hundred cavalry and four thousand infantry. Whoever has seen the width and rapid current of the Danube can the better gauge the extraordinary nature of this feat.

The Macedonians landed unobserved at a place where the

growing corn stood high, which in a measure concealed their movements ; and here, too, the enemy had no outpost. Through this field they advanced at daylight, pressing down the high thick corn with sarissas held transversely, the infantry leading, followed by the horse, which, says Arrian, could not well make its way until the corn was trampled down. So soon as they came to open ground the infantry, under Nicanor, son of Parmenio, formed square and advanced, leaning its left on the river, while its right was sustained by the horse under Alexander. The Getæ were so utterly dumbfounded at this crossing of the greatest of rivers in a few hours by so large a force that they were ill-prepared to oppose the Macedonians, and fled, at the first attack of the cavalry, towards their city, which was about four miles from the river. Lest there should be an ambush, Alexander continued to march his phalanx in a square, with the left flank leaning upon the river bank ; but he vigorously pushed the cavalry on in pursuit of the retreating Getæ. The latter, their city being poorly fortified, attempted no defense, but fled, with as many of their women and children as they could carry upon their horses, to the steppes leading upward from the river. Alexander razed the city to the ground, took the booty, which he appointed Meleager, son of Neoptolemus, and Philip, son of Machatas, to collect and carry away, offered sacrifice to Jupiter, Hercules and the Danube, and recrossed the same day to his camp. He did not care to advance his borders beyond this great natural boundary, for, particularly as the Getæ had been taught to respect his power and prowess, the Danube itself was the best of defenses to his kingdom.

Alexander now received ambassadors from Syrmus and other near-by tribes, asking for the young king's friendship. This was cheerfully granted with mutual pledges. One of these tribes, Celts from the Adriatic region, of gigantic stat-

ure and reputed for bravery, came also to beg Alexander's friendship, having heard of his great deeds. Alexander, among other things, asked them what they especially dreaded, expecting they would confess that they most feared his anger. But his astonishment and chagrin were marked when they replied that they were afraid of no one, and feared nothing except that the sky might some day fall upon them.



Alexander.

(From a Statue in the Dresden Museum.)

XVI.

PELIUM. B. C. 335.

ALEXANDER now marched southwesterly towards Pelium, where the Illyrians had rendezvoused. This town lay in the only gap in the range which bounded Macedon on the west, and was an outpost necessary to the security of the land. Unless held, Macedon was never safe from attack, and now the enemy had seized it. Alexander feared that he might be cut off from the nearest road to Greece, — where trouble was again brewing, — as well as from Pella, and be forced to make a long circuit in retreat. But he reached the gap in season to forestall these dangers. In the gap he was, however, cut off from rations, and so vastly outnumbered that he was unable to make headway against the barbarians, who surrounded him and threatened his communications. By an equally ingenious and brilliant stratagem Alexander re-established himself, and awaiting a suitable opportunity he fell on the enemy, unprepared, and inflicted a stinging defeat upon him. This resulted in the recapture of Pelium, and the Illyrians were glad to sue for peace. His barbarian neighbors on all sides were now well checked.

HAVING by the victories over the Getæ and the Triballians rendered innocuous the tribes along the course of the Danube, the Macedonians now turned southward toward the land of the friendly Agrianians and Pœonians. Here Alexander first learned the revolt of the Illyrian tribes under Clitus and Glaucias, already referred to. He heard that they were holding the passes of Pelium and had taken this city. He also heard that the Autariatians proposed to attack him on his way through the mountains towards Pelium, they having made common cause with the other barbarians.

Alexander's situation was far from bright. The pass of Pelium, through which flowed the Aordaeus or Apsos (Devol) River, was the one available gap through the range which divided Illyria from upper Macedonia. Its possession was

the sole means of keeping the western tribes back of the watershed. He himself was heading for this locality along the Erygon. Should the Autariatians fall upon his flank on the march, as they threatened to do, their diversion might retard him so much that the Illyrians would find time to invade and inflict immense damage on southern Macedonia before he could reach the scene of action. Or in fact, as he had already advanced too far between the mountain ranges readily to return, the Illyrians might cut him off from Greece (which rumor said was again becoming restless) by seizing the passes on the line of the Erygon, while keeping open their own communications and their entrance to Macedon by way of Pelium. This would be a most serious check, perhaps a fatal one, to his Grecian affairs, by giving Thebes and Athens time for preparation, not to speak of the danger to his own territory from the uncivilized but brave and skillful Illyrians. Philotas, to be sure, held the Cadmæa at Thebes ; Parmenio, at home, had a goodly force of troops on hand, but even these two were scarcely equal to so large an undertaking as another uprising in Greece, coupled with an incursion into Macedon by Clitus and Glaucias.

The gap of Pelium had been seized by Philip as the result of many wars. It lies southeast of Lake Lychnitis (Ochrida), and is long and narrow, but widens out at intervals into larger valleys. Through its entire length flows the Apsos to the west into the Adriatic. Whoever holds the gap commands not only this river but the headwaters of the Erygon (Tzerna), which from this point flows northeasterly, and of the Haliaemon (Jendje Karasu), which flows through southern Macedonia, as well. Pelium was a mountain fastness of the greatest importance ; and the town had considerable strength. In the heart of the mountains, it was for the Macedonians an outwork which protected the road running along


the valleys of the Erygon and the Haliacmon, and one which must at any cost be held as a barrier against the restless barbarians of Illyria. The town lay in a wide plain in the mountains, and fully commanded the road through the gap. This road most of the way ran along the rocky precipices bordering the Apsos, and in places was so narrow that but four men could march abreast. The game was really a serious one for Alexander. A slight failure, and he would forfeit the western security of his kingdom, conquered by Philip with so much bloodshed; and as he was already engaged in the mountain ranges, the Illyrians could now readily interpose between him and Pella, which Alexander could then only reach by a counter-march and circuit of many days; and even this march in retreat might be cut off by the Autariatians. A serious setback would forfeit perhaps the control he now held in Greece. The king's Persian expedition looked far off indeed.

The danger from the Autariatians, however, was happily disposed of. Langarus, king of the Agrianians, of old a faithful personal friend of Alexander, and whose contingent in the late campaign on the Danube had behaved with splendid hardihood, now came to meet the king with his best troops and volunteered himself to keep the Autariatians busy by attacking them and making inroads into their country. This service he performed in so workmanlike a manner that the Autariatians, not a very warlike race, were fain to keep to their hills. For this kindly and efficient service Langarus was rewarded by Alexander with many proofs of friendship, and the promise of his half-sister Cyna's hand,—which, however, Langarus did not live to claim. We shall constantly refer to the gallant Agrianians who accompanied Alexander to Asia. They were among the bravest and most efficient of his light troops.

This initial danger put one side, Alexander advanced on

Pelium by forced marches up the Erygon and towards the gap. Clitus had already seized Pelium, and there he was awaiting the arrival of Glaucias, king of the Taulantians. Alexander hoped to recapture the town before the arrival of Glaucias, but Clitus held all the heights in the vicinity, intending to fall upon Alexander's rear if he advanced near enough to make an assault on the city.

Alexander camped on the Apsos and prepared for immediate attack. According to the barbarian custom of his tribe, as Arrian relates, Clitus, before meeting the Macedonians, offered up in sacrifice three boys, three girls and three black rams, and then made disposition to fall upon them. Despite the difficulties, Alexander was by no means to be deterred



Plain of Pelium.

from his purpose, and opened the action by an advance upon the heights held by the Illyrians. This was made with such vigor that they were unable to stand their ground. The assault resulted in their retiring into the town and shutting themselves up within its walls. Alexander, having failed to capture the town by first assault, then began to erect lines of contravallation and circumvallation. But this was next day

interrupted by the arrival of Glaucias with an overwhelming force, who seized and occupied the heights around the eastern side of the valley in which Alexander was camped, so that should he again assault the town they could take him in rear and perhaps seize his line of retreat.


Alexander was seriously involved, for the enemy outnumbered him many times. Victory was essential to him in his situation here. He could not afford the slightest check. Not only time but supplies were scant. He was in great stress for both rations and forage. Sending Philotas one day, with some horsemen and pack-animals, on a foraging excursion, the latter was followed and surrounded by Glaucias, who took possession of the hills about the plains where he was collecting corn. Philotas was with the utmost difficulty rescued by Alexander, who hurried to his assistance with the hypaspists, Agrianians and bowmen, sustained by some four hundred cavalry, and by a timely diversion enabled him to cut his way out. The king was neither strong enough to cope with the barbarians, unless he could lure them into a pitched battle, nor had he food sufficient to last until he could procure reinforcements.

Clitus and Glaucias, on the contrary, could afford to sit still and wait. They held the key of the situation. They had their breadstuffs available and their communications open, and had no other business on hand than to hold the pass. They were wise enough to be shy of battle. They congratulated themselves that Alexander was so seriously compromised that they would by and by have him at their mercy. They held all the heights about Pelium, the garrison of which could debouch on Alexander's rear as they upon his flanks should he retreat from the plain where he was camped. Moreover, his only line of retreat lay through the narrow defile by which he had come, between the precipices and

the river, where but four men could march abreast. The army must ford the river on its way towards the gap, which gave the barbarians a still greater advantage ; for they held the heights which commanded the ford as well as the entire valley, and had sent detachments along the hills to command the road on which lay the Macedonian line of retreat. They were a warlike and well-armed people, and their confidence was so high that they were apt to do stanch fighting. The heavy woods on all hands offered them a chance for ambuscade whenever any part of the army was sent out in search of provisions. Alexander's position was well-nigh desperate. And yet he must have Pelium.

The young king had no idea of retreat. Neither would he wait for reinforcements. His natural impatience stood him in good stead. This problem must be worked out successfully, or he could not attempt to leave Greece for Asia ; and quickly, or the Greek insurrection would gain too much headway to be handled without vast trouble. The first step in the problem was to make secure his line of retreat, now dangerously threatened. He conceived one of those brilliant ideas which only emanate from the brain of a man of genius. He resolved to impose on the enemy by a display of military manœuvring, a battlefield drill, as it were ; and having thus made him uncertain of how he might be about to attack him, seek to fall on him at a disadvantage. While the horse and light foot were thrown out towards the town, the king accordingly drew up his phalanx with files one hundred and twenty men deep, placed some cavalry on each wing to protect the manœuvres, and began, in the middle of the plain, in full sight of the enemy, who was also drawn up in battle array on the heights surrounding the plain and at the town, a series of those incomparable evolutions which only a Macedonian phalanx could execute. Imagine the splendor of this hostile

review, with its holiday aspect and its deadly intent ; the hills and the walls of the town crowded with myriads of wondering barbarians ; the Macedonian soldiers in equal wonder as to what their chief was about to do, but trusting with blind confidence that this young king, of whom they were so proud, would wield their skill and courage as he could his own good sword. Never was so curious, so magnificent a ruse employed in war before ; never since.



Pelium Manœuvre.

The phalangites drilled in perfect quiet, with set teeth and purpose, listening intently for the commands which the bugles rang out sharp and clear. First they smartly couched their spears at the word of command, and then as smartly shoudered them, each with the thud of a perfect manual ; going through their times and motions with the precision of an inspection at Pella. Next they faced to the right, and couched their spears as if to attack the enemy on that front ; but instead of so doing were again made to rehearse the manual. Again the phalanx was faced to the left as if for similar purpose, and on each occasion the enemy on the threatened side

made ready to resist or fly should the phalanx advance. Then Alexander marched and countermarched the body by either flank, going through the complicated drill of which Philip's phalanx was supreme master.

The enemy, who had been watching this parade with amazement almost amounting to awe, and whose uncertainty as to what it all meant gradually made him careless of his own formation, was quite unprepared for a real attack, for this drill must have lasted some time. Suddenly, as it were a part of this wonderful review, Alexander ployed his phalanx into a wedge and launched it at a *pas de charge* by the left flank at that part of the enemy's army which was nearest him and most open to attack. The barbarians made not even a pretense of sustaining the shock, but at once fled from the lower mountain ridges. Hereupon Alexander gave the Macedonians the order to raise their war-cry and clash their spears upon their shields. Still more alarmed, the Triballians, who had so far been outside the gates, retired precipitately into the town.

A small force still remained on one of the ridges which especially commanded Alexander's line of retreat and the river-ford over which he must cross. To dislodge this he hurried the Companion cavalry and some light horse towards the ridge, with orders for half of them to dismount and fight on foot if the enemy remained to defend the place. For mounted men alone might not suffice. It will be seen that Alexander found useful, as we did in 1861-65, that species of cavalry which could fight on foot as well as mounted. Traversing, as he often did, a rugged country, to perform this double duty made his horse doubly valuable. This same cavalry we shall see doing as splendid work in the saddle as the most exacting *beau sabreur* could demand; in fact, work never surpassed in the world's history, despite the idea so often

expressed that to dismount a cavalryman spoils him. No defense was attempted by the enemy to this last attack, but he withdrew in disorder right and left and made for the mountains. Alexander took possession of the hill which was the key to the ford, and posted the Agrianians and archers upon it, some two thousand strong.

This dispersion of the enemy afforded him means of safely passing the river, where he could be more secure from sudden attack, to which he had laid himself open from there being but one ford. The hypaspists and the heavy infantry were ordered to wade the river first and form at once into phalanx towards the left so as to present as imposing an array as possible, and the king gave instructions to set the artillery in battery for the moral effect of its novelty on the Illyrians. He himself remained on the hill to observe the operations. The barbarians, perceiving that their foe was about to escape, came down from the surrounding heights to which they had again returned when they saw the Macedonians, as they thought, taking to flight by the ford. They hoped to be able to attack their rear. But Alexander was closely scanning their movements. As they drew near he headed against them his own brigade — the companion agema — with an impetuous rush and its terrible battle-cry, and the phalanx made motion as if to advance again across the river. This attack and simulated advance drove the barbarians back, and the pause enabled Alexander to get the Agrianians and archers over the ford.

To sustain this operation the military engines (of which he had brought an ample number from the arsenal at Pella) showered projectiles of all kinds upon the enemy. This is the first record of the use of artillery in battle. The archers also from mid-river turned and sent their flights of arrows at the barbarians, who, under Glaucias' incitement, constantly returned to the attack. By these means, Glaucias being una-

ble to breast the storm of missiles, Alexander with the whole army gained the other side in safety.

The first step was successfully taken. The line of retreat was secure. Alexander had fought in the van, as all through his life he did, and had been wounded by a sling-stone upon the head and by the blow of a club upon the neck. Not a man, however, was killed during this well-managed manœuvre. Numbers were wounded, but the excellent armor of the Macedonians saved them from fatal casualties as much as the weaker weapons of the barbarians. It is to be noted that the killed among the light troops were not generally deemed of sufficient moment to record.

Alexander had gained a place of safety. His late position in front of Pelium had been untenable, for he was surrounded by multitudes and was cut off from victual. But he was far from content. He was unwilling to retire without inflicting a signal defeat on the barbarians and recovering Pelium. He was now placed so that he could collect corn and await reinforcements. The enemy could not cut him off from the supplies in his rear. But a retreat, happily, was not made necessary, for time was of the utmost consequence. Three days after the crossing, Alexander's scouts, whom he always kept briskly at work, reported to him that Clitus and Glaucias, who no doubt flattered themselves that he had retired from fear and who were becoming careless accordingly, lay in a negligent position in front of Pelium, with no outposts, ditch or rampart, and in much too extended an order. This was the opportunity Alexander had been watching for. As night came on he crossed the ford with his shield-bearing guards, the Agrianians, archers and the brigades of Perdiccas, son of Orontes, and Cœnus, son-in-law of Parmenio, as vanguard. So soon as he arrived on the ground, without waiting for the rest of the troops, which had been ordered to follow rap-

idly on his heels, he launched the Agrianians and archers, formed in phalangial order, upon the flank of the barbarians' camp and took them *en flagrant délit*. Many were caught in their beds; all were taken by surprise. The rout was complete. Numbers were slaughtered, numbers captured. Those who escaped lost their weapons. Alexander pursued the relics of this force as far as the Taulantian Mountains. Clitus fled into the city, but finding that he could not hold it, set it on fire and withdrew to join Glaucias, near the Adriatic coast.

Thus Alexander regained Pelium and reestablished the outpost which was so essential to the security of Macedonia. Clitus and Glaucias were glad to accept terms and again swear fealty to Alexander. The position was put into such a state of defense that no fear remained of its falling again into Illyrian hands. The barbarian neighbors of Macedonia had received a series of salutary lessons, and recognized that a greater than Philip now sat upon the throne.



Tetradrachma in Louvre.

(Head of Alexander, idealized as Hercules.)

XVII.

THEBES. B. C. 335.

THE Persian monarch had foreseen the threatening danger to his kingdom from restless Alexander. He began to distribute money among the anti-Macedonians of Greece. The rumor of the death of Alexander before Pelium determined Thebes to revolt and eject the Macedonian garrison from the Cadmæa. Athens and other cities promised active aid. So soon as Pelium was taken Alexander marched rapidly southward. In two weeks he covered three hundred miles over a mountain road, and appeared suddenly before Thebes. He was anxious to save the city, but the misguided Thebans pronounced their own doom. The town was stormed, sacked and razed to the ground, and the Theban territory added to that of its neighbors, late its vassals. Athens begged off. In one year this young king of twenty had firmly seated himself on his throne, had made himself master of Greece, had utterly defeated the Danube barbarians, had reduced the Illyrians to obedience and had welded the shackles on Hellas. He was now ready for Persia.


THE king of Persia, foreseeing grave danger to himself and his kingdom from this youthful but vigorous monarch, who on his side made small secret of his intentions, in addition to sending Memnon the Rhodian, his most able general, to Asia Minor to oppose the Macedonians there, began to distribute money in Greece to induce the cities to take up arms against Macedon and their new autocrat. The long absence of Alexander on his Illyrian expedition and the lack of news from him had given rise to rumors that he and his army had been destroyed by the barbarians. A man, in fact, is said to have reached Athens,—at all events Demosthenes produced such an one,—who pretended to show a wound received before Pelium, and who stated that he saw Alexander receive his death-blow. The man may have had a fair basis for his story.

Some of the Theban exiles in Athens deemed the occasion good for throwing off the Macedonian yoke. The Cadmæa or citadel of Thebes, situated on an eminence in the town, had, since the battle of Chæronea, been held by a Macedonian garrison. These exiles proceeded to Thebes, hoping to surprise the Cadmæa, and, being admitted to the city at night by friends, they met and slew two Macedonian officers who, in no expectation of mutiny, had descended from the citadel, incited the national assembly to revolt, and persuaded the populace to reinstate the Bœotarchs and again proclaim the independence of Thebes. Several of the neighboring cities declared themselves ready to do the like, and Thebes was promised help from many quarters. Her plausible excuse was that she believed Alexander to be dead, and her allegiance *ipso facto* at an end.

So soon as the news of the event reached Alexander, he foresaw grave danger to his standing in Greece unless the revolt was summarily nipped in the bud. The vote creating him Hegemōn had been passed under the pressure of an army on the spot. Sparta had been constant in her enmity. Athens was half-hearted. It would be easy to raise a powerful coalition against him. The Illyrian question had just been happily settled. It was here that began the remarkable series of fortunate events which always seemed to run in Alexander's favor, which always, when the sky was most threatening, blew away the clouds.

Fortune is said to be and is generally of a man's own making. So long as he will not allow circumstances to dictate to him, fortune is apt to be constant. When he begins to heed adverse facts, we see what is generally called bad luck step in. This is undeniably true. But it is equally true that the utmost ability sometimes runs foul of uncontrollable circumstances. No one can study the careers of Alexander and of

Hannibal without acknowledging that, with equal capacity, equal determination to control circumstances, the former had fortune uniformly in his favor, the latter misfortune as constantly staring him in the face. If a skillful general wins



Alexander's March from Pelium to Thebes.


because he is opposed by crass stupidity, must it not be set down to good luck that he did not happen to be matched by talent equal to his own? It is in this sense that Alexander's luck is referred to, and in such a sense only can luck be said

to exist for the captain. Fortune is and should be almost uniformly of his own creation.

Alexander at once started by rapid marches for Greece. His route lay through Eordæa and Elimæa in Macedon, and along the uplands — the peaks, says Arrian — of the Pindus range. Alexander probably selected the higher foot-hills because along these the rivers were smaller than in the plains. It was a choice of evils he had to make between mountain roads and unfordable rivers. In seven days he reached Pelina, on the Peneus, in Thessaly. Thence in six days he entered Bœotia. Alexander's celerity of movement in this case was undoubtedly supplemented by good fortune ; but the gods help those who help themselves, and the king never failed to put his own shoulder to the wheel. No character in history ever exceeded him in constant personal endeavor. So speedy was this march that the Thebans did not even know of his passing Thermopylæ until he reached Onchestus, fifty stades, less than six miles, northwest of their city. Even then his enemies continued to maintain that the son of Philip was dead, and that Antipater commanded the army, or else the Lyncestian Alexander. For Alexander, as narrated, had really been wounded by a club and a stone in the last battle, and the belief in the fatal nature of these wounds was universal. If the Danube and Illyrian campaigns leave one full of astonishment at their rapidity, energy and able management, this march of over three hundred miles, through a rugged mountain country, in a fortnight, with a considerable army of foot and horse, the equivalent of our artillery, and no doubt some trains, worthily caps the climax.

Alexander's appearance at once caused all her allies again to fall away from Thebes. Even Athens preferred to await events. Thebes stood alone.

Alexander desired to be just as well as to save his men. He moved slowly on the city, so as to afford the Thebans time to send an embassy and crave pardon (August, 335 b. c.). He camped north of and over against the city, and waited. Diodorus and Curtius place his force at thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. But far from acting on a peaceful policy, the Thebans boastingly sent out their cavalry and light troops and made a determined attack on Alexander's outposts. This attack was repulsed by a body of archers and heavy foot at the moment it had all but reached the Macedonian camp. Alexander now moved around the city and encamped opposite the gate which led to Attica, thus cutting the Thebans off from Athens, as well as placing himself in view of the Cadmæa, and close to it, for here the Cadmæa touched the city wall. The Thebans inside had blockaded the Macedonian garrison in the citadel, and had fortified their position with an outer stockade besides, in order to forestall assistance. They now began to push the siege. Alexander was still patient. He sent to demand the two ringleaders, Phoenix and Prothytes, but promised the *status quo ante* to all others who might surrender. The bulk of the citizens were for giving in, but the exiles, with whom



Thebes.

it was neck or nothing, left no stone unturned to hold them up to their work. The demand was refused. Still Alexander was unwilling to attack. His moderation certainly savors of a kindly motive, for it was unusual with him. He wished to save the splendid city, as well, no doubt, as loss in his own ranks.

The Thebans, however, by this obstinate perversity, sealed their own doom. Alexander, says Diodorus, made all his plans for an assault; but, according to Ptolemy, he still put off his action. The delay was, however, brought to an end by Perdiccas with the first brigade, who, without distinct orders, but seeing a favorable chance, assaulted the Theban lines. After breaking the outer stockade, or city wall, with his engines, he mounted the breach and fell upon the siege lines of the Thebans. Amyntas, whose brigade was next to that of Perdiccas, followed close on his heels with his own troops. Alexander, seeing that Perdiccas and Amyntas had made a lodgment, and, lest their isolated brigades should become compromised, threw forward the entire force of light troops, archers, and Agrianians, which had been held close by as supports, giving them instructions to press on after Perdiccas and Amyntas, and held the agema and the other hypaspists for the nonce farther in the rear and on the outside, as a reserve.

Perdiccas was severely wounded in carrying the second stockade; but his men drove the enemy into a hollow way leading to the temple of Hercules, and followed them as far as the temple itself. Here the Thebans rallied, and with a desperate onslaught pushed back the two Macedonian brigades and the light troops. The latter lost their chief and fell into some disorder upon the reserves. The Thebans followed hard upon. Alexander was well prepared to receive them; and as he moved upon them, somewhat disorganized

by their success, in regular phalangial order, he drove them back into the gates and entered with them. A sally from the Cadmæan garrison was made at the same moment towards the temple of Amphion. The walls were swept by a force taking their defenders in flank right and left, and were captured. Connection with the garrison of the Cadmæa was reëstablished. A stand was attempted by the Thebans in the market-place as well as opposite the temple of Amphion, but Alexander's phalanxes quickly routed the few who awaited their onset.

The Theban cavalry fled from the city, while the infantry dispersed wherever it could find an outlet, fighting for their lives in isolated bodies, but bravely as of yore. Numbers were slaughtered, more by the Bœotians, Phocians, and Platæans than by the Macedonians, who, says Curtius, did not join in the massacre. For the former had an old score to settle with Thebes for many years' oppressions. Even women and children did not escape. Nor was house or temple or altar a protection. There fell that day five hundred Macedonians. Adding the wounded, this was a loss of about seventeen per cent., — a high average. Six thousand Thebans were slain; thirty thousand were sold into slavery. These latter are said to have brought about five hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars, not quite eighteen dollars each. This is an interesting gauge of values at that time, though the number probably glutted the market. In later days Alexander repented of the cruelty perpetrated at Thebes, believing that he had offended Bacchus, its tutelary deity, who therefore looked with unfavoring eyes upon some of his subsequent exploits.

The celerity and power of Alexander's blow made a deep impression throughout Greece. Athens was in no condition to oppose the conqueror. Sparta was amazed to see the city

which under Epaminondas had humbled her at Leuctra and Mantinæa, broken to pieces as if by the arm of a demigod. The Thebans were believed to be under the ban of the gods, and Alexander the favored of Olympus.

The king allowed his allies, whom Thebes had for years oppressed, to settle the affairs of the city. Thebes was razed to the ground. Only those connected with Philip and Alexander by ties of hospitality, and the house of Pindar the poet, were spared. The Cadmæa was again occupied by a Macedonian garrison. Theban territory was parceled out among the allies. Thus miserably perished the proud city of Epaminondas (September, 335 b. c.). Its fate, when we remember this splendid chief, evokes our compassion. Orchomenus and Platæa, which Thebes had destroyed, were rebuilt.

The Athenians had gone so far towards aiding Thebes as to send forward troops to join her. These they speedily recalled on hearing of her fate. The Ætolians and Elæans had also erred, but all hastened to send ambassadors to crave forgiveness. This was universally granted, no doubt quite as much because Alexander was anxious to set out on his expedition to Asia as from generous motives. Though he by no means lacked these, Alexander always knew when and how to supplement punishment with clemency as mere political expediency. Athens likewise sent an embassy to deprecate the king's wrath. Alexander at first demanded the surrender of nine men who had particularly inveighed against him, including Demosthenes; but, on an urgent appeal from the city, wisely consented to forego this demand. He insisted only on Charidemus being exiled. This was done, and Charidemus went into the service of King Darius, to be later executed by his new master, as we shall see. Alexander returned to Macedon in the fall.

For the coming dozen years, until Alexander's death, the history of Greece is practically a blank. The land of heroes became a mere appanage of Alexander's great empire in the East. Internal broils and constantly recurring ebullitions of opposition to Macedon monopolized Hellenic politics.

Thus in one brief year Alexander had settled himself firmly upon his throne, had made himself secure against his barbarian neighbors, had nullified his Grecian brethren, and could safely turn to the Asiatic problem which was to be his life's work, as it was his life's ambition. Surely a wonderful first twelvemonth for a monarch of twenty years. The coming weeks were full of restless business in assembling his army, equipping his ships, and in studying out the vast problem before him,—the most vast ever attacked by man. The more important part of his military life now begins.



Alexander.

(From Bust in Louvre.)

XVIII.

OFF FOR ASIA. B. C. 334.

ALEXANDER probably possessed all the existing information with regard to the topography and resources of Persia; but this only reached as far as the Euphrates. Beyond this all was guess-work or dream. On what he knew he founded careful calculations. He was heavily in debt, but he started with thirty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry and a month's supplies. He had no fleet worth the mention. Antipater was left at home with twelve thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse to keep order in Hellas. The Persian kingdom was enormous in extent, population and wealth; but it lacked cohesion. Each satrap was a sort of independent monarch, and jealous of all his neighbors. This condition greatly facilitated Alexander's plans. Persia was ripe for a fall. The army marched along the coast, in twenty days reached the Hellespont, and crossed to Asia Minor in safety. Alexander visited Troy and offered due sacrifices to the manes of Homeric heroes.

IN narrating the life of Alexander two extreme theories have been enunciated. The expedition against Persia has been treated as the act of a half-mad adventurer, a soldier of fortune, whose erratic visions were moulded into action by a wild, unreasoning will and absolute power over his small monarchy, and whose success was due to hairbrained courage and proverbial good luck. It has been treated as a deliberate, well-digested scheme, having as a basis a profound knowledge of all the countries, governments, resources, geographical limitations and military power he was to encounter; about such knowledge, in fact, as Napoleon possessed himself of before entering on the Russian campaign. Each of these extreme theories is far from being exact; but granting the abnormal good fortune which was pleased to wait on Alexander's intelligence, and on his courage, moral and physical, there is no

doubt that the latter is the more reasonable point of view. What the ancient world had so far learned Alexander had by heart. Why should he not, with Aristotle for a tutor?

We know comparatively little about the extent of Alexander's information respecting the Persian kingdom. Asia Minor had long been full of Greeks with whom there was constant intercourse. This portion of the Great King's dominions was no doubt familiar to him. Beyond this point, Alexander had perhaps nothing but Xenophon's *Anabasis* and the unsatisfactory *Cyropædia* to guide him. Travelers then, as in modern times, lied by authority. Greek mercenaries who had been in Persian pay might have observed but partially. The Persian history of Ctesias he may never have seen. Artabazus and Memnon, distinguished men both, had been refugees at the court of Pella, and could have told much. Persian ambassadors could be interrogated. How carefully these sources of information had been used cannot be said. We know that Alexander's habit in all his campaigns was to gather information with scrupulous care; we can imagine that he had got together a fair nucleus of facts to serve him as guide so far as the Euphrates, though the actual obstacles and enormous distances to be encountered could scarcely have been fully comprehended, even by him. Beyond the Euphrates was a blank or a dream.

But Alexander had one peculiarly marked power. He could generalize from specific facts with astonishing accuracy; he could gauge the exact value in a problem of one or two isolated facts. There is no mark of the perfect military grasp so positive as the power of seeing the whole without being misled by the parts; of never allowing detail to obscure the main purpose; of properly interpreting partial signs. All Alexander's campaigns exhibit this ability in an exceptional degree, and it is fair to infer that from even the paucity of

detail he may have possessed on the to him all-important subject, he had been able to construct the skeleton of his plan, at least as far as the great river on which lies Babylon.

That his imagination carried him beyond this there can be no doubt. All great captains have possessed an abundant share of imagination, or its complement, enthusiasm. But they have kept it well under control. In this quality Alexander was preëminent. We know that Philip had long cherished the plan of an invasion of Asia, and Alexander had grown up with this plan as a part of his daily food. All things tend to show that preparations were for years constantly and persistently made tending towards this object. Few things tell historical truths better than the coinage of the ancient countries. And in the coinage of Macedon, and of the cities of Asia Minor, during the reign of Philip, and constantly and for many years succeeding Alexander's campaigns, one may read the early purpose of conquest of both father and son.

The policy of Macedon so far had not demanded of Greece the aid of a fleet. With such assistance as Greece could have given Alexander might have seized the *Ægean*, and placed his projected campaign on a much more certain basis. But it was now too late to do this. He must rely on his land forces alone. Fleets then were more readily equipped and got to sea than they are to-day, but still it would have caused some months of delay to prepare a suitable squadron. Alexander was impatient of every moment; and it is moreover probable that even he did not entirely recognize its value. His finest quality was the power of quickly and thoroughly learning from experience. He often divined, almost, long before the event. But the full advantages of a fleet had probably not as yet gained access to his mind. Alexander had until now seen war only on land. He had but one hundred and sixty triremes.

Wise preparations were duly made to leave Macedonia in safety. The chiefs of most of the allied nations were to accompany the king, with their contingents generally officered by the more prominent citizens, thus insuring the good behavior of their respective countries. Antipater was to be left as regent, with a sufficient force of Macedonians to command respect. Entreated by Antipater and Parmenio to marry and await the arrival of an heir before going forth, Alexander rejected the advice as unworthy when Persia stood all ready for the fray. Should he await the arrival of the fleet of the Great King on the shores of Macedon, or the crossing of the Taurus by his army? If he expected to utilize Asia Minor as a base, there was not a moment to be lost. He must seize it before it was still more strongly occupied by the enemy. The Persian dependencies in Phœnicia and Cyprus, which furnished the best mariners of the day, could put four hundred vessels into commission at the first call. All Greece could not equal this complement. The Persian armies were numberless, and day by day might inundate Asia Minor. How would he then be able even to open his campaign? He must do so now before the road was blocked.

So complete were Alexander's preparations for a long, even permanent, absence that he is said to have given away all his personal possessions and effects,—mostly to his friends to aid them to defray the heavy expenses of equipment,—leaving himself, as he laughingly said, only his "hopes." His conduct roused his Companions to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and many of the rich ones among them did the like. This anecdote is probably exaggerated. But it shows the spirit which prevailed, the birth of which lay in Alexander's enthusiasm.

Philip had died owing five hundred talents for money spent in perfecting the army. Before leaving Macedon Alexander

borrowed eight hundred talents more. He started heavily handicapped, with but sixty talents of ready money left. He needed his "hopes."

The monarchy of Persia was ripe for a fall. Its overgrown body had long been diseased. If it did not die of one, it must of another cause. Its one protection against the restless efforts of Greece had long been money, which, judiciously disbursed among the several cities, kept them at odds with one another, and prevented their joining hands in an attack on Persia. But Macedon had risen superior to the effects of this pusillanimous policy, and now stood knocking at its gates.

Darius had, as we have seen, sent Memnon, the Rhodian, to oppose Parmenio and Attalus in Asia Minor. These generals had conducted a campaign of no particular moment in Mysia. Attalus had been executed for treason by Alexander's command, and his troops, after momentary hesitation, had returned to their fidelity and were again concentrated under Parmenio, the ever faithful. The campaign was not prolific of results, but the points essential to protect Alexander's crossing had been secured and held, as it were, by bridge-heads. Memnon was an excellent soldier, and it looks to us strange that he did not succeed in brushing away the Macedonian force here, particularly after Parmenio was recalled to the capital, just before the Danube and Pelium campaign; but we may look for an explanation in the fact that the jealousy of the Persian satraps so constantly broke forth against every Greek in authority, that he was usually prevented from anything like vigorous action by the reduction of the means at his disposal and the consequent tying of his hands. All this again was Alexander's luck. Memnon unfettered might have stemmed the tide setting against Persia.

Persia had recently reconquered Egypt and Phœnicia, principally through the aid of Greek mercenaries under Mentor,

the Rhodian. Mentor had afterwards become commander-in-chief of the entire Hellespontine region, and had placed under him Memnon, who was his brother, and Artabazus, his brother-in-law. But Mentor was now dead, and the work had devolved on Memnon. The Persian royal line of Ochus had been poisoned wholesale by the eunuch Bagoas, and Darius Codomanus of the line of Artaxerxes Mnemon had been placed upon the throne. On the death of Philip, Darius, who came into power about this time, imagined the youthful Alexander to be unequal to the invasion of Asia, and became careless of defense, deeming a distribution of money among the anti-Macedonians of Greece a sufficient means of keeping him at home. Memnon was better informed, and advised the king wisely; but he was not listened to. Darius possessed qualities which, under less unfavorable auspices, might have made him a successful, as he was a wise and just king. Nothing short of the overwhelming career of such a man as Alexander, whose onward course seemed to be irresistible, can explain the hebetude and inaction into which Darius now fell.

The kingdom of Persia was a disjointed mass, whose several parts were under dissatisfied satraps having no longer a binding tie to the ruling sovereign. They were, on the contrary, by no means disinclined to welcome any new conqueror. Though nominally one empire, it was really a host of minor kingdoms, with little or no interdependence. No doubt Alexander was as well acquainted with the political and geographical status of western Persia as he was with all which was then known of the art of war. The mutual jealousies and constant bickerings, almost rising to a condition of warfare, between neighboring satraps, opened the door to easy success for Alexander if he but took advantage of the situation. This he was prepared to do. His army was not only passionately attached to its young commander, but was eager for the spoils of the

richest of countries, which it knew would be, and which in fact were, most lavishly distributed to all by Alexander. The generals, as we shall see, became greater than princes; even the private soldier grew to untold wealth, compared to what he had possessed at home, in recompense for his bravery and toils.

Having completed his preparations for home rule and foreign warfare, Alexander felt that he could safely leave Macedonia. His expedition against Persia, ostensibly to free the Greek colonies under Persian rule, was so popular throughout Greece, despite the secret cabals of malcontents, always more or less pronounced, that a force stated at seven thousand Greek allies and five thousand mercenaries was put at his disposal. As an assumed descendant of Achilles, he could claim an inherited right to lead such an expedition. After his return from his Theban expedition to Macedonia, he had spent the winter in the hard labors of preparation, alternating with sacrifices and games in honor of the gods. Of his two most trusted lieutenants, he planned to take Parmenio with him, and leave Antipater behind, who, though the queen-mother, Olympias, and he were always at odds, was the only man on whom he could rely to carry on the government wisely and firmly during his probably extended absence.

Early in the spring of 334 b. c., leaving with Antipater a force of twelve thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, with which he was charged to keep Greece in subjection, resist Persian fleets, and hold Macedonia against the malcontents or aspirants to the throne; and assuring Antipater's fidelity by taking with him the latter's three sons, Alexander marched towards the Hellespont. He had about thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse,—a small force indeed with which to attack the myriads of the Great King, to undertake an invasion destined to change the current of the world's history,—and only the paltry remnants of such moneys in his camp-chest as he had been able to borrow.

He was about to invade the land of Xerxes, of Cyrus, a land of untold resources and wealth, full of brave and able men, but a land rotten to the core. The weakness of Persia, though it exceeded his own territorial limit thirty to one, was its lack of homogeneity. Composed of many kingdoms, as it were, each success of Alexander's would place under his control (so long as he continued to be victorious) such territory as the victory was won upon. Alexander was aware of, and proposed to rely upon, this, for him, fortunate set of conditions, together with a free-handed policy of rewards to his officers and men, as well as to such of Darius' servants as should volunteer to join his cause. He intended to forage on the country as he advanced.

Following was the organization of his army: —

1. CAVALRY.

Heavy :

Macedonian hetairai, Companions, under Philotas,	8 Ilē,	150
@ 300 each	.	1,800
Thessalians, next in reputation, under Calas,	8 Ilē	. 1,200
Greek auxiliaries	" Philip,	8 " . 400 <u>3,400</u>

Light :

Macedonian lancers, Prodromoi, under	Amyntas,	4 Ilē	. 600
Pæonians,	" "	Ariston,	4 " . 600
Odrysians,	" Agatho,	8 "	. 600 <u>1,800</u>
Total cavalry	.	.	<u>5,200</u>

2. INFANTRY.

Phalangites :

Macedonian pezetæri, companions, in six small brigades or taxes, in each of which were, say, six syntagmas of 250 men, or three moras of 500 men, under	{ Perdiccas, Cœnus, Amyntas, Meleager, Philip, later Polysperchon, Craterus	9,000
Greek Auxiliaries, Antigonus commanding, 6 brigades	.	4,000
Greek mercenaries, Menandrus commanding, 6 brigades	.	<u>6,000 19,000</u>

Peltasts :

Macedonian hypaspists (companions), Nicanor comd'g, 5 taxes.

(These might properly be classed with the phalangites)	3,000
Greek auxiliaries, commander not named, 5 taxes	1,000
Greek mercenaries, commander not named, 5 taxes	1,000
Thracian acontists (javelin men), Sitalces comd'g, 4 taxes	4,000 9,000

Light armed :

Macedonian archers,	{	Clearchus comd'g	{	500
Cretan archers,					500
Agrianian acontists (javelin-men), Attalos comd'g				. .	1,000 2,000

Total Infantry	30,000
Add Cavalry	5,200
Total	35,200

It will be noticed that the proportions of the troops are not those set down in the organization details above given. No army in active service corresponds strictly to its technical organization. Alexander took with him what he had left after leaving Macedon secure.

No artillery officers are mentioned. The engines no doubt had specially drilled men to work them, but these apparently were not recognized in the specific organization of the army. The same low estimate of artillery officers was apparent in the Middle Ages.

The above named were the original commanders. But active service produced many changes. Later in the war, as will be seen by the list of officers, fourteen others are also mentioned as commanding infantry brigades. Commanders of other corps were also often replaced, and the army, largely by Oriental accretions, grew to be one hundred and forty thousand strong in India.

The Macedonians, Greeks and allies were generally recruited in localities and kept together as much as possible, so as to breed rivalry and a proper *esprit de corps*. Whether

the Thracians, Agrianians, Odryssians and Pæonians were all allies, or partly mercenary, is not known. The allies enlisted "for the war," as it were; the mercenaries for set terms. The aristocrats owed service with their fealty; the regulars served very long terms. The Greek auxiliaries and mercenaries were often mixed with the Macedonian troops in actual service — so many lochoi or syntagmas of one to an equal number of the other.

We are obliged to draw largely on guess-work for the size of the baggage-train which accompanied Alexander's army. The artillery — it is surely proper so to call the missile-throwing engines — needed horses, though nothing like the number called for by our guns; for many of the heavier parts of the engines, the beams, etc., and of the larger missiles, were not transported, but cut on the spot. Ammunition was always readily procured. Still, rations had to be carried, and forage. Philip had cut down the several slaves a mounted man had been allowed to one. This one was probably also mounted, and if he had to carry forage for his master's as well as his own animal, he would need a pack-horse. This alone would multiply the cavalry contingent by three. Each ten phalangites were, at the time of the strictest reduction, allowed one slave, and probably a pack-horse. Headquarters must have considerable transportation. On the whole, the train of the Macedonian army could not have fallen very much short of ours, especially when booty and women were allowed to be carried by the soldiers.

Following are such of Alexander's officers as deserve mention, numbering sixty-eight. Changes in some commands were constant. In others one man retained office for years. It is impossible to give an exact list of generals as they stood at any one date. The old authorities vary. But the following one is as accurate as may be: —

1. Parmenio, general-in-chief, under the king, usually commanding the left wing of the army, while Alexander commanded the right.
- 2-9. The Somatophylaxes, specially trusted officers, always near the king, unless put in command of detachments. They acted as general officers, chiefs of staff or aides-de-camp, and were the king's military family. They were, according to Arrian, though two or three more are added by other authorities: —
2. Hephaestion, the king's bosom friend, son of Amyntas, from Pella.
3. Leonnatus, son of Anteas, from Pella.
4. Lysimachus, son of Agathocles, from Pella.
5. Perdiccas, son of Orontes, who also commanded a brigade of pezetæri, from Orestis.
6. Aristonus, son of Pisæus, from Pella.
7. Ptolemy, son of Lagus (succeeded Demetrius), from Æordæa.
8. Peithon, son of Crateas, from Æordæa.
9. Peucestas, later appointed in Carmania, b. c. 325.
10. Philotas, son of Parmenio, commanding the Companion cavalry.
11. Nicanor, son of Parmenio, commanding the hypaspists.
12. Clitus (the "black" one), son of Dropidas, commanding the cavalry agema.
13. Glaucias, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
14. Aristo, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
15. Sopolis, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
16. Heraclides, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
17. Demetrius, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
18. Meleager, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
19. Hegelochus, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
20. Cœnus, son-in-law of Parmenio, commanding brigade of pezetæri and later agema of cavalry.
21. Amyntas, son of Andromenes, commanding brigade of pezetæri.
22. Meleager, 2d, commanding brigade of pezetæri.
23. Philip, son of Amyntas, commanding brigade of pezetæri.
24. Craterus, commanding brigade of pezetæri.
25. Polysperchon succeeded Ptolemy and Craterus in command of brigade of pezetæri.
26. Calas, son of Harpalus, commanding Thessalian heavy horse.
27. Philip, 2d, son of Menelaus, commanding Greek heavy horse.
28. Philip, 3d, son of Machatas, commanding brigade of infantry.

29. Sitalces, commanding Thracian acontists.
30. Clearchus, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers and later Greek auxiliaries.
31. Cleander succeeded Clearchus, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers.
32. Antiochus succeeded Cleander, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers.
33. Ombrion succeeded Antiochus, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers.
34. Antiochus, 2d, commanding a brigade of infantry.
35. Attalus, commanding Agrianians, later an infantry brigade.
36. Admetus in temporary command of hypaspists at Tyre.
37. Amyntas, 2d, son of Arrhabæus (the Lyncestian), commanding Macedonian lancers.
38. Amyntas, 3d, commanding infantry brigade.
39. Aristo, commanding Pæonian light horse.
40. Agatho, Parmenio's brother, commanding Odryssian light horse.
41. Antigonus, son of Philip, a Macedonian, commanding Greek auxiliary phalangites.
42. Balacrus, son of Amyntas, vice Antigonus, commanding Greek auxiliary phalangites.
43. Balacrus, son of Nicanor, sometimes mentioned as a Somatophylax.
44. Menandrus, son of Nicanor, commanding Greek mercenary phalangites.
45. Seleucus, in command of royal pages.
46. Ptolemy, 2d, son of Seleucus, commanding infantry brigade.
47. Sitalces, commanding Thracians.
48. Ptolemy, 3d, son of Philip, temporarily commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry.
49. Philotas, commanding an infantry brigade.
50. Calanus succeeded Balacrus in command of Greek auxiliaries.
51. Alecastas, commanding an infantry brigade.
52. Ptolemy, 4th, commanding an infantry brigade.
53. Gorgias, commanding an infantry brigade.
54. Aristobulus, a minor officer, who wrote a history of Alexander.
55. Clitus (the white one), commanding an infantry brigade.
56. Peithon, 2d, son of Sosocles, an infantry officer.
57. Peithon, 3d, son of Agenor, commanding an infantry brigade.
58. Neoptolemus, commanding an infantry brigade.


59. Antigenes, commanding an infantry brigade.
60. Cassander, commanding an infantry brigade.
61. Alexander, son of Aëropus, the Lyneestian, commanding Thessalian horse, vice Calas.
62. Erigyius, commanding Greek allied cavalry.
63. Simmias, commanding infantry brigade.
64. Artabazus, commanding Darius' Greek mercenaries, later with Alexander.
65. Nearchus, an infantry officer and later the distinguished admiral.
66. Eumenes, the secretary.
67. Diades, the engineer.
68. Laomedon, provost marshal.

Others there were but of lesser importance. Some of the above generals are constantly mentioned in all accounts of Alexander's campaigns. They usually retained their commands, as given, but wounds, death, detail on other service, promotion, and sometimes unbecoming conduct, wrought changes.

At the head of these generals, and in a sense which no captain has ever since reached, stood Alexander, the king, the master, the first and in every respect the leader of his army; its pattern, its hardest worked, most untiring, most energetic, bravest, most splendid member. What he did, and the way in which he did it, roused the emulation of his lieutenants to an unexampled pitch. With Alexander it was never "Go!" but "Come!" The hardest task he invariably selected for his own personal performance. The greatest danger he always entered first. Despite his better armor, he could show more wounds than the most reckless of his men. None could vie with him in courage, bodily strength, expert use of arms, or endurance. And in every detail of the service, from hurling the Agrianian javelin to manœuvring the phalanx, from the sarissa-drill of the heavy pezetærus to the supreme command of the army, he stood absolutely without

a peer. In his every word and deed he was easily master; not from his royal birth, but from his qualities of body, head and heart.

Alexander's route lay between the coast and Lake Cercinitis, via Amphipolis, and passed Abdera and Maroneia. Crossing the Hebrus, he continued along the coast, passed the Melas, and pushing down the peninsula, arrived at Sestos, some three hundred and fifty miles from Pella, in twenty



Pella to Asia Minor.

days. This was a rapid march. It is said that the fleet accompanied the army along the shore, and that they rendezvoused every night. This was the usual habit when army and fleet had the same destination.

Parmenio was charged with conveying the cavalry and nearly all the infantry from Sestos to Abydos, for which service he had the aid of the one hundred and sixty triremes, and of many trading vessels which had already been assembled in the Hellespont. This transit was easily accomplished, for there was practically no opposition from the Persians or the Greek mercenaries under Memnon. Alexander himself, with a few of his troops,—the hypaspists and Companions,—is said to have sailed from Elæus, where he offered sacrifices at the tomb of Protesilaus, the first Homeric Greek who per-

ished on the Trojan shore, steered the vessel with his own hand, and landed on Cape Sigeum, not far from the tombs of Ajax, Achilles, and Patroclus. Having in mid-channel again sacrificed to Poseidon and the Nereids, he was himself the first man to step, in full armor, upon the coast of Asia, having from the bows of his boat first cast his spear as a symbol of conquest upon the land of the Persian foe.

Troy was then visited, Alexander heading the chosen troops he had brought with him, and due sacrifices were made to the gods and to the shade of Priam. Especially to Achilles did the king make sacrifice, while Hephaestion, his bosom friend, poured libations to Patroclus. From the temple of Athenē, on the heights of Ilium, Alexander took certain arms, said to have been carried by the Homeric heroes,—perhaps even by Achilles,—leaving his own panoply in their place. These historic arms were thereafter always carried near him in battle by some specially selected brave man. Here also games and feasts were held. The multiplicity of these sacrifices was in accordance with the customs of the Greeks, and was, moreover, in unison with Alexander's somewhat superstitious nature. The landing was marked by the erection of altars and memorials, and by the founding of a new Troy.

In all such matters Alexander gives us an index to his character. We may better liken him to an Homeric Greek than to an ordinary mortal. Great in love and hate, in common sense and superstition, in generosity and savage rage, he was Achilles come to life. The Æacidæ had indeed a fit representative in Alexander. But grafted on this heroic character was all that Greek intelligence could lend it; and this it was which enabled him to grow into the greatest soldier whom perhaps the world has ever seen.

The army was here reviewed, and, according to Diodorus, was as follows: —

Infantry.

Macedonian phalanx	12,000
Allied hoplites, 7,000 ; mercenaries, 5,000 . . .	12,000
Thracians and Illyrians	5,000
Agrianian javelin-men and archers	1,000

Cavalry.

Macedonian heavy, under Philotas	1,500
Thessalian heavy, under Calas	1,500
Greek mercenary, under Erigyius	600
Thracian and Paeonian light, under Cassander . .	900

34,500

These figures vary not materially from those already given. To these must be added some five thousand men already in Asia Minor, the remnant left by Parmenio. But the effective force was speedily reduced by the garrisons left behind in Asia Minor.



Head of Alexander.

(From the Equestrian Statuette found at Herculaneum.)


XIX.

BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS. MAY, B. C. 334.

THE Persian chiefs were awaiting Alexander on the line of the Granicus. Memnon had advised them to retire and devastate the country behind them. But overweening courage and jealousy of this wise Rhodian made them reject his counsel. Advancing to the river, Alexander found the Persian cavalry drawn up on its banks to dispute his crossing, with the infantry in its rear. The order should have been reversed. Foot could better defend the fords. Of this faulty disposition the king took immediate advantage, and determined on attack. He placed his phalanx in the centre with the Companions on the right and the Thessalians on the left. Parmenio, commanding the left wing, operated independently, and sought to force a crossing below the Persian right; while Alexander, on the Macedonian right, endeavored to break the Persian array at the main ford. The vehemence of the king's attack on the Persian left advanced the Macedonian right so as to give the line the aspect of an oblique order. It was solely a cavalry battle, in which Alexander had four to one against him. The fighting was stubborn; splendidly gallant on the Persian side, many princes, nobles, and generals being killed; bold, pertinacious, heroic on Alexander's. Finally, after great personal risk and true Homeric daring, the king succeeded in forcing a passage opposite the Persian left. The phalanx began to follow. Parmenio crossed below and came in on the Persian right. Thus compromised, the Persian cavalry was dispersed. The Persian infantry, which had not lifted hand, took to flight. The Greek mercenaries fought for existence, but without avail. The victory was decisive. No army could again oppose Alexander in the open field in Asia Minor.

ALEXANDER joined his army at Arisbe, and next day advanced to Percote. The passes of Mount Ida were found to be defended, and the Persian army lay on the plains of Zeleia. Alexander headed northward along the coast. He could thus turn the Mount Ida positions as well as seek the enemy. Orders were issued against devastation or injury to the people. Passing Lampsacus, he threw forward as scouts

a cavalry force consisting of one ilē of Companions and four of lancers, all under the Lyncestian Amyntas, and sent Panegorus with another body of Companion cavalry to take Priapus, a town lying at the mouth of the Granicus, in a position to command the plains through which it flowed. The place was readily surrendered.



To the Granicus.

The Persian fleet was ready at hand, and commanded the Aegean. The army lay in the plains behind the Granicus. It consisted of twenty thousand cavalry,—Persian, Bactrian, Median, Hyrcanian, Paphlagonian,—and not quite an equal number of Greek mercenaries. The figures of Diodorus,—one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse,—are unquestionably inaccurate. But the force was ample, if employed with intelligence.


The Persians were under a sort of joint command of Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, and of Arsites, viceroy of Phrygia in Hellespont, aided by many noted and brave chiefs,

among whom were the Persian Omares, Mithrobarzanes, hiparch of Cappadocia, Arsames, Rheomithres, Petines, Niphates, Atizyes, satrap of Greater Phrygia, and others, near relatives of the Great King, and nobles of high degree. The Greek mercenaries were part of the command of Memnon. This was a very respectable force, which, well led, was capable of delaying and embarrassing, if not arresting, the Macedonian army.

Memnon, though having only a subordinate command, volunteered to the Persian officers the very sensible advice to avoid a decisive battle, to retire and to lay waste the country by burning crops, farms and villages, if need be, so as to cut Alexander off from supplies. For Memnon kept his eyes open, had his own sources of information, and knew that Alexander was but scantily provisioned and had little money. He offered to lead a large land force into Macedonia, and suggested that this should be coupled with a naval expedition ; for the fleet was ready at hand. This admirable advice was rejected, the Persian generals being jealously suspicious of Memnon, not only as a Greek, but as a favorite of the king. They were conscious of their own personal bravery, and deemed courage enough to make short work of the invader. Particularly Arsites refused to allow a single house to be burned in his satrapy. It was well for Alexander that Memnon's opinion was overridden. Having deliberated and agreed that to give immediate battle was the one thing to be done, the Persians advanced, determined to dispute the further passage of Alexander on the line of the Granicus.

Instructed that the Persian force was in that vicinity, and always going straight for his objective, Alexander forged ahead with his heavy-armed troops in two columns consisting of right and left wing, the Macedonian cavalry on the right, the Thessalian and Greek on the left flank, the baggage and

bulk of the light troops in the rear. Hegelochus with the lancers and some five hundred light troops curtained his front. Not far from the river came galloping back couriers with the news that the Persians had occupied the other bank, and stood there in order of battle.



Battle of the Granicus.

The Granicus was fordable in many places ; in others it was deep and rapid. Its farther bank was steep, and it was far from easy to cross in face of opposition. The troops would be obliged to ford the stream in column, and thus not only present a meagre front to the enemy, but also be liable

to be taken in flank by the Persian cavalry. Parmenio advised to camp for the night,—the day being already far spent,—hoping that the sight of such a considerable force would constrain the enemy to retire, and fearing that a first check, which was not improbable under the existing conditions, might produce a bad effect on the *morale* of the army. But Alexander always believed in the moral effect bred of a bold offensive, and having reconnoitred and ascertained that the disposition of the Persians was faulty, he determined to force the passage at once. This he believed he could do, and preferred the attempt even to a resort to ruse, for he would not have the Persians think that he would for an instant pause at even so considerable an obstacle, and thereby give them confidence in their ability to oppose Macedonians. The quality of Alexander's moral courage was always equal to his personal daring. At this his first encounter, it is hard to say that daring, even to the verge of foolhardiness, was not a better policy than prudence.

The Persian chiefs had employed their cavalry, which had for generations ranked as the best in existence for attack, to defend the passage of a river which the Greek mercenary infantry, with their long spears, could vastly better have held, while the latter, on account of native jealousy of Memnon, had been placed in the rear, where it was distinctly useless, and could only be spectator of the fray. This error Alexander had at once recognized. The Macedonian columns were filed right and left into line. Parmenio was placed in command of the left; Alexander himself took command of the right wing. There was no centre.

In the right wing, counting from the right, were first Philotas with the cavalry Companions, sustained by the archers and the Agrianian acontists. To Ptolemy, son of Philip, had that day come by rote the honor of leading the van of the

heavy horse with, as Arrian says, the *ilč* of Socrates. Amyntas, with the lancers, the Pæonians, and one taxis of hypaspists to give them stability, was thrown out in front on the right. Alexander was behind Ptolemy with the rest of the hetairai. Nicanor, with the other shield-bearing guards, was on the left of the heavy cavalry; then came the taxes of Perdiccas, Cœnus, and Amyntas, the infantry officer; and finally the taxis of Philip, son of Amyntas.

Alexander proposed to make a diversion on the Persian left with the light troops under Amyntas; to have this followed up by Ptolemy with his squadron of heavy horse; while himself, with seven squadrons of the hetairai, backed up by the phalanx on his left, would deal the heavy blow, advancing on the enemy with the right wing. This operation would throw this wing into an oblique line, left refused. The left wing, under Parmenio, was, if necessary, to act independently. In the latter wing, counting from the left, came the Thessalian cavalry, under Calas; then the allied Greek cavalry, under Philip, son of Menelaus, and the Thracian cavalry, under Agatho. Then came the infantry taxes under Craterus and Meleager, which adjoined Philip. The artillery was posted on this flank to throw missiles across the river at the enemy, and thus aid Parmenio, who was to advance also in oblique order, on the Persian right. It is not stated how efficient service the engines may have rendered. In the *mêlée* beyond the river they might be equally dangerous to friend or foe. It is the novelty of their use, not their effectiveness, which is of interest in this connection, for engines had until Alexander's day been used exclusively in sieges.

The Persians had four to one of Alexander's force of cavalry. They made no use of their infantry. The battle was almost solely decided by the use of horse. The phalanx merely capped the stroke. The Persian horse was extended

in long phalangial order along the bank of the river. Their foot, as stated, was in its rear, on the higher ground which gradually ascended from the water-side. This was a fatal mistake. The heavy infantrymen with their thrusting pikes were peculiarly adapted to defend the crossing, while the cavalry, by attacking the Macedonians after they had crossed and were somewhat in disorder, would be in their very element. The order should have been reversed; but no doubt excess of gallantry in the Persian chiefs led them to open the first and heaviest fighting in their own persons, as leaders of their choicest cavalry. Memnon, with his sons, and Arsames were on the left with the mass of the cavalry; the Medes and Bactrians were on their right; the Phrygians, Paphlagonians, Hyrcanians and Lydians were under Arsites and Spithridates in the centre; Rheomithres was on the right. More than forty Persian chiefs of high rank and princes were prominent in the battle.

The Persians, so soon as they perceived the Macedonian formation, concentrated the bulk and flower of their horse upon their left, opposite the place where they recognized Alexander, who was always conspicuous in action by his two white plumes, resplendent arms, and commanding presence. And this Macedonian wing, too, was somewhat advanced by the accidents of the ground. While Alexander was marshaling his array, the Persians were doing the like. When this was completed, for a brief period both armies stood facing each other in profound silence. The Persians were waiting to take the Macedonians at a disadvantage as they crossed. Alexander was assuring himself that each brigade was in place and ready for action. To do this he rode the lines, and calling on all to show themselves men, he ordered Amyntas, the cavalryman, forward with his lancers, and the Pæonians and hypaspists. Ptolemy followed upon his heels.

The pæan was intoned, the trumpets blared, the war-cry, “Enyalius!” an Homeric name for Mars, was shouted, and the attack was begun with true Macedonian *élan*. In the order given the army entered the fords with the confidence bred of many victories. But they had never yet encountered such foes as the splendid Persian horse.

Alexander was leaning his right on Ptolemy and his left on the phalanx. This whole wing, by the advance of the extreme right, was, as stated, thrown into a sort of oblique order, and the right still kept on edging to the right, partly on account of the way the main ford ran, and partly so as to prevent the enemy from outflanking it in that quarter. The left wing, under Parmenio, was operating lower down, so as to fall on the Persian right. The two wings were separated,—not the error then which it now would be. The phalanx of the right wing was to make its way across the ford when the horse under Alexander had opened the way by its vigorous onset; the phalanx of the left to follow Parmenio.

The oblique order of the right wing was thus partly intentional, partly owing to the greater rapidity of onset of the *hetairai* and light horse, and the inability of the phalanx to get over the fords as soon as they did. But it was none the less effective. Alexander's excessive ardor, and the fact that he always commanded the right, gives the appearance in all his battles of a premeditated oblique order. But, as will hereafter appear, it was sometimes accidental and due to his own tremendous energy. At the Hydaspes, no doubt, the oblique order was intended. Here it was not so. Many books on the history of war portray Alexander's battles with the troops as regularly echeloned in oblique order as Frederick's army at Leuthen; but the careful comparison of the original authorities by no means sustains this view. The regular order in echelon is of late creation, though Epaminon-

das certainly originated, and Alexander constantly used, a formation which had the quality and effect of the oblique order in the shape best adapted to the circumstances. It has been discussed above how far Epaminondas' formation at Leuctra or Mantinæa probably approached the echeloned. At the Granicus there could be no such regularity from the very nature of the case.

The Persians began the use of weapons by hurling their javelins from the high banks in all directions towards the fords, where Ptolemy, preceded by Amyntas, was struggling through the slippery clay towards the shore. The cavalry fell to, hand to hand. The Persians advanced boldly to the water's edge to force the enemy back. They cast their spears; the Macedonians used theirs to thrust, and could thus repeat their blows many times with the same weapon. The Macedonian cavalry was much inferior in number; the men suffered severely from the missiles showered down from the high bank above them, where were posted the best-armed Persian horsemen, commanded and encouraged by renowned and valiant chiefs. The leading Macedonians fought with valor, but they were quickly cut down and the line was driven back. The king, leading the agema of cavalry, came to the rescue with Philotas and the remainder of the Companions, and fiercely attacked that portion of the Persian line where he saw that the flower of the horse and the leaders stood. Holding himself here by efforts worthy of his ancestor Hercules, he enabled squadron after squadron of his cavalry to essay the crossing under protection of his stanch attack. The fight was unlike the cavalry skirmishing of that day, which was by short and repeated shocks; it was more like an ancient tussle of heroes, man to man, horse to horse; each one trying to force the other back by the momentum of weight, as well as by valor and sturdy blows. The Persians

were determined to drive the Macedonians back into the river ; the Macedonians to win a footing on the bank. Having cast all their javelins, the Orientals fell to with their curved swords. The fighting was furious. The bravest and stoutest bit the dust. The white plumes waved everywhere. “Enyalius !” resounded above the din. Finally, under the king’s magnificent gallantry, the cornel-wood spears of the Macedonians bore down the lighter weapons of the Persians, and the landing of Alexander’s immediate command was effected.

Alexander ran great personal risk in the combat at this point. He broke his own spear in the conflict, borrowed another from a Companion, and slew Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, who was rushing at him with a chosen body formed like a wedge. He received at the same time a blow with a scimitar in the hands of Rhoisakes, brother of Mithridates, which cut away part of his helmet, but he slew the prince with his spear. He was always in the thickest of the fray. Spithridates, from behind, rushed upon him with uplifted weapon, and but for the aid of swarthy Clitus, whose sword severed the Persian’s arm, he would not have escaped a grievous wound or death. He was the centre for all to rally on. Nothing but Alexander’s irrepressible courage could have held the Companions to their work. According to Diodorus, he received two body-wounds and one in the head.

Having thus pushed his van forward, the rest of the right wing was gradually enabled to cross. The cavalry of the left had forced a passage below, where the opposition was less determined, and was getting in on the Persian right flank. The Macedonians struck at the faces of the foe with their spears, and at their horses. The light-armed troops, mixed with the cavalry, did great execution upon the Persians. The enemy broke first where the king fought in the right wing.

Instantly seizing this opening and pouring into the gap with the Companions, the Persian cavalry was borne back in a body ; a few more doughty blows and it was dispersed.

What Asiatic infantry there was decamped at once. The twenty thousand Greek mercenaries, under Omrides, alone stood firm. They fought for their reputation as Greeks as well as for their lives. Drawn up in close order, they refused to stir. They begged for quarter, but Alexander refused it. They had been inactively watching a battle they might perhaps have saved, and had no orders which could apply to this unforeseen, incredible result. They fought like Greeks. But they were surrounded by the phalanx ; the cavalry of the right closed in on their left ; the Thessalians rode around their right ; they were cut to pieces where they stood, two thousand alone being captured. In this last attack, Alexander had his horse killed under him.

About one thousand Persian horsemen were slain, but a fearful percentage of the chief officers fell, for they had recklessly exposed their persons. Among these were the viceroy of Lydia, the governor of Cappadocia, the son, the son-in-law, and the brother-in-law of Darius, and many other princes. On the Macedonian side some twenty-five Companions of the van were killed, and sixty of the other cavalry. Many hundreds were wounded. Less than three thousand horse had been engaged on the right. Some thirty footmen were killed in the attack on the Greek phalanx. It seems as if this statement must be below the truth. The query naturally arises, the latter being well armed, placed where they must fight for their lives, and in the open field, how could the Macedonians slay so many thousands of them with a loss of only thirty infantry ? This question is always cropping up in ancient and mediæval warfare. The only explanation is that the beaten, broken army becomes a mere mob,—demoralized,

panic-stricken, incapable of any resistance, collectively or individually. There was in ancient days no artillery with which to cover the retreat of a beaten force. In this case the Macedonians bore the twenty-one foot sarissa, the Greeks but a twelve-foot pike ; and the cavalry attacked them on both flanks. Look at battles so late as Crécy (1346) and Agincourt (1415). At the former, the English loss is stated to have been one squire, three knights, and very few soldiers ; while the French are said to have lost eleven princes, twenty-eight hundred knights and nobles, and thirty thousand soldiers. At the latter, the English lost sixteen hundred men to twenty thousand French. The experience of nineteenth century warfare makes it all but impossible to comprehend this ; but the numberless examples of history vouch fully for its truth. It has been claimed that Macedonian losses were understated as a matter of braggadocio. But even gross exaggeration will not alter the vast excess of losses by the vanquished, nor would the many enemies of Alexander in Greece have failed to record the truth.

There are few things more curious than the comparison of losses in given battles in all ages with their military and political results. At Cunaxa, in the Greek phalanx, not one man was killed, and but one man wounded. At the Granicus there were one hundred and fifteen killed ; at Issus, four hundred and fifty ; at Arbela, five hundred. These three battles decided the fate of Persia. At the battle of Megalopolis, however, Antipater, with forty thousand men, defeated Agis, with twenty thousand, the Macedonians losing thirty-five hundred killed, and the Spartans fifty-three hundred. Important as the battle was, it is the fierceness of the fighting, especially on the Spartan side, which is the noteworthy fact.

We are wont to imagine a greater gallantry in olden times than in our own so-called degenerate days. Courage is said

to decline into stoicism when long-range weapons supplant hand-to-hand combat. But it is a question whether the latter in the soldier is not the greater virtue. Since the days when the lines of battle had to close in order to decide the day, troops have been forced to stand, and have stood, far greater decimation. Let us go no farther back than a few brilliant examples in our own day and generation.

To take small bodies : —

At Balaclava, the Light Brigade, out of 673 men, lost 113 killed, or 16.8 per cent.

At Mars la Tour, the 16th Infantry (Westphalian), out of 3,000 men, lost 509 killed, or 16.9 per cent.

At Metz, the Garde Schützen, out of 1,000 men, lost 162 killed, or 16.2 per cent.

These are the heaviest percentages of killed shown by these two nations within recollection.

During our Civil War, each of sixty-six Union regiments, *in some one battle*, lost a higher percentage in killed than this. Of these, one lost 28 per cent. in killed ; one, 26 per cent. ; one, 24 per cent. ; four, 23 per cent. ; five, 22 per cent. ; five, 21 per cent. ; seven, 20 per cent.

Or, to take somewhat larger bodies : —

At Gettysburg, the First Corps, out of 9,000 men, lost 593 killed, or 6.6 per cent. ; the Second Corps, out of 10,500 men, lost 796 killed, or 7.6 per cent. ; the Third Corps, out of 11,000 men, lost 578 killed, or 5.3 per cent.

At Antietam, the Second Corps, out of 15,000 men, lost 883 killed, or 5.9 per cent.

At Chickamauga, the Fourteenth Corps, out of 20,000 men, lost 664 killed, or 3.3 per cent. ; McCook's Division, out of 12,500 men, lost 423 killed, or 3.4 per cent.

At Stone River, the Twenty-first Corps, out of 13,000 men, lost 650 killed, or 5 per cent.

At Gettysburg, Gibbon's Brigade, out of 3,773 men, lost 344 killed, or

9.1 per cent. ; the Iowa Brigade, out of 1,883 men, lost 162 killed, or 8.6 per cent.

At the Wilderness, the Vermont Brigade, out of 2,800 men, lost 195 killed, or 7 per cent.

Or, to take some large armies of this century : —

At Borodino, the French, out of 133,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 4,400 killed, or 3.3 per cent. ; the Russians, out of 132,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 4,500 killed, or 3.4 per cent.

At Waterloo, the Allies, out of 72,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 3,600 killed, or 5 per cent. ; the French, out of 80,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 4,100 killed, or 5 per cent.

At Gettysburg, the Federals, out of 82,000 men, actually lost 3,063 killed, or 3.8 per cent. ; the Confederates, out of 60,000 men, actually lost 2,665 killed, or 4.4 per cent.

At Gravelotte, the Germans, out of 146,000 men, actually lost 4,449 killed, or 3 per cent.

The term "killed" does not include those who die of their wounds. The men, for instance, in the Federal army at Gettysburg, who were killed *and* died of their wounds (most of them within a week) numbered five thousand two hundred and ninety-one men or 6.4 per cent. But to keep the same method of figuring for all cases, only those killed in the battle are counted, viz. : three thousand and sixty-three. The figures of killed at Borodino and Waterloo cannot be vouched for, but they are not far from the truth.

The following deductions can be made from the above figures. The larger the force the less the *percentage* of killed ; principally because a smaller percentage of men can be actually got into fighting contact. In bodies exceeding sixty thousand men, the loss in *killed, in a very stubbornly contested battle*, may be some four per cent. ; in bodies of from ten thousand to twenty thousand men, five per cent. ; in bodies of from two thousand to five thousand men, seven and a half per cent. ; in regiments of from one thousand to two

thousand men, seventeen per cent.; in battalions of five hundred men, twenty-two per cent. This makes no account of wounds whatever, even mortal ones. These percentages apply only to very stubbornly fought battles. The average battle, even if severe, falls far short of these losses.

Among the Greeks only the losses of the victors can fairly be counted. The vanquished were invariably massacred. Should we count both, the Greek losses in killed would be many times those of our battles. But, in an occasional battle of ancient days, the losses in killed, quite apart from the massacre following defeat, were far higher than anything shown in modern warfare. At Megalopolis the Macedonian victors lost nine per cent. in killed, twice the loss at Waterloo, two and a half times that at Gettysburg. In the average Greek battle, the killed were usually fewer than in modern actions. Hand-weapons were less deadly than musket-balls; and the men wore armor and carried shields, which were a reasonably good protection against spears, arrows and stones. The wounded were numerous. In Alexander's combats they average ten or twelve to one of killed, often twenty. Nowadays, about seven to one is the ratio. On the basis of killed alone, Alexander's battles were not so deadly as ours; on the basis of killed and wounded, they were not far from the same.

If we take a general casualty-list composed of the killed and wounded in celebrated battles, we shall find that

Napoleon, in nine battles, lost, in each, about	22	per cent.
Frederick, in eight battles, lost, in each, about	18½	per cent.
The Confederates, in eleven battles, lost, in each, about .	14	per cent.
The Unionists, in eleven battles, lost, in each, about . . .	13	per cent.
The Germans, in eight battles, lost, in each, about	11½	per cent.
The English, in four battles, lost, in each, about	10	per cent.
The Austrians, in nine battles, lost, in each, about	10	per cent.
The French, in nine battles, lost, in each, about	9	per cent.

These figures are a good gauge to measure by.

The loss then, in killed, at the Granicus, of the three thousand horse headed by Alexander, was less than three per cent. Cavalry never loses as heavily as infantry ; the organization of mounted troops does not enable them to stand up to decimation so well as foot. The fighting ranks high as a combat of cavalry, and victory was won against vast odds. If we estimate the wounded at ten to one, the loss was thirty-one per cent., exceptionally high for cavalry, high for any body of men. We shall recur to these statistics often. It is well to bear the percentages in mind.

These first Macedonian brave to perish at the Granicus had statues by Lysippus erected in their memory ; they were buried in full armor and with the greatest honors, and their families were relieved from taxes and handsomely provided for. The wounded were treated with the highest consideration. Alexander personally visited each and listened to the story of his prowess. The Persians and Greek mercenaries were also buried, and plundering was prohibited ; but the Greek prisoners were sent to Macedonia in chain-gangs, to till the soil, for having, contrary to the decision of the associated cities at Corinth, entered the service of the Persian king and made war on Greeks. Such Thebans as happened to be among them, the king let off scot-free. Three hundred panoplies were sent to Athens to be dedicated in the Acropolis with this inscription : “ Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians, present these spoils of the foreigner inhabiting Asia.” Booty was freely distributed to all the soldiers to whet their appetite for more.

The battle of the Granicus was courageously but unintelligently fought by the Persians, who relied upon courage instead of tactics, and put their infantry to no use whatever. And yet this infantry was one of the largest and best bodies of foot the Persian army had so far had, and capa-

ble of doing, if led by a man like Memnon, the very best of work.


Calas, son of Harpalus, who was familiar with this territory, having been here with Parmenio during the preceding two years, was made satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. His instructions were to make no internal changes, to administer the government with the ancient officials, but subject to Alexander's control, and to collect taxes as usual. These now flowed into the Macedonian army-chest.

This victory was well calculated to give Alexander a great repute and abundant success in Asia. His personal prowess, the exceptional slaughter of noble Persians, not unlike the fall of heroes in the Iliad, must have impressed itself with wonderful force on the Persian imagination. The moral effect of the victory at the Granicus, and the loss of so many of the governors and chiefs of this section in that battle, so completely broke up the power of the Persian satraps, that no army thereafter was found to face Alexander in the open field in Asia Minor.

The road to the heart of Persia lay open to Alexander. He could march straight on Gordium and down towards Cilicia. The direct route lay that way. But he clearly saw that this path could not yet be trodden. The Persian fleet was in the Ægean. His advance across the Taurus mountains would not be safe till all the cities of the coast were in his possession, so as to neutralize the one power of Persia — her ships — in which he was not prepared to measure arms with her. And he must have control of these cities to protect his own rear and flanks as he advanced. Full of Greeks and democrats, these towns, not unwilling before, stood all the more ready now, after this unexpected triumph, to yield themselves and their treasures and fortunes to the conqueror. And the possession of these towns would have yet another

effect, and one of the most to be desired. It would tend to forestall the far from improbable invasion of Macedonia by the Persians. This was a danger Alexander knew he was constantly running, and one to be delivered from which was equivalent to a second army.

To fully complete his victory, the king dispatched Parmenio to reduce Dascylium on the Propontis, the residence of the satrap of Phrygia, a measure necessary properly to protect his rear while he advanced, as he now proposed to do, southerly along the coast.



Bronze Statuette of Alexander.

(Found at Herculaneum in 1751, and thought to be a copy of the statue known to have been made of him by Lysippus after the battle of the Granicus.)


XX.

SARDIS, MILETUS, HALICARNASSUS. FALL, B. C. 334.

ALEXANDER now marched on Sardis, whose rocky citadel might have kept him indefinitely at bay. Luckily, the commandant concluded to surrender the place, and was handsomely rewarded by the king. Ephesus opened its gates, and many other cities sent deputations tendering submission. All such places Alexander treated with distinguished generosity, reduced their taxes, made public improvements, and restored ancient laws and customs. Miletus elected to hold out. Alexander seized the island of Ladē, commanding its harbor, and by clever management of his small fleet and land forces, neutralized the Persian squadron, which attempted to succor the city. Finally Miletus fell, and after an unsuccessful minor sea-fight, the Persians sailed to Samos. Alexander now disbanded his fleet, as he needed the men for land service, and had scarcely funds enough to sustain it. This was, perhaps, a mistake. From Miletus the army moved on Halicarnassus, capturing many cities on the way. To this place had retired Memnon and a number of able Greeks and Persians, determined on stanch defense. The king attempted to capture Myndus, west of the town, as a point of vantage, but failed. He then sat down on the northeast side, and began regular siege-operations. These were long and exhausting; but finally Macedonian persistency succeeded, and Halicarnassus fell and was destroyed. Memnon and others retired to one of the citadels, and the king left a force behind to besiege this, and provided for the government of the land.

SARDIS, the capital of Lydia, was the first city of importance which the programme of Alexander required him to take, and he lost no time in advancing on this ancient residence of Crœsus. Judging from the modern routes, and the general topography, he marched by the east of Mount Ida; though some authorities make him retrace his steps by way of Ilium. Parmenio had easily taken possession of Dascylium, and shortly rejoined his chief. Sardis was noted for its citadel, which, built on an isolated, high and precipitous rock, and surrounded by a triple wall, might have bidden defiance

to almost any force. If held, it might lend efficient aid to the Persian fleet; and its treasure might again summon an army into existence. Time, at this juncture, was very precious. But when the army came within a short march of Sardis, the terror produced by the recent victory became



Granicus to Halicarnassus.

manifest. Alexander was met by a deputation headed by Mithrines, the Persian commandant, who, proving recreant to his trust, surrendered the city, the Acropolis and the vast treasure lying therein. Alexander camped on the Hermus, a couple of miles off, and sent Amyntas, son of Andromenes, with his infantry brigade to take possession of the citadel.

He gave to Mithrines an important place near his own person, to show the world how he could reward such signal service rendered to his cause. He had little fear of similar treachery to himself. He granted freedom to the city, and guaranteed its ancient privileges under the old Lydian laws, of which, for two hundred years, it had been deprived by its conquerors. He thus won its good-will, and insured its fidelity. Parmenio's brother, Asandros, was appointed viceroy; Nicias, collector of customs; and in the citadel was left a garrison of Argives under Pausanias. Both the latter were Companions — probably of the agema. Alexander also laid the cornerstone of a temple to Zeus on the Acropolis. Being the first great city to succumb to his arms, he was anxious to show his friendly animus towards all who should submit without a conflict. Moreover Sardis was a cross-roads of great importance in Asia Minor. It could not be held too securely, and the king employed both force and favor to strengthen its fealty.

From here Alexander detached the rest of the Greek auxiliaries under Calas, the new viceroy, and Alexander, son of Aëropus, the Lyncestian, who had succeeded Calas in command of the Thessalian horse, on an expedition into the Hellespontine region, where Memnon had for some time commanded for Darius, to work up a friendly feeling for his cause. If expertly done, this would protect his left as he advanced south, as well as hold the great roads running inland through Gordium towards the Taurus, which by and by he expected to use as he moved farther into Asia. Nicanor, placed in charge of the fleet (no special training was deemed essential for command at sea), was ordered to Lesbos and Miletus to impose upon the coast cities, and thus aid in their eventual capture. It was his appearance which won over Mitylene to the Macedonian cause — a gain of greatest value.

The easy success at Sardis was an enviable piece of good

fortune for Alexander. Its citadel might possibly have kept him as long at bay as Tyre did subsequently ; and a delay now, in the moment when his victorious advance was beginning to make a marked impression on the susceptible Asiatic mind, would have been a grievous check to his prestige. The king showed his appreciation of these facts in his conduct towards the city. Sardis and the satrapy of Lydia, in addition to many privileges, were held but to pay the same tribute to Alexander which it had been usual to pay to Darius.

From Sardis, Alexander marched in four days to Ephesus, the queen of the Ionian cities. This place also opened its gates, and the king broke up the tyrannical oligarchy there regnant, and established in its stead a democratic form of government. Wherever the democratic feeling was strong, there was opposition to Persian tyranny, and Alexander was naturally received with open arms. He here ordered the tribute, hitherto payable to Darius, to be contributed to the temple of Diana, and himself paid the highest honors at her shrine, which he commanded to be rebuilt in the most superb manner by his engineer, Denocrates. It will be remembered that this temple was burned on the day of Alexander's birth. His liberal treatment of this city, and especially of its tutelary divinity, gave to his name immense popularity.


It was here that the great painter Apelles lived, and doubtless the picture by him of Alexander holding thunderbolts in his hand, which is known long to have been an ornament of the temple of Diana, dates from the time of this visit. At this place Alexander also received deputations from Tralles and Magnesia, and from some other Carian cities, tendering submission. Parmenio, with five thousand foot and two hundred horse, was sent to Caria to receive the surrenders ; and Antimachus, brother of the Somatophylax Lysimachus, with an equal force, to the Æolic and Ionic cities which were under

Persian rule, twenty-four in number. The king's instructions were to overturn the oligarchies in every case, reëstablish democratic government, restore the old laws, and remit the tribute paid to Darius, collecting but the ancient smaller contributions for his own uses.

In every Greek city which he visited, Alexander began some public improvement in commemoration of his setting it free from the Persian yoke. Smyrna had been practically destroyed; its Greek character had been quite lost; Alexander began its reconstruction. At Clasomenæ he laid the foundation of a mole, and opened a canal to improve its harbor. Moneys for these works were easily forthcoming from the superabundant taxes heretofore collected by the Persian king; Alexander diverted a considerable portion of these to the public good. He thus made firm his hold on the territory he conquered, not only by the best measures for military occupation, but by fostering political good-will in the cities. These are the beginnings of those extensive improvements which prove Alexander to have looked on his conquests as possessions to be benefited, not oppressed; which show that greed of territory was but one incentive to his restless forward march.

After sacrificing at the temple of Diana and conducting a procession in her honor, with his army in full parade order and gala-dress, Alexander set out for Miletus. The commandant, the Greek Hegistratus, had lately been anxious to surrender, and had so written to the king more than once, no doubt expecting rewards and honor like Mithrines; but news that the Persian fleet was coming to his rescue changed his determination, and he resolved to hold the place for Darius and to defend its citadel. For Persia had not oppressed Miletus, but rather utilized its commercial importance as it had that of Phœnicia, allowing it to retain its own government, and not a few exceptional privileges.

Miletus was of the utmost consequence to the Persians, if they proposed to hold the Ægean, now that the season was growing late. It was built on a cape south of, and protected by, the jutting headland of Mycale, fifteen miles distant;



Miletus and Environments.

while twenty miles seaward lay the island of Samos. Divided into outer and inner towns, the latter surrounded with strong walls and a deep ditch; with one large harbor on the island of Ladē opposite, and three smaller ones formed by islands on the coast, it could both shelter the largest fleet and offer roadways to vast numbers of merchantmen. More than once in the past history of Asia Minor its possession had determined victory.

Alexander with small effort captured the outer city, which, practically defenseless, was quickly evacuated, and set to work to blockade the inner one with a line of circumvallation. His fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, under Nicanor, was

fortunate enough to arrive three days before the Persian squadron, and he was enabled to seize the island of Ladē, and thus insure by land and sea the complete blockade of the inner city. Alexander sent the Thracians and some four thousand mercenaries to the island to place it in a state of defense beyond danger. He had with him, after his several detachments, some twelve thousand phalangians and hypaspists, the Agrianians and bowmen, four squadrons of Macedonian horse and the Thracian light cavalry.

Many of Alexander's generals, even cautious old Parmenio, advised Alexander to attack the Persian fleet, consisting of four hundred vessels, which had arrived and now rode at anchor near the headland of Mycale. A naval battle seemed indeed inevitable, and the *morale* of the Macedonians was high; and, said Parmenio, it was well to keep up its tension by a constant offensive. But Alexander decided that a present victory at sea could bring him no advantage commensurate with the risk, while the loss of a naval battle would carry with it a dangerous fall in prestige which might encourage to revolt his enemies in Greece. He declined to make venture of his fortunes on an element where he was not only not so strong as on land, but an element so far not his own. Despite that the Greeks had always defeated the Persians on the water, his ships were not as well manned as those of the Cyprians and Phœnicians, and were only one hundred and sixty to four hundred. His intelligence overrode his natural antagonism. He was right, for there were reasons why he could not repose the greatest confidence in the fidelity of his Greek mariners.

Parmenio looked at the matter from another standpoint. An eagle had been seen sitting on the rocks near the ships, an omen which Parmenio construed as favorable. So did Alexander. But the king maintained that the eagle being on

land signified that he would be victorious on land and not at sea. And he acted on this interpretation. It seems strange indeed to think of these two generals, men of exceptional ability, intelligence and common sense, disputing over so trivial a thing as this. That they should seriously argue such a matter is as curious as the apparent pliancy of the omen. And yet is it more strange than the intellect and acrimony wasted in our day on the quite as trivial question of the damnation of the heathen?

The Milesians now sent a deputation to the king, and offered to make their port and city equally open to the Persians and Greeks if Alexander would raise the siege. But Alexander rejected their offer with scorn. He came not to Asia, said he, to take a half, but the whole. He determined to assault the walls the next day at daybreak, and dismissed the deputation with a threat so to do. The engines were at once set to work, speedily broke down the wall in several places, and Alexander led his troops to the breach at the time he had set. To prevent the Persian fleet from succoring the town, as well as to forestall the flight of the Milesian mercenaries to the ships, Nicanor ranged his galleys across the narrowest part of the harbor, side by side, with beaks towards the enemy. The Macedonians, pressing sharply in through the broken walls, easily drove the garrison from its defense, and slew vast numbers. Many of the Greek mercenaries attempted to escape in skiffs, and even by floating upon their hollow shields, to an island near the city. Of these the greatest number fell into the hands of the fleet, but some succeeded in reaching the island. When Alexander endeavored to capture this place of refuge the next day, approaching it in his triremes with ladders lashed to the prows so as to be able to scale the rocks, this handful of men, three hundred in number, made so brave a resistance that, out of simple admiration

of their courage, he was fain to offer them a truce on condition of their taking service under himself. He also pardoned the surviving citizens of Miletus, and granted the city its freedom. The other inhabitants were sold as slaves.

The Persian fleet daily offered battle to Nicanor, which the latter as often declined. At night they returned to, and anchored near, Mount Mycale, whence they had to send to the Maeander, over ten miles distant, for water. Alexander tried a scheme to drive them from their position without battle. He sent Philotas, with some horse and three brigades of infantry, to occupy their landing-place, and to patrol the shore near by to prevent them from getting their usual supply, as well as keep them from foraging, and thus, as it were, besiege their fleet. The Persians were soon forced to sail for Samos, whence, after they had revictualed, they returned. Having exhausted every effort to bring the Macedonians to battle by parading each day in line at the mouth of the harbor, they essayed to cut out some of the Greek galleys, while the sailors were ashore gathering fuel and provisions — a daily necessity in olden times — and sent five ships into the roadstead between Ladē and the mainland to surprise the fleet unmanned. By thus sailing into the harbor, they believed they might get between the army and the fleet. They came close to being successful in their effort, for the Macedonian ships were nearly all, for the moment, without their crews. Perceiving this, Alexander, who happened to be on hand, hastily assembled what sailors were to be found, gave chase to these five galleys with ten of his own which he quickly manned, drove them off, and captured one. The Persians, chagrined by this slight disaster, and seeing no chance of disturbing Alexander's hold on the place, decided to leave the vicinity of Miletus. This they soon did, sailing for Samos, and having accomplished no result whatever, despite their superior num-


bers and better condition. Alexander's waiting tactics had been efficient to a degree.

Alexander now saw that his fleet was no longer of distinct use to him in what he had undertaken to do, and especially so if it must keep to the defensive. It had already accomplished its greatest aim in protecting him in the initial steps. It was no match for that of the Persians in open fight, for the Phœnicians and Cyprians in the Persian service were by long odds the best sailors then known. The king felt that he could better neutralize the enemy's fleet by capturing, and thus excluding them from, the principal seaports, than by provoking a naval engagement; whereas by an unfortunate defeat at sea, which he might suffer at any moment, he would lose much ground difficult to recover. The Persian fleet could in no sense compromise his land operations as it was, though it might give him trouble. His own fleet was expensive, costing fifty talents a month for pay alone and an equal amount for rations,—as much indeed as the army and without making conquests, as the latter did. His treasure was small, for he could not plunder the cities he had come to befriend, and was in the habit, as we have seen, of collecting only reasonable taxes. He needed for land duty such of the men in the fleet as were available. It took nearly thirty thousand men all told — sailors, rowers and soldiers — for the one hundred and sixty triremes. He would be able again to assemble a fleet when he could better afford one. He therefore took steps to disband the seamen and lay up the ships, excepting a few transports and the twenty ships Athens had contributed. These latter he preferred to keep in commission as a sort of hostage for their city's good behavior. Diodorus says that Alexander disbanded his fleet to show his army that they had no means of retreat, and must win or perish. But this is a shallow reason. Alexander's men could always fight without bolstering of such a nature.

The king then marched along the coast to Halicarnassus, taking, one by one — usually by surrender — the cities from Miletus down, and leaving a garrison in each. It had become doubly important to secure every town upon his route. Only by such a land blockade could he drive the Persian fleet from the *Æ*gean. This conception of Alexander's, of forcing the enemy's fleet from the sea by occupying all the coast towns, was as noteworthy as the execution was excellent. It was, on an enormous scale, what he had done at Miletus on a limited one. The towns relied for subsistence upon the interior; the fleet could do them no harm except by interfering with their commerce; and the king felt that he could best restore their trade at sea by starving out the Persian fleet. The longer its naval operations were kept up in the *Æ*gean, the longer the trade of these towns would droop; the sooner he drove the fleet to other waters, the better for his friends.

Halicarnassus was the last great Persian stronghold on the *Æ*gean. Here had collected a large force of Persians and Greek auxiliaries, under Memnon, who, after the defeat at the Granicus, unable to save Ephesus and Miletus, had retired hither, by a circuit, with some fragments of his army, accompanied by Ephialtes, an Athenian exile, and Orontobates. The place was very strong by nature, and Memnon, who had now been appointed governor of Lower Asia and chief admiral of Darius, — for if he could not save what remained, no one else could do so, — having sent his wife and children to the Persian court as voluntary hostages for his truth and fidelity, had added all that art could supply. The mighty walls and a newly-made ditch, exceeding wide and deep, encompassed it upon three sides. On the other, the south side, was the sea. It contained three citadels, — the Acropolis, on the heights of its north side; the Salmakis, on the southwest corner near the sea, on the neck of the cape

which forms the western boundary of the harbor; the royal citadel, on an island at the entrance of the harbor. The island of Arconnesus had been fortified, and garrisons put in the surrounding towns as outposts to divert Alexander's attention from the city. The city had been provisioned for a long



Halicarnassus.

siege. A number of war ships were in the harbor to hold it against the Macedonians, and to use in procuring supplies, which latter proceeding Alexander could not prevent without a fleet. Meanwhile, the sailors were mostly told off for land duty. Many noted refugees were in the city, among them the Lyncestian Neoptolemus, brother of Arrhabæus, who was


mixed up in the murder of Philip ; Amyntas, son of Antiochus, who fled from Alexander's anger, though it would seem that his flight was uncalled for ; Thrasybulus and others.

A siege of Halicarnassus became necessary. On the day of Alexander's approach, as he was leading his men up to the gate opening towards Mylasa in the northeast, and was still about a thousand paces distant, a sortie was made by the garrison, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Macedonians proved too strong for the Halicarnassians, and drove them back into the city. The king then opened his operations with vigor.

There was a town on the western extremity of the peninsula named Myndus. Alexander thought that if he could take this town, it might materially aid in the siege by furnishing him a convenient depot, and accordingly moved a considerable part of his forces — the hypaspists, the cavalry Companions, the brigades of Amyntas, Perdiccas, and Meleager, and the archers and Agrianians — around Halicarnassus by the north to that point. In addition to the above purpose, Alexander intended this movement to be a general reconnaissance to ascertain if there might not possibly be a better chance of assault on the Myndus side of the city wall. Some of the Myndians had offered to surrender the place if he would come under cover of night ; but when he reached the spot his friends had probably been overpowered, and he was received with arms. Angered with this outcome of the affair, though not having brought ladders or engines, Alexander none the less resolved on an offensive ; and in the darkness of night attacked and undermined the walls, and threw down one of the towers. But this did not effect a practicable breach, and the Halicarnassian garrison, informed early next morning of the danger in which Myndus lay, hurried reinforcements by sea to the succor of the place.

Alexander was reluctantly compelled to give up the prospect of capturing Myndus, returned to his old location, and again sat down to besiege Halicarnassus.

He elected to remain on the northeast side, not having found a more promising position. He first covered his men with pent-houses (tortoises) and filled up the ditch, which was forty-five feet wide and twenty-three deep, in convenient places so that he might advance his towers to override the



Siege of Halicarnassus.

wall, drive away its defenders, and bring up his battering rams to open a breach. While he was getting the towers in place, the garrison was by no means neglectful. Their engineers not only erected on their side a tower one hundred and fifty feet high, from which they could dominate Alexander's, but made a night sally to destroy the works so laboriously constructed by the besiegers. The Macedonians were alert, the outposts were quickly reinforced, and all combined met the attack with vigor; they repulsed the sortie with a

loss of one hundred and seventy of the enemy killed (Neoptolemus among them), and sixteen of Alexander's men killed and three hundred wounded. The excessive number of wounds was the result of the surprise, and of the fact that at night the men could not so well protect themselves from the missiles with their shields and the mantelets.

Shortly after, an attack was brought about by two of the Macedonian phalangites who, as a matter of braggadocio and rivalry in courage, armed themselves, and went forward, single-handed, to assault the wall at the point nearest the citadel. A few of the defenders, half in sport, made a sortie upon the reckless couple, who, however, killed and wounded a number of their assailants. This led to others joining the fray from both sides and to a pretty general fight and sortie in force of the garrison. A somewhat similar case occurred in the Gallic War in the land of the Nervii, and is mentioned by Cæsar. The sortie was repulsed, and had the assault been regularly planned and followed up, it might have been successful ; for the walls were not well guarded, and two towers on this side (towards Mylasa), with all the wall between them, had fallen. A third tower had also been undermined, and was ready to fall, but the garrison sustained it by an interior wall or demi-lune. Next day Alexander brought up his engines against this new wall, and the garrison made another sortie in an attempt to destroy them. In this they were partially successful, for they managed to set fire to some wicker-work sheds covering the engines and to part of one tower ; but Philotas preserved the rest from injury, and Alexander, leading up his Macedonians in person, drove the enemy back with loss. Still Alexander had to ask a truce to recover his dead, — the only time he ever made this confession of defeat ; for this new defense was difficult to approach, inasmuch as from the old wall the garrison could throw their darts upon the rear and flank of any party assaulting the demi-lune.

But the Halicarnassians were none the less in parlous case. They foresaw a speedy prospect of surrender unless they could fully destroy the besiegers' works, and resolved upon another general and desperate sortie. This was made from two places at one and the same time, the breach, and what was called the triple gate. The former was under charge of Ephialtes, and was so sharp and unexpected that the young Macedonian troops, who were on guard at the demi-lune works, were at first driven in, and it was with some effort that the heavy fire from the towers, and Philip's veterans, under the personal lead of the king, re-established the matter. Here Ephialtes was killed. The Halicarnassians were well provided with torches and combustibles of all kinds, and came near to accomplishing their purpose. But they tried to fire the towers and engines at the place where Alexander was himself superintending the work, and had, as usual, some of the best troops. They were met fiercely and hustled back. The breach was narrow, and the defeated enemy could not easily make his way through the débris. His loss was heavy. The second party issued from the so-called triple gate, where one of the Ptolemies (not the son of Lagus) was posted. This sortie was also driven back; and as the Halicarnassians in crowds were retiring over a bridge which they had thrown across the ditch, it broke under the excess of weight, and many fell in, and were there slain. Seeing the rout of their comrades, the garrison shut the gates lest the besiegers should enter pell-mell with them; and the Macedonians cut to pieces a number who remained outside without weapons, horror-struck and incapable of defense. The city could doubtless have been taken, had not the king ordered the recall to be blown, for he hoped now for surrender, and desired to avoid delivering up the ancient city to plunder. About one thousand of the garrison were killed, and of the Macedonians some forty, in-

cluding one of the Ptolemies, Clearchus, chief of the archers, and many noted Macedonians.

The wall of the town was now so far destroyed and weakened, and so many of the garrison had been killed or wounded, that Orontobates and Memnon decided to withdraw to the fortress called Salmakis, and to the royal citadel, on an island in the harbor. This they did in the second watch of the night, after setting fire to their big tower and other works, and to the houses near the walls. The fire spread rapidly. The Macedonians speedily moved in, did their best to arrest its progress, and measurably succeeded. Some booty was secured. The city could, however, not well be abandoned to Memnon, and it was essential that Alexander should continue his advance. He deemed it best to raze what was left of Halicarnassus to the ground.

Alexander was unable from lack of time personally to carry on a siege of the strongholds to which Orontobates and Memnon had retired, but he left a garrison of three thousand foot and two hundred horse, under another of the Ptolemies, to reduce them and then finish the capture of the remaining coast cities. His siege train he sent to Tralles. The political charge of Caria, as vice-regent, he left to Queen Ada, who had once ruled over the land, but had been displaced. She was a woman of strong character and noted virtues, and Alexander paid her singular honors. Her influence had weighed much in bringing the Carian cities to Alexander's side. Garrisons were left in the several cities under Macedonian officers. Harpalus was placed in receipt of custom.

With the fall of Halicarnassus, Alexander could consider the west coast of Asia Minor entirely under his control, and permanently. He had done a good summer's and autumn's work since the battle of the Granicus.

XXI.

TO THE TAURUS. WINTER, B. C. 334-333.

ALEXANDER now headed for the interior of Asia Minor. He divided his army into two columns. The heavy trains and the bulk of the heavy troops were sent under Parmenio towards Gordium by way of Sardis, with orders to winter there. The king retained the lighter part of the army, and marched along the coast to where the Taurus range comes down to the sea. On the way he captured or received in surrender all the important towns. At Phaselis he performed the unheard-of feat of marching his army along the tide-washed beach at the foot of Mount Climax,—a matter of cool calculation with the king, but by all others ascribed to the divinity of his character. From Sidē he turned northward, reducing many places and masking such as he could not readily take. In the Termessian defile he was fain to resort to a ruse to obtain the upper-hand, which he got only then by a hard fight. At Sagalassus he had a still more bitter combat and some loss; but victory here opened his way to the upland plateau of Asia Minor. Thence he advanced, *via* Selænæ, to Gordium, where Parmenio's column duly reached him, and some recruits from Macedonia.

ALEXANDER'S plans now pointed towards the interior of Asia Minor. The renewed freedom given to the Greek cities so far captured had placed their allegiance on a basis secure beyond a peradventure. The Macedonian garrisons, holding all the important places of the *Æ*gean coast, rendered the ground already gone over comparatively safe against any incursions by the Persian fleet, while the Persian army had practically evacuated Asia Minor. Alexander now rightly estimated that the thereby weakened means of resistance of the cities of the southern coast, and their lessened hope of aid from either the fleet or the army of their suzerain, would enable him to make more or less easy capture of them all. And this with but a small part of his forces. But he would need recruits for the next campaign.

It was approaching winter. A considerable number of the men in the Macedonian army had been newly married before starting from home. The king furloughed these men and sent them back to their homes to stay with their wives till spring, under charge of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, Cœnus, Parmenio's son-in-law, and Meleager, who were also married men. This act added greatly to the good-will of his soldiers, and on their return the furloughed men brought with them many comrades. He likewise detailed Cleander to the Peloponnesus to recruit.

Alexander then divided his effectives into two columns.




Halicarnassus to Gordium.

Parmenio with part of the Macedonian and all the Thessalian heavy horse, the Greek auxiliaries, the siege material and the wagon train, was headed for Sardis, which was to be an intermediary base as it were, *en route* to Phrygia. He was to winter here, and, as spring opened, march to Gordium, which was to be the rendezvous of all the forces. Alexan-

der had cut out for himself a winter campaign. He never intrusted the dangerous or important work to the hands of others. With the second column, consisting of the rest of the troops, — some Companions, the hypaspists, phalanx, Agrianians, archers and Thracian prodromoi (dragoons) — in light marching order, he proposed, despite the inclement season and rugged country, to move by way of Lycia and Pamphylia,

capture and garrison the coast cities, and thus finish the work of neutralizing the Persian fleet. For without a port on the mainland it must soon leave the *Ægean*. Thence his route would lie across the mountains through Pisidia into Phrygia, due north to Gordium.

The columns separated. Parmenio, whose task was easy, carried out his programme with discretion, and in due time



Halicarnassus to Gordium.

turned up at Gordium with the troops in excellent discipline and heart. We shall find him there by and by. Alexander started along the coast. Having taken Hyparna, where the Greek mercenaries surrendered the citadel on promise of safe conduct, Alexander invaded Lycia, and captured Telmessus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and some thirty other towns. This was the more easy, as Lycia had retained under the Persian king a sort of semi-independence. Of all the cities, Marmara alone defended itself desperately. But naught availed it. When the engines had effected such a breach that all chances

were cut off, these brave people organized themselves into a forlorn hope, fired their city and household treasures, and actually made their way by stealth through the Macedonian camp, and escaped to the mountains. With whatsoever pride and admiration we watch our hero's progress, it gives us pleasure to see an occasional act of signal bravery like this one meet with a less bitter than the usual fate.

Though the mid-winter season was very unfavorable, Alexander pursued his advance — probably up the Xanthus, and marched into Milyas on the headwaters of this river. To him here came embassies from Phaselis and nearly all the coast towns, offering, in token of surrender and greeting, golden crowns and presents, for the news of his liberal treatment of those who did not oppose him had preceded him, and acted as an open sesame. These embassies Alexander received with honor, and bade each accept the regent he should send to represent him.

As a rule, in all the important towns which the king captured, or which submitted to his arms, a few Macedonians were left behind as the nucleus of a garrison, generally wounded or disabled or invalided men who had earned a right to easier duties than those in the field, but who were still able to leaven the lump by their skill and fidelity. If the town was important or the population hostile, a larger garrison was left; but even a few Macedonians, under a good chief, in possession of the citadel of a town, could hold their own with the aid of the mercenaries, with whom they increased their force up to a figure sufficiently high.

From Milyas Alexander proceeded to Phaselis, perhaps the most important of those cities which had surrendered to him. It lay at the foot of Mount Climax, and possessed three fine harbors and an ample roadway. It was powerful and wealthy. From Phaselis there ran over the mountain ranges the prin-

cipal road into the interior, leading direct to Pergē. On this road a Pisidian tribe had built a fortress, from which they made frequent descents on Phaselian territory to gather booty. Alexander at once came to the rescue of his new subjects, and lent them armed assistance in reducing this den of robbers, for it was little more. Moreover as he must use the road himself, it was essential that it should be opened.

In Phaselis the king spent the rest of the winter. He was well pleased with his prosperous campaign, and indulged in feasts and games. His enjoyment of such occasions was keen. No man ever worked harder when at work ; his periods of relaxation, comparatively rare, sometimes partook of the same exuberance of strength. It is related that on one occasion here he headed a procession through the streets after a feast, and decorated with wreaths the statue of the poet Theodectes, who had once been at Philip's court, and left a savory reputation.

Nearchus of Amphipolis, a Cretan, whose affiliations made him acceptable to the population, was made satrap of Lycia.

It was here that occurred the unfortunate treason of the Lyncestian Alexander. This man, we remember, had been implicated in the murder of Philip, but had been pardoned for being the first to salute Alexander as king, and had been rewarded with honors and brilliant commands. When, however, Amyntas had fled from Macedonia to Darius, this Alexander, fearing lest his pardon should not be lasting, had made overtures through Amyntas to the Persian king. He was not of those who believed in Alexander's star. Darius, under another pretext, dispatched a messenger to convey his answer, which was to the effect that if this Alexander would kill the king, he himself should be king of Macedon, and should receive one thousand talents of gold (\$1,250,000) as a present. The messenger was captured by Parmenio, and

compelled to reveal the plot. The Lyncestian Alexander was at the time commander of the Thessalian horse, a position second to none in the army, and was also one of the Companions. To this body the king confided the facts. The Companions had long mistrusted the man, and feared that the king's confidence was misplaced. The traitor, who was with Parmenio at Sardis, was deprived of his rank and ordered under guard. The Companions would have sentenced him to death; but the king still strove to spare him despite his treachery; he never forgot a benefit. This Alexander was eventually executed three years later on the occasion of the conspiracy of Philotas.

When the weather became more auspicious, Alexander moved from Phaselis, sending a part of his light troops over the mountain road, which he had caused to be repaired by the Thracians after he had driven the robber tribe from its all but inaccessible fastnesses, to Pergē. This was stragetically the most important town of this part of the country, because the key to the passage of the mountains on the north. The king himself, with the cavalry Companions and phalanx, marched along the seashore. This march was a very risky one to make. A narrow beach, shut in between Mount Climax, which rose in bold outlines to the height of seven thousand feet, and the sea, was generally covered by water a number of feet deep, or by marshes, for a distance of many miles. Only at those very rare intervals, when the north wind, blowing with unusual violence, beat back the tides, could the beach be used at all, and this but for a few hours at a time. The idea of marching an army along this beach was almost as bold as the conception of Hannibal's march through the Arnus swamps, though not undertaken with the crisp strategic purpose of the latter. Still, if it could be done, Alexander might surprise the position of Pergē, whose inhab-

itants would not expect him from this direction, and the moral effect of such a march would not be inconsiderable.

It happened with Alexander's usual good fortune that about the time when to make this march would be desirable, the elements conspired in his favor, and the periodical north wind blew with exceptional fury. That luck attended him cannot be gainsaid, but Alexander deserves none the less credit for seizing the proper moment to enable him to secure a prosperous passage of this treacherous route. In places the troops waded to the middle, but the transit was safely accomplished. His success gave still further voice to the superstitious notion that Alexander was under the direct favor of the gods. The whole expedition was no doubt well calculated by Alexander in all its details, and what generally was a most hazardous feat may have been at that time a safe one. Not a man was lost, but his soldiers, gazing back on their perilous passage for miles through the waves of the sea at the foot of a perpendicular rock, shuddered indeed, but all the more gained confidence in their king, and gloried in his skill and courage, as they did in his youth and beauty. While the wonderful good luck which always followed this great conqueror was a marked factor in his success, it must not be forgotten that at his headquarters the king always had the very best scientific and professional talent; that he was indefatigable in studying up the questions which bore upon every step he took; and that what often appears to be crass luck was the result of close calculation. Moreover, Alexander never gave Fortune a chance to desert him; whenever she stood ready to help him, he always helped himself. The Peripatetic, Kallisthenes, who accompanied the king's headquarters, and first wrote a history of his campaigns, related the march with his usual unction, and claimed that the sea was fain to bow to the power of this godlike youth. But Alexander simply wrote home

that “he had made a path along the Pamphylian Ladders, and had marched over it.”

Pergē, which was the key to the mountain passes, north and west, surrendered ; whether on account of this march or not, does not appear. The town of Aspendus was willing to do the like, but demurred at admitting a garrison ; and Alexander agreed to accept, in lieu thereof, a tribute from this city of fifty talents — pay for his army — and certain horses which it had been in the habit of rearing annually for Darius. Thence he marched to Sidē, and here he put the usual garrison. The city was the last place of importance on the hither side of the Taurus, and was situated near the point where the range comes to an abrupt end on the seashore.

Alexander could now turn safely northward, and subdue the interior provinces ; for he had under his control practically the entire coast line of Asia Minor. There were but a few isolated and not important points left behind in a state of blockade. He was preparing to besiege Syllium, a place about five miles from the sea between Aspendus and Sidē, when news reached him from Aspendus that the promised tribute had been denied. Syllium was an exceptionally strong place, and was held by Greek mercenaries in Persian pay, — men of a different stamp to the ordinary Asiatic soldier ; so that Alexander deemed it wise to turn from this fortress for the moment, and march back upon Aspendus. The king was fond of hard tasks for their own sake. He was obstinate to a degree in his resolution ; but he had a strong enough grasp of his general problem not to allow this natural antagonism to lead him astray. There was method in his stubbornness. There can scarcely be pointed out an occasion when it misled him. And on this occasion he concluded that he would not waste time in besieging Syllium, but made arrangements to observe it instead.

Aspendus was built mainly upon a very high rock, at the foot of which ran the Eurymedon; but a part of the inhabitants lived in a village which nestled at its foot, and was protected by a wall. This the citizens deserted on the approach of the Macedonian army, and the empty houses afforded Alexander an opportunity to quarter his army to good advantage. The place was of extraordinary strength, and might well have held out an indefinite time, for all Alexander's siege material was with the column under Parmenio; but the garrison, doubtless influenced by the current rumors of Alexander's divine powers,—which superstition Alexander was by no means loath to foster, for its political value as well as, be it frankly confessed, the gratification it yielded to his personal vanity,—agreed to surrender on terms harder than the former ones, namely, double tribute and hostages; and the king, having no desire to devote his time to minor exploits with the world open to his arms, settled the matter in this form, and made haste to march on Phrygia by way of Pergē.


Alexander had no intention of halting long on his way to subdue the mountain tribes of the Taurus. He had altogether too much work cut out ahead. It sufficed if, in passing through, he personally taught them a salutary lesson. He could then leave the eventual settlement of the country to whatever lieutenant he might commission to represent him. Alexander invariably kept the main object in view, and did not allow unessential matters to call his attention from the more important ones. His hope now was speedily to measure swords with the Great King.

The only road to Phrygia lay west of Pergē, skirting the foot of the mountain and then running through the defiles of Termessus, where the mountains had been torn asunder into a gap with sides so precipitous that a handful of doughty men could readily obstruct the passage of a host. The road

was hewn in the rock along one side of the steep wall, and was commanded by yet higher rocks on both sides of the gorge, and within arrow-shot. Beyond the defile lay a strongly fortified town. On reaching the defile, Alexander found that the rocks on both sides commanding the road had been occupied by a considerable body of mountaineers. He at once made preparations to go into camp, rightly arguing that this act would lead the barbarians to suppose that he would not attack the defile that night. The ruse had its natural effect. It was the same Epaminondas had practiced at Mantinæa. The bulk of the enemy retired to the city which lay beyond, leaving but a slender guard on duty in the gorge, which in its turn became somewhat careless of its work. The king, watching his opportunity with his wonted restless eye, no sooner ascertained this fact than he took his archers, javelin throwers and hypaspists, marched with the utmost caution to that part of the defile which the enemy had chosen for defense, and fell with great audacity upon this guard. Surprised and unable to withstand the heavier missiles of the Macedonians, the enemy was driven headlong from his foothold. This opened the pass. The king at once moved up his army and went actually into camp near the city gates. Here he received an embassy from Selgē, a town whose inhabitants were at enmity with the Termessians, and were accordingly glad to assist the Greeks. Alexander made a treaty with Selgē, to which that city remained steadily faithful. But as Termessus promised to give trouble and waste much time in its capture, he blockaded and passed it by, as he had Syllium and several other places, and, no doubt leaving a suitable detachment to hold the defile, marched on to Sagalassus.

This was a city whose inhabitants were called the most warlike of all the Pisidians, themselves a race of marked courage

and determination. Sagalassus lay at the foot of the highest terrace of the mountains, and beyond it opened the uplands of Phrygia. The king found this people drawn up on the rocks on the south front of their city, which rocks formed, as it were, a natural rampart. And here, too, a considerable force of Termessians had joined them to oppose the Macedonian advance. Alexander could make no use of his cavalry on this rugged ground, but he prepared at once to assault the position with his foot. He drew up these troops with the shield-bearing guards under his own command on the right, and the phalangites on the left, each brigade placed according to the day's roster, the whole under Lyncestian Amyntas, son of Arrhabœus, and so marshaled as that each commander of rank should have an occasion to display his personal valor. The archers and Agrianians covered the right, the Thracian acontists, under Sitalces, the left. The light troops in front



Combat near Sagalassus.

of the right advanced boldly up the heights, followed closely by the line, and fell upon the Pisidians with a fierceness which deserved to encompass a victory. But both wings were suddenly taken in flank by an ambuscade, easily prepared on such a field. The archers being light-armed, and having lost their leader, gave way in disorder; but the always gallant Agrianians, better armed, held their ground with great tenacity, and enabled the phalangites to come to their rescue, headed

by Alexander in person. Undismayed at the formidable array of the phalanx, the mountaineers showed wonderful devotion, rushing in crowds upon the line of sarissas, in front of which they fell by hundreds in a vain effort to break it down. But they found the Macedonians as immovable as their own native rocks, and confessing the hopelessness of their task, but hoping to try conclusions again, dispersed all over the surrounding country in places where the Macedonians, heavily armed and ignorant of the ground, did not deem it wise to attempt to follow. About five hundred of the barbarians had been slain. This dispersion, however, worked them no good. It was at once taken advantage of by the king, who advanced on and stormed the town, capturing it without difficulty in its half-deserted condition. There had fallen in this combat about twenty Macedonians, including Cleander, the general of the archers,—the second chief of this gallant body killed in action.

At this point Alexander made a halt, and undertook a number of expeditions against the rest of the strongholds of Pisidia. By taking some by storm, and by granting terms to others, he managed in no great time, and without any single case of noteworthy opposition, to reduce the entire country to his control, so far as it was essential to protect himself in his onward march. The road to the upland plains beyond this range was open to him, without leaving danger in his rear.

The king now marched into Phrygia, leaving Lake Ascania on his left, and reached Celænæ in five marches. This city lay in the mountains at the headwaters of the Mæander, and had been constructed by Xerxes, after his defeat by the Greeks, as a bulwark against their expected advance. It was built on an inaccessible rock and could have made an interminable defense; but the garrison, consisting of one thousand Carians and one hundred Greek mercenaries, headed by the

viceroy of Phrygia, after listening to Alexander's proposals, agreed to surrender in a given period — Curtius says in sixty days — if not succored by that time. Alexander accepted these terms, knowing that his own advance on Gordium would cut off any reinforcements which they might be expecting ; left fifteen hundred men under Antigonus, son of Philip, to see that the treaty was duly carried out ; placed Balacrus, son of Amyntas, in command of the Greek allies, a position which Antigonus had hitherto held, and after a rest of ten days marched to Gordium, the ancient capital of the Phrygian kings. Parmenio shortly arrived, and the married men who had been on furlough likewise joined at this point, bringing thirty-six hundred and fifty recruits with them, namely, three thousand phalangites, three hundred Macedonian and two hundred Thessalian heavy horse, and one hundred and fifty Æleans.

To Gordium also, Athens sent an embassy praying for the release of the Athenian prisoners captured at the Granicus and sent to Macedonia in chain-gangs. Alexander saw fit to deny the request, with intent to show that he was able to hold Greece in subjection ; but he promised to consider the matter when the present expedition should be happily accomplished. He was now again on the high road from the Hellespont through Cappadocia and Cilicia to the heart of the Persian kingdom, which he might have taken after the Granicus victory. His extensive circuit along the coast had been wisely and advisedly made. It had rendered safe his base in Asia Minor, which less than this could not have done.

The king had finished his first year's campaign, the last part of it during the winter season, among the mountains. There are few things which show the wonderful capacity of Alexander to face, and his men to endure, hardship so well as the fact that the difficulties of a winter or a mountain cam-

paign are never dwelt upon by the ancient historians. Neither is credit given for overcoming the unusual labors of such campaigning, nor are these deemed an excuse for delay or failure.

In a certain sense Alexander's success had not been so splendid as to overawe the Greek opposition at home. It must not be supposed that tongues wagged any less noisily two thousand years ago than they do to-day. To be sure he had captured all the coast cities of Asia Minor as the result of his victory at the Granicus, but there were many who alleged that Memnon, whose ability was well recognized, had only permitted this apparent gain so that he himself might more securely occupy the islands of the Ægean in force, and make ready to cut Alexander off from his base by invading Macedon. Then indeed, said Alexander's opponents, he would soon show the Macedonians how slender had been their hold on all this territory. And it was openly prophesied in Athens that Alexander would not dare advance further inland. Nor were these arguments without a substratum of reason. Memnon was capable, and the one man who was so, of giving Alexander a vast amount of trouble ; and no one as yet appreciated the full extent of Alexander's resources and ability. This was natural enough.

But Alexander's political *nous* was no less strong than his military sense. As we have seen, he gave back their freedom and old laws to all the Greek cities he had captured or which had surrendered to him. This meant not that he had merely stepped into the shoes of the Persian king ; not that these cities had but exchanged one tyrant for another ; they had made so substantial a gain — and they recognized the fact — that Alexander could rely almost certainly on their remaining faithful to the end to him who had dealt thus generously by them. And it will be noticed that the king had already

begun to put in practice his uniform rule of treating with marked generosity places or parties which helped his cause, with exemplary severity those who resisted or rebelled. Nor did all this tend merely to give him the aid he needed for his invasion of the Persian monarchy ; it added abundant strength to his home politics. For every city in Asia which accepted Alexander accepted also the fact that Macedonia was Greece. This reinforced him by just so much.

Meanwhile the Persian king was no whit abashed. He looked upon the defeat of his generals by the Greeks as a mere accident, due to bad management, which could be readily repaired by proper means. Asia Minor was at one of the distant ends of his dominions, and he did not comprehend what Alexander's progress meant. He did, however, see by how much Memnon's advice had been the best, and had, accordingly, placed him in supreme command of the theatre of operations, in the expectation of speedily retrieving the disasters which had followed Alexander's initial success.



Tetradrachma in Berlin Museum.

(Alexander idealized as Hercules.)

XXII.

CILICIA. SUMMER AND FALL, B. C. 333.

MEMNON, who had just been placed in sole command of the *Æ*gean by Darius, and was preparing to invade Macedonia, now died. This relieved Alexander from grave danger, for Memnon had no worthy successor. Darius determined to collect an army and march to meet Alexander. The latter, after his late successes, was better able to sustain a fleet, and took measures to replace the one he had disbanded. At Gordium Alexander cut the Gordian knot,—or at least managed to impress upon all the idea that he had fulfilled the omen connected therewith, and would be lord of Asia. Master of all Asia Minor west of the Taurus, he marched towards the Cilician Gates. This defile Darius' satrap had failed to fortify. Alexander captured it, descended into Cilicia, and took Tarsus by a *coup de main*. Sending Parmenio forward to secure the Syrian Gates, he himself reduced Rugged Cilicia in a week's campaign, and overran the rest of the country. He here learned that the citadels of Halicarnassus and all the other important Carian cities had been taken by his lieutenants.

MEMNON, who was now in sole and unlimited command of the *Æ*gean, having the design of carrying the war into Macedonia, of instigating revolt against Alexander among his enemies in Greece, and of cutting him and his army off from Europe, managed to get possession of the island of Chios by the treachery of Apollonides, and reëstablished the oligarchy. Thence he sailed to Lesbos, landed, and took its four large towns, all, in fact, but the city of Mitylene. This city resisted his efforts for some time with the aid of its Macedonian garrison. But Memnon went systematically to work. He cut the city off from the land by double walls, and blockaded its port with his fleet. This soon reduced it to great straits. But no doubt very luckily for Alexander (for he was his one distinctly able opponent) Memnon shortly after died of a fever, leaving

the temporary command to his nephew Pharnabazus. Memnon's plan had been to sail for the Hellespont, so soon as he had a suitable base in the *Ægean*, cut Alexander's communications at this point, and thence invade Macedonia. He was the one man in the service of Darius whose conception of the methods by which to meet Alexander's invasion had all along been clear, intelligent and practicable. His successor was, however, by no means equal to the task thus inherited.



Ægean.

Mitylene, hard pressed, was finally obliged to surrender its allegiance to Alexander, which it did on the promise by Pharnabazus and by Autophradates, who was serving with him, of certain favorable conditions; but no sooner did the Persians obtain possession of the city than they violated all the agreements, and exacted heavy tribute from the citizens. They obtained possession of Tenedos in much the same manner. Memnon's vigor seemed to survive him for some months. The activity thus displayed by the Persian fleet, if put in practice a year sooner, might have seriously interfered with

Alexander's landing in Asia. But Memnon was not at that time fully trusted, and was unable to make his influence or his intelligence avail.

The death of Memnon was on a par with the uniform current of good fortune, which always seemed to set in Alexander's favor. It robbed Darius of the one man who could probably have made head against the Macedonians, who would have known how to utilize the vast resources of the Persian empire to advantage, and who would have restrained Darius from committing the irreparable errors of which he was guilty. With but a tithe of the forces Darius raised, he would, no doubt, have increased Alexander's task tenfold. His death disabled the management at sea so as to make it more probable that Alexander could again utilize a fleet. He felt able to cope with Memnon's successors, if he had not been with this admirable soldier himself.

After Memnon's death, Darius held a council of war to determine what action it were best to take to oppose the rash but dangerous invader of his dominions. Rejecting the advice of the Greeks about him, he placed his confidence, naturally enough, in the courage and intelligence of his Persian courtiers and generals, and determined to take the field himself, with a levy *en masse* of the kingdom. He sent to the Ægean to confirm Pharnabazus in his command, but at the same time withdrew from him all the Greek mercenaries serving in the fleet, purposing to use them in the army to be put on foot. This latter act handicapped the Persian admirals, and effectually put a stop to any chance of invading Macedonia. But Datames, meanwhile, had taken Tenedos.

The Macedonian treasury was now in better condition to afford the expense of a fleet. This, happily, it was not difficult to create. Alexander sent Hegelochus to the Hellespontine region to seize all merchantmen coming home from the Euxine

sea, and convert them into war-ships. Antipater raised vessels from Eubœa and the Peloponnesus. Athens, angered at the seizure of some of her wheat-carrying craft, declined to furnish her contingent, but armed one hundred vessels, and entered into correspondence with the Persian king. Hegelochus, on hearing of this, deemed it wise to release the Athenian ships which he had seized; but he had on hand, without counting these, a goodly number suitable for the purpose.

It was as well that Alexander had decided to organize another fleet as it had perhaps been necessary to disband the first one. Not only was the ability of the Persian fleet to accomplish results still an open question, but some of the Greek cities were by no means beyond taking active side with Darius when it could be safely done. The fleet became useful from the very start. The first exploit of Proteas, whom Antipater put in command, was the capture of eight out of ten triremes which Datames, the Persian admiral, had at Siphnus, one of the Cyclades; and the appearance of a new squadron had a marked effect in forestalling an outbreak of hostility from Athens, if not a general Greek revolt.

It is natural to question Alexander's wisdom in disbanding his first fleet. It was perhaps an error. If Memnon had lived, it might have proved a fatal one. Alexander had apparently, by his want of ships, placed his rear in grave danger. The Persian fleet, unopposed, was sure, sooner or later, to make a descent on Macedon. But, on the other hand, it was not a direct threat to Alexander's standing in Asia Minor. His presence there was the rather dangerous to the Persian fleet, by closing all the coast harbors against its vessels, which, with the scant naval equipment of that age, must land daily for water and provisions. And though it would seem that a fleet was a matter almost of necessity, Alexander may have

calculated that Antipater could hold head against any revolting Greek force which might grow dangerous to Macedonia (as indeed he proved his ability to do at Megalopolis), and meet a Persian invasion as well ; he no doubt looked to the future for success enough on land to outweigh any losses in the *Ægean* ; his operations imperatively called for many of the crews which manned the fleet for shore duty, let alone the fact that he had not funds enough to pay the men ; and it was not difficult, as the coming year showed, again to make himself strong at sea, when the demand should become more urgent. If it was a mistake, it had happily not proven a disastrous one.

To Gordium, then, the various columns of the Macedonians converged, and here the army was reunited. The column which had made the winter campaign with Alexander from the south ; the column from Sardis, under Parmenio, with the artillery and train and heavy cavalry ; the newly married men, reporting on expiration of furlough, and bringing their contingent of recruits from Macedonia, all met and shook hands over the brilliant success of the first campaign ; all looked forward to vastly greater victories and richer booty, as they penetrated deeper into the territory of the wealthy Persian king. Their implicit belief in their leader made success an article of faith. The recruits were a welcome arrival ; their number all but compensated for the losses incurred, and the details on garrison duty in the various cities captured.


It was here in Gordium, in February or March, 333 b. c., that Alexander imposed upon the credulity of the Phrygians by cutting or otherwise unloosing the famous knot of King Midas, the performance of which feat was by the oracle said to betoken that the successful man should be king of Asia. However the feat was accomplished, there is no doubt that Alexander did succeed in making the populace believe that

he had fulfilled the requirements of the omen, and that he would be the conqueror of the East. It makes, perhaps, small odds how Alexander managed to impose upon the credulous by his actual deeds of wonder, or by his plausible way of putting things. It is none the less true that his support largely came from a popular belief that he was more than human.

From Gordium, Alexander marched along the southerly slope of the boundary range to Ancyra, where he received the submission of the Paphlagonians, but granted their request that no Macedonian army should be quartered upon their country. But he probably placed them under the supervision of Calas, satrap of Phrygia. Hence marching into Cappadocia, he crossed the Halys and subdued the entire region west of this river, which had been the boundary between Persia and Lydia before the days of Cyrus, and that portion beyond the Halys as far as the Iris ; and appointed Sabictas viceroy. Here, too, he returned to the Greek cities their ancient laws and customs ; but not desiring to withdraw too much time from his greater task of seeking Darius and coming to a decisive encounter with him, he left the democratic party in each city with power sufficient to control the oligarchical faction, without attempting entirely to extirpate the latter party.

Alexander was now master of all Asia Minor west of the Taurus, and could choose to remain on the defensive or cross the range in offense. The latter course was the one which was always the more consistent with his character. He, therefore, took up his march toward the chief pass in the Taurus mountains, known as the Gates of Cilicia, *Pylæ Ciliciæ* (the modern Golek Boghaz), a defile thirty-six hundred feet above the sea, and well-nigh inexpugnable if held by a determined party. When Cyrus the Younger had passed this defile, he

had expected to be unable to force it, and had made preparations to turn it by transporting a force of troops by sea to the rear of the pass. Xenophon characterized the defile as beyond



Gordium to Amanus.

human ability to take. In many places but four men can march abreast between the perpendicular walls of stone. Alexander was unable, without a fleet, to resort to Cyrus' turning manœuvre. The Persians, did they but know it, had the

power to block his path. He might possibly have turned the defile by way of Laranda, from which place were passes into western or Rugged Cilicia. But this was a difficult and dangerous route, to be avoided by all means if possible, and it is far from improbable that these passes were not then known to any but the native barbarians.

But Arsames, satrap of Cilicia, Darius' chief officer at this point, made no preparation to hold these Gates. He had probably received no specific orders on the subject. When the Macedonian army arrived in the vicinity, the Gates were found to be beset by but a slender force. Leaving Parmenio in camp with the heavy troops, Alexander took the shield-bearing guards, archers, and Agrianians, and after nightfall essayed an attack, almost against hope, upon this formidable defile. Why Arsames had not occupied this place in force, and why Darius had not so ordered, will ever remain a mystery. Alexander's very boldness in advancing to attack the defile succeeded ; the small guard evidently considered itself left in the lurch, took to flight, and, next day, the pass having thus fallen into his hands, the entire army filed into Cilicia. Alexander, says Curtius, wondered at his good fortune.

Alexander learned on descending the mountain that Arsames, seeing that he must yield up Tarsus after having lost the Gates, intended to plunder the city before evacuating it. With his usual untiring activity, he led his cavalry and lightest foot by a forced march to Tarsus, and was fortunate enough not only to anticipate Arsames by his rapid manœuvre, but by a sudden and vigorous attack drove him into headlong retreat.

The invaders had thus passed the first great rampart of the heart of Persia. The second was the range of Mount Amanus, on the farther side of Cilicia.

It was at Tarsus that Alexander fell sick — from overwork, according to Aristobulus; it is said by others from bathing in the cold water of the Cydnus, on which river Tarsus is situated, when overheated by the hot mid-day march, and somewhat unstrung by the toil of the preceding week. A severe chill and fever set in ; his life was despaired of by all his physicians except Philip, who was the medical attendant of his boyhood, and much beloved by the king. The position of a medical man who in those days attended a monarch or other great person was far from enviable. Perhaps the others were afraid of the penalties of failure. Later, when Hephaestion died, Alexander is said to have crucified his physician for malpractice, and it certainly required more than ordinary nerve to undertake a critical case in high quarters. Against this Philip, Alexander had been warned, by even cool-headed old Parmenio, as having been bribed by Darius with the promise of one thousand talents and the hand of his daughter in marriage, to poison this annoying intruder. The king, however, had abundant confidence in Philip's integrity. With one hand he gave him Parmenio's letter, while with the other he drank the potion Philip had prepared, eying his physician, meanwhile, with a look none could encounter but the innocent. Conscious of his fidelity, Philip's demeanor never changed. The potion worked ; Alexander happily recovered. The king was an excellent judge of men. Perhaps no man ever reaches greatness who lacks this faculty. Bad servants can tear down more than able masters build. Alexander's capacity for selecting those who could do their work well was never at fault ; and, save in the few abnormal instances by which his life is blemished, he requited those services handsomely.

From Tarsus Alexander sent Parmenio forward with the Greek auxiliaries and mercenaries, the Thessalian heavy horse

and Sitalces' Thracians, to capture the Syrian Gates and hold the pass. With this defile, which cut through Mount Amanus near the sea, he must have been intimately acquainted from the march of Cyrus, the details of which he of course well knew; and by its possession he secured his entrance into Syria and Phœnicia. With the rest of the army Alexander advanced to Anchialus. Here was the gigantic statue of the Assyrian king, in the position of clapping its hands, with the remarkable inscription: "Sardanapalus built Anchialus and Tarsus in one day; do thou, O stranger, eat, drink and love, naught else in life is worth this!" meaning a clap of the hands. Upon Soli, which he also captured, he levied a tribute of two hundred talents on account of its tenacious fidelity to Darius, but later remitted the fine.

Hence, with three brigades of Macedonians, the archers and Agrianians, Alexander marched against those mountain tribes of the western province, known as "Rugged Cilicia," who still held out. These tribes were a species of mountain robbers who, though they could do no serious harm, might easily interfere with his communications and cause considerable annoyance unless subdued. They possibly might make their way through the passes to Laranda and Iconium, and thus turn the Cilician Gates, though this indeed was not a danger to be anticipated. They lived in fastnesses which were all but unapproachable by reason of the rough nature of the country. Despite the difficulties of the task, however, in a short week's campaign Alexander reduced these robber-hordes to reason and returned to Soli. Though we know little of the details of the short campaigns of Alexander, there is something in the mystery which surrounds them, which, added to the certainty of the accomplished fact and the known difficulties of the situation, clothes him not only

with a personal heroism beyond what we find in any other soldier, but shows rare strength, discipline and endurance, and a fidelity without equal in the men who followed in his footsteps. Success depended wholly on the wonderful physical and moral force of the man himself, and it was he alone who could evoke from his men such efforts as are implied in the conduct of some of the campaigns of which we possess but the baldest outlines.

At Soli, Alexander heard that Ptolemy and Asander, Parmenio's nephew, had won a great battle against the Persian Orontobates, in which seven hundred and fifty Persians had been killed, and had captured the Salmakis and royal citadel at Halicarnassus. Other Carian cities,—Myndus, Caunus, Thera, Calipolis,—as well as Cos and Triopium, had fallen, which happy events he celebrated with games and sacrifice; not forgetting Æsculapius in token of his recovery. Likely enough these celebrations had also for object the reclaiming of the Solians to Greek manners, customs and aspirations, which, in the course of many years' subjection to the Persians, had become but a tradition. He then marched to Tarsus and thence along the coast to Megarsus and Mallus, which two cities of Greek origin he also restored to their old status and abolished their tribute; and, after sacrificing to the deities of both, he sent Philotas with the horse across the Aleian field to the Pyramus to reduce the territory of that quarter.

The season of b. c. 333 had been expended in the advance through, and reduction of, the territory from Gordium to Mount Amanus.

XXIII.


ISSUS. NOVEMBER, B. C. 333.

ALEXANDER had learned that Darius was awaiting him on the plains of Sochi, beyond the Amanic range. He headed for the Syrian Gates, intending to seek him, but was ignorant of, or else forgot, the Amanic Gates farther north. Darius, tired of waiting for his coming, advanced through this latter defile to Issus, thus cutting the Macedonian communications. Alexander was compromised, but had the courage and ability to save his men from demoralization, and convince them that in the narrow pass of Issus, Darius had lost that superiority which on the plains of Sochi he would have retained. This was, in fact, true, as the result showed. Alexander countermarched through the Syrian Gates, and drew up in Darius' front, who lay behind the Pinarus with an army six hundred thousand strong, of whom two hundred thousand were effective, the balance a source of weakness. They were set up with his Greek mercenaries in the centre, where stood Darius, and the best of the cavalry on the right. The Persians proposed to turn the Macedonian left by breaking their line near the seashore. There was a bend in the river, which, after some preliminary manoeuvring, enabled Alexander to advance his line back of the Persian left centre. Here he proposed to make his own stoutest attack. While the Thessalian horse held Darius' right, which crossed to the attack, in check, though outnumbered ten to one, Alexander with his Companions and the hypaspists on the right of the phalanx, followed somewhat more slowly by the rest of the hoplites, dashed into the river, and attacked the Persian line with fury. Where he fought, the Persians were soon broken. But the Greek mercenaries, by a splendid rush, checked the phalanx and threatened disaster. From his advanced position Alexander sharply wheeled upon and took the Greek mercenaries in flank, tearing open their formation. This not only relieved the pressure on the Macedonian brigades, but opened a gap through which he cut his way to the place where Darius stood in person. The Great King turned and fled. This was the signal of a *sauve qui peut*. The battle was won, and great slaughter of the Persians followed. Large treasure and the family of Darius fell into Alexander's hands. The latter he treated with magnanimity. In this battle was exploded in the East the reliance on mere numbers.

ALEXANDER, when in Mallus, learned that Darius was at Sochi, beyond the mountains in Assyria, two marches from

the Syrian Gates. Hither the Persian king had come from the Euphrates, with an army of half a million men. Like Napoleon, perhaps like every one of the greatest soldiers, Alexander had lurking in his methods that touch of the reckless which has sometimes been described as the characteristic of the gambler, and never shrank, when the occasion came, from risking his all on one stroke. In the present instance this impulse proceeded equally from his self-confidence and enthusiasm, and from the situation into which his task had thrust him. He called together his Companions and other commanding officers who formed his usual council of war, to ascertain their views, and told them fully what he heard about the proximity and enormous size of Darius' army, concealing nothing of the difficulty or danger.

He found them all eager to be led against the enemy. Alexander therefore determined to seek the Persians on the plains beyond Amanus, and advanced along the seacoast, by the route he knew from Xenophon. On the second day he passed the Syrian Gates, a



Plain of Issus.

second Thermopylæ lying between the coast and the mountains, with a difficult mountain-pass beyond, and camped near Myriandrus. He no doubt intended at once to march

to the encounter of Darius, but was delayed a day or two by heavy stress of weather, for the early November storms had set in.

Alexander was apparently ignorant or oblivious that there was another pass farther north by which Darius could reach his rear; or else he was guilty of a serious lapse. There were two mountain gaps by which the Amanic range could be passed from Cilicia into the heart of the Persian empire. The more northerly one led to the Euphrates region; the other led into Syria, and was therefore known as the Syrian Gates. Alexander, after passing through these, had the intention of filing to the left, or northeast, and thus seeking Darius on the plains of Sochi. If Alexander knew of the northern pass, he may have been partially justified in calculating that Darius would remain where he was, in the broad plains of Assyria; and he may have dismissed the idea of the huge Persian army filing through a long mountain gap to seek the invaders on ground unfavorable to its numbers and arms, and where it could scarcely victual itself for two weeks, as too absurd even to make it worth while to detach a force thither to hold the defile. Alexander generally learned the topography of the country he traversed very thoroughly. He had able officers about him for this purpose, and he worked them hard. It seems as if he must have known of the Amanic Gates. In this case his leaving it absolutely open for Darius falls far short of his usual care. At least a small observation party to give him early notice of such a manœuvre as the Persians actually made was demanded by the circumstances.

Alexander may have little feared this danger in any event. That he did not anticipate it is clearly shown by his leaving no garrison at Issus to guard his hospitals there. But in case it should occur, he may have felt that his own and his army's

activity would enable him so to manœuvre as by a few bold marches easily to escape from the clutches of his vast but sluggish and ill-led enemy, if not enable him the better to attack the Persians after disorganizing them by severe and rapid marches. One can conceive several things which an Alexander might do, other than fight the enemy; but it was none the less a lapse to leave open the Amanic Gates.

Darius had from the first abandoned the only true policy he could have adopted, namely, to utilize his navy, to carry the war into Macedon, to employ Greek mercenaries, and especially to defend the mountain passes, and thus keep the enemy from gaining a foothold in the interior of his kingdom. Memnon had clearly outlined this policy from the beginning. With a superior fleet in the *Ægean*, the Hellespont could have been made impassable. The line of Mount Taurus barred the entrance to Cilicia. The occupation of its passes would have all but absolutely prevented the Macedonian incursion. Behind these again was the pass between Mount Amanus and the sea — the Syrian Gates — and the more northerly pass, or Amanic Gates. Both mountain ranges could have been easily blocked against Alexander. For this purpose no troops were as good as his Greek mercenaries, and he had plenty of them. Such blindness is hardly to be understood. Alexander's good fortune was certainly the complement of Darius' folly.

It is not unusual to inveigh against luck as not being part and parcel of a man's success. And certainly fortune, not well used, will never remain constant. Success is won by using good fortune; by combating ill. But no act of Alexander's could have brought about the fatally absurd course of action of the Persian monarch. That Darius was so ill-advised, or ill-starred, was his own fatuity no doubt, but it was equally Alexander's good luck. Had the Taurus or Amanus been strongly barred to Alexander, it is hard to see how he

would have carried out his scheme of conquest on this line of advance, unless we assume that he could have turned these defiles, as he later did the Persian Gates. It is in this sense that the Macedonian king's good fortune is so often referred to in these pages. When we come to Hannibal we shall see how, with equal ability, a constant run of bad luck—or untoward events, if that term be preferable—forestalled the success of perhaps the most wonderful military efforts the world has ever seen.

Darius, having crossed the Euphrates, had long lain in the open country awaiting Alexander. His army incumbered the plain from very numbers. A large body of Greek mercenaries had recently reached him under Bianor and Aristomedes, running the sum of his Greeks up to thirty thousand men. His heavy-armed men (Cardaces) and his armor-clad cavalry were of the best. Darius felt certain of success. He relied upon his numbers, his righteous cause, the past fame of his royal house, and the fear the Great King and his myriads must of necessity inspire ; and it is said was lulled into security by a dream which, before leaving Babylon, the Chaldeans had interpreted as promising speedy victory and decisive. On such a plain as Sochi the great multitude of his troops, and especially his cavalry, could manœuvre to advantage. Darius must have recognized the error of his past military conduct, but he was now correspondingly eager that Alexander should enter the broad levels of Persia, so that he might all the more easily surround and annihilate him by his countless hordes. The Persian army was accompanied by the usual vast train of attendants and harems. It is said that there was gold and silver enough to be loaded on six hundred mules and three hundred camels ; and that it took five days and nights to pass the bridge over the Euphrates with the army and trains.

Arsames, flying from the Cilician Gates, had first brought the news of Alexander's approach; and Darius anxiously looked for his coming. But when Alexander, on account of his sickness and the campaign in Rugged Cilicia, tarried so long at Tarsus and at Soli, Darius, once more misled by the bad native advisers who surrounded him, and who hated and therefore imputed doubtful motives to the Greek officers in the royal suite, gave up his excellent position, and, sending his harem, baggage, and treasures to Damascus, under Kophenes, advanced through the Amanic Gates, which were on the nearest road from Sochi to Issus.

Darius was by no means alone in his belief that he could crush the invaders. Demosthenes is said to have gone about the streets of Athens exhibiting letters from Persia to the effect that Alexander was cooped up in Cilicia, from which trap he would never live to escape. All Asia, says Josephus, was persuaded that Alexander would not even be able to come to battle with the Persians on account of their vast multitudes. On the other hand, Amyntas, who, we remember, had deserted from Alexander, advised Darius strongly against leaving Sochi, asserting that the Greeks would surely come to meet him. But Darius' Persian advisers, who prophesied smooth things unto him, prevailed. They assured him that Alexander was already losing courage, and would endeavor to make his escape; that only by speedy action could he catch and punish this impudent upstart, and thus prevent future aggressions. Darius advanced towards his ruin. In a similar manner, the intrigues of Darius' courtiers had previously caused the execution of the Greek Charidemus, who foretold misfortune to the Persian king, if he hastily met the Macedonian army, relying only on numbers and the courage of his Persian officers; for art was essential to meet art, said this wise but unfortunate man. Charidemus had for a moment held Alexander's fate in his hands.

Having passed through the northerly or Amanic Gates, Darius had now placed himself in Alexander's rear. At Issus, which he reached on the same day that Alexander went into camp at Myriandrus, he found some of the Macedonian sick and wounded, left behind by Alexander. These he cruelly maimed and slew. He then moved forward to the Pinarus.

Alexander was loath to believe that Darius was at Issus. He sent some of the Companions by sea in a triaconteros, or fast sailing long boat, manned by one bank of fifteen rowers on each side, to reconnoitre, and these speedily ascertained the fact. Even Alexander's bold spirit must at first have been startled at the miscalculation which had thus resulted in compromising his safety. But he by no means allowed it to be known, and his powers of conception and action were never so great as when he was most hardly pushed. In this quality he has been equalled perhaps by no one except by Frederick. It is probable that his apprehensions soon disappeared in looking at the other side of the question, a habit of mind he strongly possessed. He knew his own power of manœuvring; he saw that the enemy, though standing athwart his path, had far from as good ground as on the Sochi plains; he knew that the vast host could not long subsist in Cilicia; he knew that they were not ably led, despite the undoubted individual bravery of their leaders and excellence of the men. Were he alone to be consulted he might have risked a good deal and resorted to any feasible stratagem to place Darius in this, to the Macedonians, really advantageous position, how ever threatening it may at first have appeared. Even Alexander, however, before the event, would scarcely have dreamed of trying to induce the Great King to cross the range to Issus.

But the effect on the troops was different and might easily have become alarming. To a surprise like this it is always

difficult to reconcile even the best of soldiers. They had been looking forward to meeting the enemy on the plains beyond the mountains after the lapse of some days; and now they suddenly found him in their rear to be encountered on the morrow. No doubt there was much talk in the Macedonian camp of the surprising and incomprehensible situation. A soldier likes to feel that his retreat is safe. Here the phalangians looked back along the perilous path they had trod, and remembered the mountain ranges they had passed, the difficulties they had overcome. Were not these passes now occupied by the enemy? Must they not cut their way back to their homes through a sea of blood? Could they accomplish what alone Xenophon had done? The Macedonian soldiers were wont to speak their minds. They had a certain American independence in thought and word. They did not understand or like this situation, and they openly said as much. This very independence and intelligence was, however, what made them, like our own volunteers, such excellent material for an army called on to do long and arduous campaigning and to encounter dangers in which demoralization would mean destruction. This discussion was a safety valve; and it was coupled with unswerving faith in their king. Soldiers are quick to catch alarm. These Macedonians showed no sign of demoralization, but doubtless they were by no means lacking in that feeling of uncertainty which is akin to it. They needed the one touch to set them right.

Well aware of this feeling among the men, but by no means disconcerted by it, for he knew his phalangians well, Alexander held another council of war, calling in all his chief officers (the infantry strategoi, and cavalry ilarchs, both of the Macedonians and of the Greeks, of the light troops, mercenaries and allies), and exhorted them to do their bravest, promising

them certain victory. He assured them that Darius had done the very thing he most ardently desired ; that the gods had no doubt interfered in his behalf in placing the Persians where their enormous forces could not manœuvre, while they themselves could deepen their phalanx. They must not be misled, said he, by the idea that the enemy was in their rear. He showed them that they were the always victorious going out to fight the always vanquished ; that they were vastly superior to the slaves in the ranks of Darius, who were driven into battle by the lash, while the Greek mercenaries who fought there for a miserable stipend were little better when contending with their countrymen ; and that the coming battle would decide the fate of Asia ; for this was not a satrap's army, but Darius and all his peoples with him. He praised every man who had shown valor and spoke modestly but confidently of his own ability to lead them. He bade them remember Xenophon and the glorious deeds of the Greeks in every age. He promised them rewards such as they had never dreamed of, and with that consummate art which a true leader must of necessity possess, Alexander roused his officers to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. All crowded around him eager to grasp the king's right hand and swear to do or die. No doubt also hundreds of Macedonian soldiers stood about the place of conference whence they could hear the echo of these stirring words, and the hot blood which the young monarch's own brave heart-throbs sent pulsating through the arteries of his listeners, soon bounded along those of every man in the command. The interview strikingly reminds one of the glowing words of Frederick before the battle of Leuthen, and the hearty response of his generals.

The coming night Alexander countermarched towards the seashore pass in the Syrian Gates, which he had promptly reoccupied with some cavalry and archers, and took up the


road to Issus, the place he had left but two days before. Resting in the rock-bound pass and throwing out his outposts, he passed the night, and in the early morning red, he marched in column through the defile towards the plain.

This plain stretched from the Syrian Gates northward, gradually widening, but shut in on the west by the seashore and on the east by more or less rugged foot-hills for some twenty odd miles to Issus. Some smaller streams flowed at intervals from mountain to sea. A few miles south of Issus the plain is crossed by the larger mountain stream, Pinarus, in a southwesterly direction, and along the southern boundary of the stream the hills jut forward into the plain. Just beyond the Pinarus began the Persian encampment.

As the army debouched from the defile and the narrow pass began to widen, Alexander advanced the successive columns with manœuvring precision into phalangial order, on the centre forward into line. Alexander's habit was to keep his men in parade order when marching to battle. The drill steadied them and kept the lines closed up. The cavalry had been following the infantry ; but when the plain was reached the cavalry rode up to the flanks and the king formed the whole army in order of battle. The phalanx was as usual sixteen deep. Next the mountain, in the right wing, he placed Nicanor with the agema and other hypaspists ; next the brigades of Cœnus and Perdiccas. The left wing under Parmenio leaned on the sea, and counting the phalanx from the left came Amyntas, Ptolemy, Meleager ; these infantry brigades being under the orders of Craterus, the position of whose brigade is not given. Parmenio had strict orders to allow no gap between his left and the sea, and the Greek allied infantry was sent him to strengthen it. The king's first idea was to keep the Macedonian and Thessalian heavy cavalry on the right, and they were ordered thither. The flanks were thus

abundantly safe, for the plain beyond the defile as far as the Pinarus was, at that time, but about a mile and a half wide at most. The topography has materially changed since then.

Darius, who lay near Issus and south of it, on learning



Issus before the Battle.

Alexander's whereabouts, had made ready for an advance. He had hoped to seize the Syrian Gates, but found that Alexander had anticipated him. He had then taken up a position behind the river Pinarus, and, on hearing of Alexander's proximity, threw out thirty thousand horse and twenty thousand light foot across the stream to make a curtain behind which he could form unobserved ; ordering them, on being recalled,

to retire right and left around the flanks. He was well intrenched. The Pinarus formed his ditch ; its northern bank, which was high, his wall. He had in his army some thirty thousand heavy armed Greek mercenaries under Thymondas, son of Mentor. These he placed opposite the Macedonian phalanx, which he could see from his position as it deployed into line, and on both sides of this he placed double their number of Cardaces (foreign mercenaries known by this name) who were also heavy armed and trained to combat hand to hand. There is some conflict of authorities as to the numbers and positions of the Greeks and Cardaces. But the conflict is not material. This part of the Persian force was in the centre and more than ample.

The Greeks and Cardaces appear to have formed the first line. If ninety thousand strong, and in a phalanx sixteen deep, they would occupy a breadth of over three miles. Calisthenes states the then breadth of the valley at the Pinarus as fourteen stadia. To crowd into this breadth (one and two thirds miles), the Greeks and Cardaces would have to be twenty-five deep. These questions are interesting, but by no means material to that consideration of the subject on which this work is intended to dwell. They may have been in two or more lines.

Some twenty thousand men, perhaps the Cardaces in part, were on the extreme left, near the mountains, on the left bank of the Pinarus. They were intended as a threat to Alexander's right. For, owing to the configuration of the ground, which had once been a bay in the seacoast, part of this latter force would extend beyond the rear of Alexander's right flank, so soon as he advanced. This was a clever formation, and deserved success.

The rest of Darius' men were drawn up in rear of this front line, by nations, in columns so ordered that they might,

it was thought, be successively brought into action, but really in equally unserviceable and dangerous masses. The whole, including probably camp-followers, was said to be six hundred thousand strong. The effective fighting force may have been two hundred thousand men, but it was decidedly weakened by the admixture of unreliable material. The very size of the army was its infirmity. Being assured that they were in pursuit of a flying enemy, their courage was by no means raised at the sight of the Macedonian army ready for attack.

Having completed his formation, Darius now withdrew his curtain of cavalry and light foot, which fell back right and left. But finding that it could do no service near the hills, he ordered the bulk of the horse over to his right, opposite Parmenio, where on the seashore sand was the only place it could find room to manœuvre. A few he ordered to the left. He relied on the hills to protect the latter flank, and proposed to make his main attack with the cavalry of the right, which was under Nabarzanes, and which he intended should break through the Macedonian left by mere weight, and take the line in reverse. Darius took up his own station in the usual place, the centre, in rear of the Greek mercenaries. The whole army extended from the mountains to the sea.

The Macedonians were in the highest spirits and full of confidence in their own valor. The king's words had roused their enthusiasm, and so soon as they came within sight of the enemy they grew eager for the fray. One can scarcely imagine a situation which, according to our notions, was worse compromised than that of Alexander at Issus. It might have proven so in his case. And we can only marvel at the cool daring and extraordinary ability which enabled him to keep his troops in heart and rescue a brilliant victory from such desperate danger.

When Alexander perceived that Darius' cavalry was filing

over to his right opposite Parmenio, he saw that his lieutenant was apt to be overmatched, for only the Peloponnesian and Greek horse was stationed on this wing. He therefore dispatched his own Thessalian cavalry, quietly but speedily, by the rear of the phalanx, so as not to be seen, over to his left. Of the horse which he retained on the right, the Companions were in line ; the lancers under Protomachus, and the Pæonians under Aristo, were in front of them ; and of the infantry, the archers under Antiochus, and the Agrianians under Attalus, were also on their right front. He threw back a crotchet of light foot and horse on the right to oppose the body which was posted so as to take this flank in reverse ; but he saw the danger of this force so long as it remained *in situ*, and before the battle attacked it with a body of light troops, and though it had the advantage of being on higher ground, drove it away to the top of the hill, and occupied a position in its front by two *ilē* of Companion cavalry, some three hundred men. The troops in the crotchet he was then able to use to strengthen the right wing phalanx, which was weak in places. The right of the phalanx, when the formation was completed, proved still to be rather thin, and he filled it by two squadrons of Companion cavalry, named from the districts from which they came, the Anthemusian and Lugæan. In the left wing the Cretan archers and Thracians, under Sitalces, were in front of the infantry line ; the cavalry in their front, towards the left. The Greek mercenaries were in reserve. It will be noticed that Alexander fully appreciated the value of a reserve, as only Xenophon before him had done. He recognized that the one weak point of the phalangial order was, as a rule, its lack of reserves, and was wont to correct the defect by dispositions of his troops, unusual in those days.

The formation was completed with masterly skill and in

perfect quiet, and each change was made after full reconnoitring of the enemy's position, which happily could be readily seen. There was no flurry, no apprehension. Everything was orderly and precise to the last degree. Some thirty thousand men stood in line.

The Pinarus, looking from Alexander's right towards the Persian left, made a northerly sweep such as to throw backward Darius' flank ; and by advancing the archers and Agrianians, and some Greek mercenaries, now that the Cardaces had been driven away, Alexander so thrust forward his right that it enveloped and extended beyond the left of the Persian first line. He had contrived just such a threat to Darius' left as Darius had sought to make to his right.

The position was a very good one for an inferior force. The flanks were protected, the ground well covered, and mere numbers ceased to be of the value they would possess in an open plain. Alexander now gave his men some rest, thinking that Darius might advance on him, and hoping to attack him as he crossed the river. But the Persians kept their ground, except that the cavalry of the Persian right began to cross the Pinarus to attack the Macedonian left. Alexander saw that Darius made a mistake to hold his centre, where he himself was, on the defensive behind the Pinarus, while advancing his right in offense across it, because if this centre was disabled, no efforts or success of the right could rectify it or retrieve a disaster which might happen to headquarters. Particularly, Oriental troops would be demoralized by a defeat of that part of the line which was held by the king in person. Alexander's problem then was how to break this centre, and he guessed that it could best be done by destroying the Persian left, and taking the centre in reverse. This he felt confident he could do if only Parmenio would hold the Macedonian left until he could make some headway.


Darius awaited the attack of the Greeks, confiding in his numbers, and intending, as above said, that his cavalry should, by defeating Alexander's, break the latter's left wing, and take the whole army in reverse. Thus the strong right flank of each army was opposed to the other's weaker left. Alexander's sending the Thessalian cavalry to his left had to a degree remedied this evil in the Macedonian army, for the Thessalians were wonderful fighters ; but Darius had not corrected the corresponding weakness of his own left. His flying wing of Cardaces had disgracefully failed him.

The defensive attitude of the Persian king gave Alexander's troops the impression that Darius was lacking in courage, and this still more heightened their own. There was a general shout to be led to the attack, and Alexander gave the order to advance. The tone in which troops cheer is indicative of what breeds victory or defeat. Here it was unmistakably for victory. As the line slowly and with the steadiness of parade moved forward, Alexander rode in front of the line, calling on the men to do their duty, saluting each brigade of the phalanx by its name, individually addressing each chieftain, and rousing all to heroic tension. He was received with loud huzzas, and his noble presence and confident bearing acted as a stimulant on every soldier in the ranks.

The river had to be crossed, but this difficulty only raised the spirits of the men who had fought their way across the Granicus. The north bank of the Pinarus was in most parts steep ; where it was low, Darius had caused a stockade to be erected. The water was everywhere fordable.

The battle was about to open. The enthusiasm of the Macedonians rose to boiling point. In order to keep the line intact and free from wavering, the phalangites advanced slowly to the sound of music, as they were wont to do on parade, with measured tread and soldierly bearing, until, reach-

ing the zone of darts, at a preconcerted signal, and headed by Alexander and the agema, they took the double-quick, and dashed into the river with the shout which their enemies had always heard with dread, and which the hills sent reverberating back to the sea. This rapid attack both astonished the Persians and saved themselves from being long under the



Issus (Alexander's manœuvre).

fire of missiles. Where Alexander fought in person, near the right, so soon as the troops came to close work, the Persians gave way in disorder, being, as we have shown, taken somewhat in reverse by the position which the bend in the river enabled him to give the line.

It will be seen that this bend in the river again resulted in the formation of what many have termed Alexander's favor-

ite method,—an oblique order of battle, the left refused. It was again accidental, but none the less effective. It enabled him to force the attack on the Persian left centre, which he saw was the weak point of Darius' line.

The impact of the Companions and hypaspists was tremendous. There was but a brief resistance. No soldiers under Darius' standard could stand up under the blow. The Persian line reeled and weakened. The Macedonians pressed steadily on. So soon as Alexander had driven back that part of the Persian left wing which he had struck, he found himself on the left flank of the Greek mercenaries in the Persian centre, on whom Darius peculiarly relied, and who had so far held the Macedonian phalanx in check. Where Alexander led, fortune always followed. He had won a foothold of first importance. Success here made it certain that success by Darius' right could not be fatal; for Alexander cut Darius from his line of retreat by turning his left or strategic flank.

The discovery that the enemy has a strategic flank, that is, a flank the turning of which will cut him off from his line of retreat, has often been ascribed to Napoleon, and it is no doubt true that no captain ever made use of this weak point on so grand a scale or so efficiently as the great Corsican. But here it is plain that Alexander saw the advantage of an attack on this flank; we shall see him make use of the idea again; and that Hannibal very clearly understood the matter is shown by the march through the Arnus marshes. It was the commentators of Napoleon's campaigns who explained to the world the value of that captain's methods. Napoleon himself repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to his predecessors in the art. But he carried what they taught him to its highest degree of perfection.

In the centre the Macedonian phalanx had not been so speedy or so successful as it had on the right where Alexan-

der's irresistible spirit led the way, and the line was somewhat disordered and less advanced. The banks had been higher where they crossed ; they were more heavily armed, and the king's impetuosity had carried him and his immediate surroundings ahead of the line. Darius' Greek mercenaries had attacked the phalanx with dangerous ardor. Not only had the Macedonian centre lost its alignment, but there had been opened a gap in the phalanx towards the right wing, owing to Alexander's forward rush which the brigades on the right of the phalanx were trying their best to follow up. The Greeks and Macedonians were rivals in courage, and this gap boded evil. Ancient hatred made the combat all the more bloody. The fray covered both banks of the river and the main ford itself. Both fought desperately ; the Greek mercenaries to reëstablish the battle and earn the praise of the Great King and their promised reward ; the Macedonians not to be behind their own king in conduct, nor lose the name of invincible for the phalanx. To yield their ground meant destruction to the Macedonian army. The lines came to close quarters, where darts were useless and swords were the only weapon. Here fell Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, and one hundred and twenty Macedonians of no mean rank. Despite utmost gallantry, the phalanx was in grave danger.

But as usual Alexander came to the rescue. His wing had by this time driven the Persian left well away from its position near the river. For the moment he was hand free. Heading the hypaspists and the right brigades, while the Companions followed up the initial success, and thus sustained his right, he wheeled about and took the Greek mercenaries in flank, tearing open their formation with a terrific blow, and immediately relieved the pressure on the failing brigades. The danger was averted. Renewing the struggle under better auspices, the phalanx at once regained its ground and alignment, and thenceforward held its own.

On the left the Persian cavalry had crossed the river, and attacked the Thessalian horse with fury. A fierce combat ensued in which the enemy began by winning a marked advantage. Indeed, Parmenio was getting so decidedly the worst of the fight at this part of the line that, but for the effect of Alexander's wonderful impetuosity on the right, serious results might have followed. Yet this was traceable rather to the Persian numbers and splendid conduct, than to any fault of Parmenio's, who had carried out his orders with zeal and discretion. The multitude of the Persian cavalry kept it in one mass, so heavy and irresistible that it threatened to sweep the field like an avalanche. Only by constantly repeated isolated attacks at different points, and by their perfect discipline, could the Thessalians with all their gallantry hold their ground. But though vastly outnumbered and all but crushed, they would not yield, but clung desperately to their ground, rallying and returning again and again to the charge. The Companions themselves could not have done more noble work. Thus they kept up their blows as best they might.

Darius, as was the rule with Persian kings, occupied in the centre the position of greatest prominence. In a gorgeous chariot drawn by four horses abreast, and surrounded by his military family, including all the grandees of the court, under command of his brother Oxathres, he must have been the centre of all attraction. It was not long after the phalanx had been re-established before Alexander had hewn his path clear through the Persian masses, and had headed for the very kernel of the Persian centre. It was straight for this royal group that the king at once began to carve his way. Here it was, as at Cunaxa, that the battle was to be lost or won ; and Alexander, with his usual directness, made straight for the centre point of opposition. Darius was defended by his crowd of nobles ; Alexander led his Companions. The Great

King was soon surrounded by wounds and slaughter. His horses became unmanageable ; only by a charge, under his brother Oxathres, could he be extricated from a position where he must quickly have fallen a victim. For Darius had ceased to be a hero ; and it was the godlike fury of Hercules and Achilles which swept like a whirlwind about him.

When Darius saw that the left of his army had been broken, that Alexander was getting between the Amanic Gates and his army, and that he himself was in danger of capture or death, he lost all sense of self-control, and summarily took to flight in a fresh and lighter chariot which had been brought up for him. But a chariot could not convey him far. The ground was rough, and the mass of fugitives quickly became enormous. Darius had had in readiness, as if contemplating flight, a high-bred mare whose foal had been left behind on the road through the Amanic Gates. He soon left his chariot, mounted this mare and galloped from the field. The flight of the king was followed by the immediate dissolution of all discipline in the Persian ranks at the left and centre, where his movements were within the ken of all. The reserve troops in the rear, who might have now come forward, at once melted away and followed in the footsteps of Darius. The Pæonians, archers, Agrianians, mercenaries, and the two *ilē* of cavalry pushed in on the extreme Macedonian right, and cut down all who could not escape with speed. The victorious cavalry on the Persian right became aware of the rout of the left, and soon heard the cry, "The king flees !" They also lost courage and began to waver ; then, seeing that no efforts could now avail, they turned and fled. They were pursued by the Thessalians, who not only slew great numbers of them, but so hampered their movements that they trampled each other down in flight.

Alexander could not begin his pursuit until he was sure of

his centre and left; nor was he able to pursue to any great distance, owing to the approaching darkness. This facilitated Darius' escape, but Alexander captured the Great King's chariot, in which were his Median mantle, bow and shield. Darius did not halt till he placed the Euphrates, which he crossed at Thapsacus, between himself and Alexander. He was here able to assemble but four thousand Greek mercenaries out of all his vast host. Of the infantry, such as were not cut to pieces took refuge in the foot-hills; the cavalry followed the coast until they could cross to the upper Amanic pass. A body of eight thousand Greeks, under Amyntas, is said to have cut its way out to the south along the beach, and to have reached Phoenicia, where, seizing Lesbian vessels and burning such as they did not need, they sailed to Cyprus, and thence to Egypt. Accompanying Amyntas were Thymodes, son of Mentor, Aristodemus of Phares, Bianor of Acarnania, and other refugees.

Arsames, Rheomithres, and Atizyes, who escaped at the Granicus, fell here. Vast numbers of the Persians were slain. The sum of killed is stated at one hundred thousand, including ten thousand of the cavalry. In the pursuit, Ptolemy, son of Lagus, asserts that the men who followed him filled up a deep ravine with dead bodies in order to bridge and cross it. The loss in Persian generals was heavy. They had, as usual, exposed themselves most bravely. The Macedonian loss was four hundred and fifty killed, — three hundred foot, and one hundred and fifty horse, or one and a half per cent. of the number engaged. Curtius gives one hundred and eighty-two, Justin two hundred and eighty, as the number killed. The wounded are given at various figures. The average of ten to one of killed is probably not far from correct. Taking the killed and wounded at five thousand men, the loss, not counting "missing," was not far from seventeen per cent.,

which is much higher than the average of modern battles. The killed and wounded alone rarely overrun ten per cent.

The number of men who died of their wounds in Alexander's army we have no clew to enable us to guess. It was no doubt large, for though wounds were not so severe in the days of javelins, stones and arrows as they are to-day, yet medical attendance was inefficient. That there were very many permanently disabled, we know, and the total number who disappeared from the rolls of the army was so great, that we must conclude that the battle mortality was by no means measured in the figures given of those killed.

Prisoners were never lost by the victorious army. Hence the item of "missing" in the tabulated losses of modern battles,—and it is a very big one,—must be eliminated before we can institute a comparison between these and ancient battles as regards casualties.

The Persian treasure on the field was barely three thousand talents (\$3,600,000), but vast stores of gold were got in Damascus, whence they were being conveyed away, when, through the treachery of the Syrian satrap, they were stopped by Parmenio, whom Alexander ordered up the Orontes valley after the battle to collect the booty Darius had sent to that place. It was then stored in Damascus.

Next day Alexander, though himself disabled by a sword-cut in his thigh, went among the Macedonian wounded, commended and rewarded with money all who had distinguished themselves, and saw to the burial of the dead with military honors, the army marching to the funeral as to battle.

The family of Darius had been left behind in the Persian camp. They were treated with great respect and dignity. If, as is sometimes alleged, Alexander was not really generous, he assuredly curbed his passions to policy in a manner unusual in men so young. It is pleasanter to believe what

Plutarch, Arrian, and others tell us of his real magnanimity. We cannot equitably debit his account with all the ill which can be discovered in his character, unless we credit it with what was noble. It is related that when Alexander returned from the chase of Darius, and was supping with his Companions in the Great King's pavilion in the Persian camp, he heard in the adjoining tent the sobs of women. Inquiring the cause, he was informed that the queen-mother, Sisygambis, and the queen, Statira, were lamenting the death of their son and husband. He at once sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius still lived, and that they themselves had nothing to fear. He was as good as his word, for not only did he take no advantage of the acknowledged right of the conqueror of those days, but forbade the beauty and accomplishments of Statira to be mentioned in his presence. For Statira passed for the most lovely woman of her times. The royal ladies were surrounded by their accustomed Eastern state, and were treated as queens, and in no respect as captives. Perhaps Alexander was the only Greek of his time who would have done this; and his forbearance does as great honor to his heart as the keeping of his royal captives on this scale redounds to his knowledge of state craft. For all his contemporaries praised him; it became the more easy to handle Darius, and the Persians acquired as high a regard for his character as they already had for his skill. When, the next day, the king and Hephaestion paid a visit to the queens, Sisygambis fell at the feet of the latter, thinking him the monarch, for Alexander was in no wise more richly habited, and Hephaestion was the taller of the two. And when she discovered her error, and in fear for the result fell at the feet of the conqueror, Alexander at once raised her from the ground, and assured her that it was no mistake, for Hephaestion was also an Alexander. Then, taking up the little son of Darius, he fondled him.

The entire army of Darius (except the small force of Greek mercenaries which joined him at the Euphrates, and that which escaped to Egypt) disappeared at Issus — how we cannot say. Parts held together and made for inner Persia ; parts for the Cilician mountains. Many, grouped in smaller or larger bodies, wandered for a while, and then deserted to their homes. Squads or companies of the army reappeared at intervals in Asia Minor,— Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Lycania,— to be overcome by the Macedonian viceroys. Antigonus in Phrygia and Calas in smaller Phrygia dispersed many such, but no serious opposition to Alexander could be organized for two years to come. The approach of winter saved Darius from sharp pursuit.

The battlefield of Issus is said to have been much changed by the deposits of the streams which crossed the ancient plains. A large part of the coast is now a continuous marsh. The Syrian Gates have been blocked up by land slides, and disuse. The road across the range is now by the Amanic Gates alone. The other is a mere path.

Thus was exploded, even in Persia, the reliance on simple numbers. So trite a maxim is it to-day that numbers without skill cannot avail, that it is perhaps difficult to place ourselves in the position of the peoples who at this time knew nothing but numbers. Napoleon's saying that God is on the side of the heaviest battalions, and his calculation on the equality of thousands, implies that these battalions and thousands are drilled and disciplined substantially on the same methods, and, saving only the genius of the commander, are substantially similar bodies. Mere hordes of men are not covered by his dictum or his theory. Darius had boasted that he would trample Alexander under foot by the weight of his magnificent army ; and but for his personal weakness here, and later at Arbela, perchance he might have done so. The

misconduct of the Great King is another instance of the good fortune of Alexander. The Persians, as a rule (especially the grandees and generals), were brave and faithful; but the mass was easily to be demoralized. Nor did Darius by nature lack heart; but when he saw that the Greeks, whose meagre numbers he had been led to despise and underrate, really dared oppose him, he lost his head. In contrast to this, Alexander's splendid conduct stands out in highest relief. The keen eye which grasped the situation, and discovered the weak point in his adversary's position, and the courage which faced vast odds with such calm skill, are alike admirable. And as no doubt it was just these qualities put into action which produced the effect from which Darius weakened, in so far was Alexander the arbiter of his own fortune on this field.

Perhaps Issus was the most far-reaching of all Alexander's victories. In consequence of the event the name of Alexander became the synonym of god. The usual games, feasts and sacrifices were held, and the town of Alexandria at the Syrian Passes was built as memorial of the victory. Three huge altars at the Pinarus were erected as a monument to the slain.

Alexander appointed Balacrus, son of Nicanor, one of the royal body-guards, viceroy of Cilicia. This was the most important military territory which he had as yet taken, and must be in the best of hands. He put Menes in Balacrus' place among the body-guards. Polysperschon succeeded to the command of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus. Menon, son of Cerdimmas, was made satrap over northern Syria, as far as Parmenio had taken it, and left with a force of Greek allied cavalry to hold the land.

XXIV.

TYRE. NOVEMBER, B. C. 333, TO AUGUST, B. C. 332.

Issus did as much to weaken the Persian fleet by fostering desertion in the Phœnician and Cyprian contingents as to exalt Alexander's name. The king now moved down into Phœnicia, proposing to reduce the coast line before venturing inland. All the towns received him with open gates until he came to Tyre, queen city of the coast. Here he was denied admittance, and resorted to a siege. He began a mole from the mainland to the island on which new Tyre was built, using the forests of Lebanon and the old city of Tyre for material. This mole was two hundred feet wide and half a mile long. On it were built towers and sheds to protect the workmen. The Tyrians showed wonderful skill in their efforts to break up the work and once set the towers on fire with a fire-ship, consuming the labor of months. Alexander went to Sidon and there got together a fleet larger than the Tyrians', returning with which he was able to coop them up in their two harbors. He now built his mole wider and stronger and reached the city walls. But he was eventually forced to operate a breach on the seaward side, where the walls were not so strong. After a sea-fight, in which he was victorious, Alexander made a breach in the wall, stormed the city, captured and sacked it, hung two thousand men and sold thirty thousand into slavery. The city was practically destroyed. Darius now approached Alexander with an offer of ten thousand talents, all the territory west of the Euphrates, and his daughter in marriage; but Alexander declined the offer, claiming a right to the whole of Asia.

AFTER the battle of Issus the Persian admirals made an effort to save what might yet perchance be snatched from the burning. Pharnabazus sailed with twelve triremes and fifteen hundred mercenaries to Chios, fearing its defection. But the cause had suffered disastrous blows in the death of Memnon, and the defeat at Issus. There soon appeared threatening signs of falling off among the Phœnician and Cyprian allies which still more materially weakened the Persian cause at sea. For when Alexander headed towards Phœ-

nicia, instead of the Euphrates as he had been expected to do, the kings of the coast cities serving with the Persian admiral at once caught alarm for their domains and markedly weakened in their allegiance. Memnon's strong influence was no longer felt.


The Persian admirals, having garrisoned Chios and sent ships to Cos and Halicarnassus, themselves made for Syphnus. Hither came Agis, king of Lacedæmon, still restlessly opposing Alexander, and endeavored to persuade them to send a force to the Peloponnesus which the Spartans might join in active opposition to the galling Macedonian supremacy. Agis had great schemes in his head and urged them warmly. But the news of the defeat of the Persians at Issus which now came in effectually arrested such a movement. Pharnabazus returned to Chios, lest the place should revolt from Persian rule, as seemed not unlikely. Agis secured from the Persians only thirty talents in money and ten triremes. With these he dispatched his brother Agesilaus on a cruise to foment discord in Crete and neighboring islands of the Ægean, and himself joined Autophradates, who had finally sailed to Halicarnassus.

By his victory at Issus, Alexander had not properly forced the entrance to Persia, for the Euphrates still lay before him, but rather that to Phœnicia. To reduce the cities of this seacoast country would neutralize all opposition as far as Egypt. It was part of his general plan to make sure of the coast before moving inland. Whether this plan was already matured before the king left Pella, or whether the full grasp of his problem grew with its growing size as he advanced farther towards the heart of Asia, cannot be said. It is doubtful whether Alexander knew enough of the geography of the regions he invaded to construct a completed plan at the outset. But none the less was the strategy of his entire

movement so fully perfected that it bore the stamp of distinct homogeneity as it was gradually developed. He had, as above said, already sent Parmenio with the Thessalian horse up the Orontes valley to overcome Syria, as well as take possession of the treasures and camp-belongings which had been sent to Damascus by Darius, from Sochi, before he crossed the range to Issus.

He himself, having suitably arranged for the conduct of the affairs of Cilicia, marched towards Phœnicia.

This country had not been so utterly tyrant-ridden as the other parts of the sea-coast controlled by the Great King. The skill of its mariners and the dependence of Persia upon the cities of Phœnicia for its fleet, as well as for an outlet for commerce, made the Persian authorities favor these marts beyond all others. They occupied a position not unlike the free cities of Germany. They had not that insular position which is essential to perfect independence, but they were shut in between the range of Mount Libanus and the sea, and the cities were many of them built on coast islands, or in such a way as to be inaccessible from land or sea alike.



Syria and Phœnicia.

Each city controlled a greater or less extent of territory inland. The enormous trade and the clever handicrafts of these cities did not fall away as they did in other towns which became weakened by Oriental rule, but were cultivated by Persia to the utmost.

The ships of these Phœnician cities were on duty with the Persian fleet, the squadron of each generally under command of its king. But the battle of Issus, as above stated, materially altered their footing. The home governments saw the necessity of going over to Alexander. Had these cities worked in unison they could have cut out for Alexander a very serious task. But each one harbored some petty spite against one or more of the others, and their mutual jealousies, added to Alexander's clever manipulations, forestalled such action. The possession of Phœnicia was a condition precedent to Alexander's success. If Darius could retain his control or influence over, or even the merely formal coöperation of these Phœnician towns, he could always be sure of a fleet. If these towns deserted their allegiance, the power of his right arm would be transferred to his opponent.

Moving towards Phœnicia, Alexander was first met by Strato, son of Gerostratus, king of the territory of Aradus. The latter was serving with Autophradates; but Strato volunteered the surrender of Marathus, his great and prosperous capital city, and of the island of Aradus, near by, of Sigon, of Mariamme, and all the other territory subject to himself and his father. This was a first and marked gain for Alexander, as will be seen. In token of his submission, Strato had come with kingly gifts, and, in accordance with custom, he placed a golden crown on Alexander's head.

At Marathus, where he tarried a few days, Alexander received a letter and embassy from Darius, entreating that his mother, wife and children be restored to him, and propos-

ing friendship and alliance. Alexander's victory he ascribed in the message to the favor of some one of the gods. He recalled the ancient amity of Persia and Macedon, and, himself, a king, begged of a king the return of his family. To this letter Alexander replied. He sent his missive by an equal embassy. His letter recited the injuries of Persia to Greece; the beginning of hostilities by Darius; the instigation of his father's murder by the Persian court; it asserted his right as conqueror to the whole of Asia; it demanded that Darius should address him as his lord, and not as an equal; and threatened to follow him up wherever he should go till he had accomplished his mission by destroying the Persian sovereignty. As a touch in Alexander's portrait, his very words are of interest: "I am lord of Asia. Come to me, and thou shalt receive all that thou canst ask. But if thou deniest my right as thy lord, stand and fight for thy kingdom. I will seek thee wherever thou art." The letter was addressed, perhaps, as much to the Greek world as to the Persian king.


Here, too, at Marathus, Alexander caused to be sent to him from Damascus certain Greeks who were at Darius' court as ambassadors from Sparta, Thebes and Athens. These men he treated with exceptional generosity, in view of their position. He released the Thebans, and but temporarily confined the Spartan. The son of Iphicrates of Athens, the general and originator of the light troops known as peltasts, who was one of them, he appointed to a position of honor near his own person.

Alexander next advanced on, and occupied Byblus by terms of capitulation. King Enylus was with his squadron in the Persian fleet. This, says Arrian, was called the oldest city in the world, and possessed a considerable territory. Sidon opened her gates, from hatred of the Persians engendered of

ancient wrongs and from bitter jealousy of Tyre. Tyre, queen city of the coast, also sent ambassadors, headed by the son of King Azemilcus, who himself was also with Autophradates, tendering submission, provided, however, Alexander would not enter the city. Alexander replied that he desired to come and sacrifice to the Tyrian Hercules. To this the Tyrians made objection, because at Ephesus Alexander had marshaled his whole army at the gates of the temple of Diana; and such an entry meant absolute surrenders of all their liberties. For Alexander, once in possession, might not be willing to vacate. They had not so admitted Persia, and would not Alexander. They were open to be persuaded to transfer their allegiance and fleet to Alexander's service, but not their life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. They no doubt wished to keep their city free to join whichever king might eventually prove the victor. They knew their importance both to Darius and to Alexander, and did not propose to yield it up in exchange for mere uncertainties. If Darius won—as still seemed far from unlikely—they would profit by being the only Phœnician city which had retained its loyalty. If Darius should be again beaten, they could still offer a stanch resistance, and perhaps make their own terms. Their argument was natural and sensible. But they did not know Alexander. The city therefore refused the Macedonian overtures. The citizens shut their gates, and their king returned home to defend the city.

Alexander had matured a sensible sequence in his plan of campaign: first, an expedition to Egypt, to complete the conquest of all the maritime cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, so as to neutralize the Persian power at sea; and second, an advance on Babylon, which he could undertake if Macedon and faithful Greece were, by the possession of the seacoast, put beyond the danger of harm from Sparta and her Persian

allies. But he could accomplish neither of these things till he held Tyre, for he could not safely advance on Egypt or on Babylon, with Tyre, the chief of the naval stations of Phœnicia — all but of the world — in his rear. He therefore called the usual, perhaps legally required council of Companions, strategoi, ilarchs, taxiarchs, and officers of the allies, and put the case to them. Tyre, they agreed, must be taken; but how? The thing seemed impossible. But, said Alexander,



General Map showing Alexander's Base-line.


what must be done is never impossible to you and me. Relying on the fertility of resource of the king, it was determined to isolate the city, and then operate against it. This decision, when matters eventuated in so long a siege, was one which would have been working directly into Persian hands, if but such a spirit as Memnon's were still in control. But Darius had no master-mind to oppose the ability of Alexander. Time, usually of the essence in war, did not now run against him.

Many critics have inquired why Alexander, immediately

after the battle of Issus, did not sharply follow Darius, and penetrate to Babylon and Susa, seek to control the Persian kingdom from its centre, and prevent Darius from accumulating another army. A similar criticism has been passed on Gustavus for not advancing on Vienna after crossing the Lech. But the truth was that Alexander had vastly more grave fears for his rear and for Macedon than dread of any force in his front. The Persian fleet still commanded the Ægean, though it was fast being neutralized ; King Agis' brother had got control of Crete ; the Greek states, though quieted for the nonce by the late victory, were easily capable of again breaking out into revolt ; and until the entire coast from the Hellespont to the Nile was in his hands, it would be but a thrust in the dark to venture his all on an expedition into the interior. If his objective was the conquest of the whole then known world, his base of operations must be the entire coast-line of the then known sea. The prize won at Issus was not his objective, but his base. This coast-line was the least he needed as a base for so gigantic an undertaking as he had planned, and that his schemes of conquest were broad and sensible, is by nothing so well shown as by his patient waiting and working here on the coast before he ventured beyond the Euphrates.

On reaching Tyre, Alexander found the old city on the mainland vacated. The citizens had retired to the so-called new city. This was situated on an island two miles long, less wide, and separated from the coast by a passage half a mile wide, some eighteen feet deep near the town, shallow and swampy near the shore. It was surrounded by very lofty walls. It had two harbors, one the harbor of Sidon on the north, and one the harbor of Egypt on the south, both partly facing the mainland. The old town, vastly less strong, had stood a siege of thirteen years by Nebuchadnezzar. It was

well provided with arms, and had a brave population, — a garrison stated by some at thirty thousand men, though this figure may refer to arms-bearing inhabitants, — all manner of machines suitable to resist a siege, and a number of war-ships, which were brought back by King Azemilcus just before the



Tyre.

investment was completed. It was provisioned for a long period. Alexander hoped to get the assistance of the Phœnician fleet. The Tyrians still trusted that their old associates might join them, rather than help Alexander crush an ancient ally.

As the king had for the moment no vessels, and was reduced to attacking the city from the shore, he made up his mind to build a mole across the channel from the mainland. The

mole was designed to be two hundred feet wide, and was built by driving piles into the bottom, and filling in with stones, earth and wood. Work was begun at once. Laborers were procured from every part of the neighboring country. The piles were cedars brought from Mount Libanus, and these were easily driven into the swampy soil ; the stones came from the old town on the coast, abandoned by its citizens, and now demolished and used against them. The rushes from the swampy land made excellent binding. To prevent the edges of the mole from washing away by the attrition of the waves, whole trees, leaves and all, were cast into the sea to still the water which the southwest wind usually kept in heavy motion. A city and a forest were exhausted to build this wonderful mole.

Alexander oversaw every part of the work, and constantly encouraged the Macedonians and other workmen who labored at it day and night, with cheering words and substantial presents. The work progressed rapidly ; but as they approached the deeper water near the city and within reach of missiles, it not only became difficult, but hazardous. The Tyrians mounted engines on the walls, and employed all manner of expedients to break up the work. They attacked the workmen on the mole with vessels of war at all times and places. They sent expert divers to undermine it. Their devices were beyond telling clever and unexpected. Diodorus details many of them, for which we have no space. They were bound to show their old skill to these impertinent Macedonian upstarts. Alexander was soon forced to build two towers on the end of the mole to keep the Tyrians at a distance. These he manned with soldiers and engines, and covered the front with skins to keep them from being set on fire by missiles from the walls. He made movable breastworks of wicker-work and skins, and erected palisades and mantelets for the workmen so as to

protect them from such assaults. Under cover of these the work made worthy progress.

The Tyrians saw that they must destroy these towers. From an old horse-transport provided with two masts and a wide deck, with room to carry a bulky burden, they constructed a fire-ship and loaded it with a quantity of bitumen, dry twigs, and other inflammable material. From the yard-arms or booms, which stood out like antennæ, they hung cauldrons filled with sulphur, naphtha, chemical oils and similar substances. They towed this fire-ship between two triremes, one blustering day when the wind set well inland, towards the end of the mole, and leaving the men who were put aboard to kindle the fires to swim back to the city as best they might, retired to a safe distance for hurling missiles to keep off the Macedonians from quenching the flames. The headway it acquired carried the fire-ship towards the mole in a few minutes. The poop was ballasted so as to throw the bows out of water and allow it to run up on the mole where it could be anchored firmly in place. The towers, breastworks and engines of war caught fire; the yard-arm cauldrons emptied their inflammables; the wind lent its aid; despite manful fighting of the flames, all were destroyed. For the northwest wind was very fresh and the missiles from the soldiers on the Tyrian vessels and from the garrison on the town walls, made it all but impossible for the Macedonians to work at extinguishing the flames, which were blown directly in their faces. Boats from the city also brought out many Tyrians who, landing on the wind side of the conflagration, aided in pulling down the breastworks and burning up the engines of war. Not only were the towers lost, but the end of the mole was cracked and weakened so as later to be washed away by the waves. The work of months and multitudes had been destroyed in a short hour.

But this disaster by no means discouraged Alexander. He was by nature incapable of taking a backward step. Curtius and Diodorus suggest that he now contemplated a treaty with Tyre. But it nowhere appears that he took any steps in that direction; nor was such an act consonant with his moods. He at once set to work to construct a wider mole on which he could build more than two towers, and to replace the burned military engines. The new mole is said to have been headed more end on to the prevailing wash of the sea. The old one had taken the heavy water at the side and been weakened accordingly. He had plenty of able engineers and good machinists. Diades and Chairias from the school of Polycides were at their head.

It was early spring. Alexander was convinced that he could not accomplish much so long as the Tyrians held the sea. He went to Sidon to collect triremes, leaving Perdiccas and Craterus in command, and taking with him the hypaspists and Agrianians. His mission was soon accomplished. Gerostratus, king of Aradus, and Enylus, king of Byblus, who, as we have seen, had been serving with Autophradates and the Persian fleet, so soon as they ascertained that their cities had surrendered to Alexander, had deemed it wise to desert the Persian navy and now placed all their vessels at the service of Alexander. These, with the Sidonian contingent of triremes, made up eighty ships. Rhodes concluded to send its ship of state and nine others. Vessels from other places also joined the new fleet, induced thereto by the victory at Issus, and still later Cyprus sent one hundred and twenty ships under Pnytagoras. Among the ships were many with four or five rows of oars. This was a crowning triumph of Alexander's persuasive arts, and the conqueror was glad to overlook in present zeal past opposition wherever it had existed.

While this naval force was being put into condition for battle, and the engines were being built, Alexander, with a few ilēs of cavalry, the hypaspists, Agrianians and archers, conducted a ten days' campaign against the mountain tribes of Anti-Libanus, who were in control of the roads which led from the Orontes Valley to the coast, as well as of the valley itself, and gave much trouble. This campaign he made as thorough as the one in Rugged Cilicia, storming a number of mountain fastnesses, and sweeping like a whirlwind through the uplands. We have no information as to the details of this expedition, and can only judge by other similar feats of this untiring monarch how thoroughly he did his work, and by a knowledge of the difficulties of the region how huge was the task to be accomplished in so brief a space. The mere marching to and from his objective was apparently enough to do within the time. Plutarch mentions, on the authority of Chares, many acts of personal valor by the king during this expedition. But heroism was Alexander's daily habit. We cease to notice it. On his return to Sidon he found there a reinforcement of four thousand Greek mercenaries under Cleander, and the fleet well on the road towards completion.

When his fleet was ready, Alexander embarked on the vessels as many of his shield-bearing guards as he deemed to suffice for boarding and for close conflict, and by the first fair wind — for, though the vessels depended mostly on oars, they did not willingly encounter head-seas — sailed in order of battle towards Tyre, intending without delay to come to pitched battle with the enemy. He himself, with the Cyprians and Phœnicians, was on the right. Craterus and Pnytagoras commanded the left wing. As this imposing array approached the city, Alexander stayed the advance to rectify the line, much as he had slowed up the impetuous forward march of the phalanx at Issus. When the slower ves-

sels had come up, the king again gave the order to advance. The Tyrians, who had previously resolved to fight, and were noted for their prowess, especially at sea, were so astonished at the number of vessels — thrice their own force — which Alexander had collected, so disheartened that their allies had deserted them, and so taken aback by Alexander's audacity in offering battle, which he did with unquestioned confidence, that they declined to come out into the open, but contented themselves with blockading the mouth of the north or Sidonian harbor by a row of as many triremes as could be put in, which they disposed bows on for fear of capture. Seeing this, Alexander did not seek to force the entrance. The Phœnicians, however, by some skillful manœuvring, managed to cut out three triremes which had ventured beyond the harbor, and destroyed them. The sailors swam to shore. Alexander moored his fleet along the coast on both sides of his mole, where there was shelter from the winds. Andromachus and the Cyprians moored opposite the Sidonian harbor, and the Phœnicians opposite the Egyptian harbor. Alexander's headquarters were established on the latter side. The reduction of Tyre was now only a question of time.

A vast number of missile-throwing and other machines had now been collected from Cyprus and Phœnicia, or built on the ground. All that the science of the day afforded and much in new invention was put to use. Of these engines, some were mounted on the mole and others on flat-boats or merchantmen, and on the slowest-sailing triremes. Towers were built on some of these vessels, provided with bridges to be thrown over to the walls. Rams were mounted on others. These floating engines were moored opposite the city. They were now brought into play, but were speedily and skillfully opposed by the Tyrians, who erected towers on the walls opposite the mole and opposite the ships. This prevented the

bridges from being dropped upon them, and enabled them to discharge missiles from their own excellent artillery. They shot fire-tipped arrows against the vessels which approached and cast fire-pots from their ballistas. The walls of Tyre were one hundred and fifty feet high and correspondingly broad, and were built with the utmost skill and care of square hewn stone, laid in gypsum in a fashion of which the secret seems to have been lost. It was almost impossible for engines to be got near enough to work at undermining these walls, not only on account of the missiles from the walls, but because the water at their base was filled with loose stones, purposely cast in there to impede such approach. These stones Alexander now proceeded to fish up and remove, a work requiring no little skill and patience. The vessels which were moored and set at this work were soon interfered with by triremes which the enemy clad in mail, and from which, with long-handled, sickle-shaped knives, they cut the stone dredges adrift. This manœuvre Alexander met by mailing vessels in the same manner and placing them in front of the dredges, to prevent the cables of the latter from being cut. Then the Tyrians resorted to divers—this was the mart for sponges, and divers were many and expert—who cut the cables under water. Alexander nullified this scheme by using chains. The stones were then laboriously seized with slip-knots, taken out by cranes, carried away and thrown into deep water. In this manner, one part of the wall previously selected was gradually made accessible to the engineers for undermining.

The Tyrians had naturally hoped for aid from Carthage, which was its most flourishing colony, and whither they had sent their families out of harm's way when Alexander's mole had become a threatening matter; and they were no doubt grievously disappointed at the unfilial conduct of this eldest

daughter; for Carthage volunteered no assistance whatsoever. To be sure she was at war herself, but, as she did later in the days of Hannibal, Carthage pursued a thoroughly selfish policy.

The Tyrian fleet was divided into two sections, one in each harbor. The Macedonian fleet rode near the mouth of the harbors, and prevented all egress, so that they could not join forces for attack. Together they were too weak to expect to do much; singly they were impotent. But the harassed Tyrians felt called on to undertake some sharp offense, and determined to attack the Cyprian ships moored on the north side of Alexander's mole.

Under cover of sails spread as for drying across the mouth of the harbor, and thus unknown to Alexander, they placed expert rowers and their bravest soldiers on board thirteen ships of war,—three quinquiremes, three quadriremes and seven triremes; and, towards the middle of the day, when Alexander's sailors were scattered in quest of victuals, and Alexander was in his tent on the farther or Egyptian side of the mole, where headquarters had been located, the Tyrians rowed out of the harbor. At first they moved with as little commotion as possible; but when well under way, they raised their battle-cry, and sharply made for the Cyprian fleet. So sudden was the attack that at first they had things their own way, and drove on shore, sank or damaged a number of these allied vessels. Some of Alexander's outposts had, however, conveyed to him speedy information of the attack, or, as others relate, he had happened to leave his tent earlier than usual this day. He at once manned as many of the vessels on the south side of the mole as he could get together, posted some of the half-manned ones at the mouth of the southern harbor, to prevent the exit of more Tyrian ships while he was absent, and with the rest—all the quinquiremes and five tri-

remes — started for the scene of action. The mole had now so nearly reached the city walls that he was compelled to make the entire circuit of the island in order to reach the place opposite the Sidonian harbor, where the Tyrian ships were committing such dangerous havoc. His direction would, however, enable him to take them in the rear. Seeing the danger of their vessels from Alexander's manœuvre, — and his men rowed fast, as fast as an average steamer of to-day, — the Tyrians signaled from the walls to their vessels to return ; but before these, deafened with the noise of battle and excited with unwonted success, understood the meaning of these signals and essayed to escape, Alexander was upon them. The Tyrian vessels at once made off, but the king damaged many beyond use and captured two, one with five and one with four rows of oars. The mariners mostly escaped by swimming. Alexander had shown himself to be an admiral.

This victory was the beginning of the end. The loss of the sea was to the Tyrians much like the loss of the glacis of a fort. Alexander blockaded the harbors so as to confine the Tyrian fleet within them, and was thus at liberty to try his engines upon the walls.

Alexander had accomplished a goodly part of his labors. He had advanced his mole to a point from which he could attack the walls ; he had secured a safe anchorage for his vessels ; he had cleared the channel so as to enable his engine-bearing ships to reach the walls ; he had driven the Tyrian fleet into its harbors, and held it there. Nothing remained to be done but to break down and carry by assault the city walls. But just this was the gravest task of all. The desperation of the Tyrians grew with the danger.

Despite all his trouble, Alexander found that he was unable to make any impression on the wall next to the mole, it being

too solid for any engines he had constructed. Nor could the floating engines make any impression upon the side nearest Sidon. Still, though he was much disappointed, all this did not discourage the king. After long efforts and trials on every part of it, the floating engines finally succeeded in greatly weakening the wall on the side toward Egypt and seaward, where the Tyrians, expecting no attack, had constructed a masonry less solid, and in breaking down a portion.

The besieged had shown themselves to be easily masters in their inventiveness and mechanical skill; and Alexander's engineers had needed all their ingenuity to match them. The impatience of the army had been growing, and confidence began to weaken in the possibility of capturing this extraordinary fortress. But the opening of a breach kindled fresh courage in the hearts of all. Into this breach Alexander now threw a bridge and a storming party, but the Tyrians, with showers of missiles, fire-pots and other devices, drove this partial assault back, and repaired the breach by a half-moon. Alexander waited for a better chance. It is asserted that he was again tempted to observe the place, and proceed upon his way. But there is no act of his to support this theory, and it is scarcely compatible with Alexander's characteristic persistency.

Three days after this failure, the sea being calm, Alexander made preparations for a new attack in force. It was the end of July. He assembled his battering engines at the most assailable place, which was on the southwest front, and ordered some of his vessels carrying catapults and other missile-throwing engines as well as slingers and archers to skirmish around the island on all sides, in order to make the garrison uncertain as to where the stoutest attack was to come, and stationed others near the breach so as to overawe the enemy by the

violence of the assault and the multitude of missiles. Upon still other vessels he placed his best troops, the shield-bearing guards under Admetus, and the phalangial brigade of Cœnus. He proposed to lead the assault in person. He sent parts of his fleet to the mouths of both harbors to endeavor to force an entrance, by breaking the chains which barred them. All the rest were put to use to assist in the final struggle. After some hours' effort, he succeeded in opening a still wider breach, the battering vessels were withdrawn, and the two which had been fitted with bridges were brought up; the bridges were thrown, and the shield-bearing guards, under the personal eye of Alexander, mounted to the assault. The affair was sustained in the most courageous manner by the Tyrians; but when the Macedonians had once got a footing upon the wall, they pushed back the enemy with their accustomed gallantry. Admetus was the first to fall, pierced by a spear. Alexander with Cœnus and the phalangians followed up this success, and having taken several towers and the wall between them, advanced fighting along the battlements towards the royal citadel. For this was an easier means of approach than to descend to the level of the city streets, The citadel was taken.

Meanwhile, the fleet at both harbors — the Phœnicians at the Egyptian, and the Cyprians at the Sidonian — had found its way in, and, making short work of the Tyrian vessels, captured the north and south fronts of the city, erected ladders and soon forced an entrance. Being thus taken between two fires, the stronger force of Tyrians opposite Alexander deserted the walls and rallied near the temple of Agenor. But Alexander, who, after the death of Admetus, had headed the shield-bearing guards, emerged from the citadel and soon broke down all opposition; and the enemy being attacked from all sides by Cœnus and by the men of the fleet, a fear-

ful slaughter ensued. For the Macedonians were enraged at the obstinacy of the city's defense and the cruelties practiced on Macedonian prisoners captured by the Tyrians, who had tortured and put them to death on the walls in full sight of the army, and thrown the bodies into the sea, thus depriving them of the rights of burial. They had even cast Alexander's heralds into the sea from the top of the walls. Over eight thousand men were slain. Two thousand Tyrians, say Curtius and Diodorus, were hung or nailed to gibbets on the seashore. Of the population, Alexander pardoned all who had fled into the temple of Hercules, among whom were the king and many prominent officials; but sold into slavery the rest of the Tyrians and mercenary troops, some thirty thousand men. The women, children and old men had mostly been previously sent to Carthage, their, as it proved, ungrateful colony. In the assault, but twenty of the shield-bearing guards were killed. During the siege, four hundred Macedonians had lost their lives. No doubt between three and four thousand had been wounded,--a somewhat higher rate of loss than that of Grant at Vicksburg. Grote deems this number much too small. A part of the population is said to have escaped by connivance with the Phoenicians on the fleet, and to have later returned to Tyre. Curtius says fifteen thousand were thus saved.

The cruel fate of Tyre was but the usual outcome of the sieges of antiquity. Inexcusable, if you like, but readily matched by the similar horror at Magdeburg in the Thirty Years' War. If, after sixteen centuries of Christianity, thirty thousand men, women and children, out of a population of thirty-six thousand, could be butchered in the name of religion, the less criticism passed on the so-called cruelties of Alexander the better. Masses have no soul. The armies of olden times demanded such holocausts. Even such a king as

Alexander, had he so desired to do, could scarcely have prudently stood in their way. To deny his men their rights in this particular would have forfeited much of his influence. And Alexander, no doubt, was at times as revengeful as the basest of his phalangians.

Alexander now offered the proposed sacrifice to Hercules with military honors, his army parading at the very gates of the temple, and dedicated the particular engine which had opened the breach, to the god, as a thank-offering. The fleet was drawn up in battle order, and passed in review; and the Tyrian ship, sacred to Hercules, which had been captured, was likewise dedicated, and a suitable inscription placed upon it. Games and gymnastic sports were celebrated within the precincts of the temple.

Thus fell Tyre, after a siege of seven months, and no doubt its extraordinary resistance and awful doom made as deep an impression upon the world as had the battle of Issus. The pride of centuries had been humbled by the persistent courage, ability and military skill of Alexander.

The place was retained as a naval station, but Tyre was entirely destroyed, though Strabo says that it again became a flourishing city. The building of the mole altered the flowing tides in such a manner that the ancient harbors have been filled up with deposits of mud, and the island has become a peninsula, nature's monument to the almost super-human labors of this greatest of captains.

While besieging Tyre, Alexander received from Darius a second letter, tendering him ten thousand talents for the release of his mother, wife and children, and offering him his daughter Statira in marriage and all the territory west of the Euphrates. Alexander submitted this letter to the Companions, and Parmenio is said to have advised its acceptance. "If I were Alexander, I would accept." "If I were Par-

menio, so would I; but being Alexander, I will not," — are the words said to have been exchanged. Alexander replied to Darius that the whole of Persia was his, and that he would marry his daughter, if he so wished, without his consent; as for the money, he was in no need of it. Thus rebuffed, Darius prepared for a further contest.

It is related by Josephus that Alexander now (some put the event after the capture of Gaza) marched towards Jerusalem, which had refused him supplies, feeling bound to honor its oath of allegiance to Darius. But at the gates he was met by a procession of citizens headed by the high priests. These he treated with the highest respect; and having been shown in the prophecy of Daniel that he was the Greek foretold as the one who should overcome the Persian king, he not only abstained from injuring the city, but granted it every seventh year immunity from taxation. If this be not strictly true in all its details, it is nevertheless certain that Alexander would not have left in his rear so prominent a city as Jerusalem unvisited and unsubdued. No doubt the relation is substantially exact. Sanballat, satrap of Samaria, cast in his lot with Alexander. Acco made no resistance.



Alexander.

(From Cameo in Zanetti Museum.)

XXV.


GAZA AND EGYPT. SEPTEMBER, B. C. 332, TO SPRING, B. C. 331.

FROM Tyre Alexander marched to Gaza on the way to Egypt. This town, the outpost protecting the road to Egypt, under Batis, made stern resistance to the conqueror. It was captured only after a two months' siege, and by the erection of mounds and works of remarkable extent. The garrison was exterminated, and Batis treated with unnecessary cruelty. From here Alexander went to Egypt, which he found no difficulty in reducing. He laid out Alexandria, and visited the temple of Jupiter Ammon. He might have kept on to Carthage, but learning of Darius' new army, he turned back. The Ægean fleet had completed its work, and Alexander had possession of the whole Mediterranean and its coast. He could advance into the interior with safety.

IT was early September. All Syria except Gaza had submitted to Alexander. But Gaza must be reduced. This city was situated near the edge of the desert on higher ground than the level of the plain and on an artificial eminence sixty feet high, and was by far the most formidable place in southern Syria, a bulwark, as it were, which dominated the road from Damascus to Egypt, from the Red Sea to Tyre, and had been the fortress from which the restless population of that country had been controlled by Persia. It had been intrusted by Darius to one of his most faithful servants, and victualed for a long siege by the Eunuch Batis, its commander, who, with a eye single to his master's interest and honor, believed that he could hold the fort with his Persian garrison and Arab contingent, and thereby keep the Egyptians in subjection until Darius could again gather a new army, and come in his might to chase this overbearing adventurer from the sacred soil of Asia. Batis knew that Alexander had captured Tyre

with his fleet. Vessels could not approach his fortress. Gaza was some two miles inland,—Strabo says but seven stades; the coast was marshy and bad for landing; the fleet here was useless. Batis was satisfied that he was safe.

Alexander, on his arrival, camped near the weakest-looking part of the wall on the south side, and ordered suitable engines to be built for its reduction. The engineers were of opinion that no towers could be erected from which the walls



Gaza.

could be successfully reached and battered down, owing to the height of the ground on which they were built above the level of the plain. But Alexander would consider no difficulty whatever. After Tyre, was there any city which could resist him? He began the construction of a mound around the city, beginning on the south side where the walls seemed least stout; and here, too, the mound was largest. In an almost incredibly short time this mound had — probably only in places — risen to a height such that the engines could be set at work upon the walls. It is not improbable that there were several of these mounds.

When the battering was about to begin, and Alexander was, according to custom, sacrificing to the gods, a bird of prey flew above him, and let fall a pebble which smote Alexander on the head. But the bird then alighted on one of the machines, and was caught in some of its ropes. The soothsayer Aristander, from this event, prophesied that Alexander should indeed capture the town, but must in the assault have a care of himself. Alexander, therefore, kept somewhat more than usual in shelter, taking up post near the batteries instead of near the walls. But one day, when a sortie was made by the garrison, the works erected with so much toil were near to being fired, and the Macedonians from their lower position were in danger of being driven from the towers and engines, Alexander, seeing the imminent danger of defeat and unable longer to contain himself, seized his arms, and heading his shield-bearing guards, came quickly to the rescue. The sortie was repulsed, though the Macedonians had lost some ground ; but Alexander was wounded by a shaft from a catapult which pierced through the shield and corslet, and entered the shoulder. The wound was a serious one, and came close to being worse. According to Curtius, the king received two wounds in this siege.

The engines from Tyre which had been sent for now arrived by way of Majormas, a neighboring small harbor, and the mound was completed all around the city, though possibly the expression "all around" may mean concentric with the wall. Part of it — Arrian leads one to infer that all of it — was twelve hundred feet wide, and two hundred and fifty feet high (that is, near the wall) ; and as the sand from this plain could not be used, materials were brought from a distance. If such figures as these were not abundantly vouched for, they would be incredible ; but we know from Ethiopia and Egypt, and Nineveh and Babylon, what gigantic works can be erected by

the forced labor of the entire population of a district. The fact that to build such a mound all around the city would be a vast expenditure of unnecessary labor (for the mound was of use only for the towers and rams, and these were erected but at one or two of the most available spots, and the rest of the wall of contravallation need be but comparatively small), leads us to construe the passage as above, whatever the dictionary meaning of the words. If opposite but a small part of the wall, the performance is sufficiently magnificent.

From this mound the Macedonian engines could easily operate. A large part of the city wall was speedily undermined or battered down, and much more made full of breaches. But though Alexander thus commanded the walls, and could drive the defenders from the parapet and embrasures, the defense was very stubborn, the garrison forcing back three assaults, though these were made with true Macedonian élan, and the garrison lost heavily. The fourth was delivered in greater force, and from several sides, after enlarging the breaches and making use of all the ladders and tools which their previous ill success had shown to be necessary. There was the greatest emulation as to who should first scale the wall. Neoptolemus, one of the Companions, was the man who outstripped all the rest. Being closely followed by other leaders, on whose heels pressed the balance of the troops, the wall was surmounted, and a chosen body made for each gate. These were soon opened, and the Macedonians passed into the city. The most bloody contest raged through its entire extent. The brave Gazeans fell to a man sword in hand, where each had been posted. The women and children were sold into slavery. It is said that ten thousand men were slain at Gaza, and that Alexander took barbarous revenge on Batis, the commander, dragging him around the walls lashed to the back of his chariot—as his ancestor Achilles had done to Hector. Un-


usual vengeance, and one which, however much in accordance with the spirit of the age, we can wish untrue of Alexander. The siege had lasted two months.

Enormous stores of spices were captured here at Gaza, which was the chief market for such goods. Alexander is said to have sent Leonidas, his ancient tutor, five hundred talents' weight of frankincense and one hundred of myrrh, in memory of a reproof once given him. When as a boy he was, at a sacrifice, throwing incense by the handful into the fire, Leonidas had said to him that until he had conquered the land of spices he must be more sparing. Alexander now accompanied his gift with the hope that Leonidas would no longer be a churl to the gods.

The study of numismatics furnishes us with many of our historical facts. The coinage of Asia Minor and Syria shows us that, while Alexander restored to the territories west of the Taurus their liberties, the cities being left on the same footing as those of Greece, those east and south of the Taurus were treated as possessions of his own. The coins of the latter countries bear the impress of Alexander as king; those of the former are not so issued. Syria and Phoenicia were accordingly left under a strong government, and Alexander headed for the country of the Nile.

It was early December, just a year after the battle of Issus, when Alexander started on his Egyptian expedition. In seven days he reached Pelusium, whither he had ordered his fleet under command of Hephæstion, so that it might meet him on his arrival. Though recently conquered, Egypt had no bond whatsoever with its Persian masters, nor was there any desire for an armed conflict with the Macedonians. The Egyptians were a peaceful folk. The occupation of a new conqueror seemed quite immaterial to population and rulers alike. The Persian Satrap Mazaces, in lieu of receiving as

friends the Greek mercenaries who had fled from Issus under the renegade Amyntas, and thus being able to use them for the defense of the country, as they had anticipated he would do, had attacked and dispersed the force, and massacred most of them. This left him no means of offering resistance, and being moreover at odds with the population, Alexander gained easy admittance to all the cities of Egypt, besides enriching himself with some eight hundred talents in money. He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the east branch of the river to Memphis, and marched on the east side of the



Egypt.

Nile to Heliopolis through the desert, taking possession by voluntary surrender of all the towns upon the way. He then advanced towards Memphis, crossed the Nile at this point and sacrificed to Apis, the Sacred Bull, with Greek feasts and gymnastic contests. Alexander was always careful to treat the religion of the countries he conquered with respect instead of contumely and outrage, and on this occasion desired to see what could be done to merge the feelings of his old and new subjects by mixing the Macedonian religious customs with those of Egypt.

From Memphis he sent his army down the Nile to the coast, the agema of cavalry, hypaspists, Agrianians and archers on vessels down the west branch, and turning towards

the west he arrived at Canopus. He sailed round Lake Mareotis, and foreseeing that a city might become very prosperous at this location as an *entrepôt* of trade, he chose the site of Alexandria and founded this famous mart. His first selection was the Pharos as the site of the city, but its extent being too small, he drew the outline of the city on the mainland. The harbor is one of the best, and Alexander's calculations as to the future value of this, his first Alexandria since crossing the Hellespont, were not disappointed. In making the plans, there being nothing on hand wherewith to mark the lines proposed for walls, Alexander resorted to the use of the soldier's barley, which he scattered along the ground. Numerous birds were thus attracted to the spot, and the future great prosperity of the place was prophesied from this sign by Aristander and other soothsayers present.

At this point Alexander was joined by Hegelochus, his admiral in the Ægean, who reported that Tenedos had revolted from the Persian yoke forced on them against their will and had come over to him; that Chios had taken a similar step; that the fleet had captured Mitylene, and brought over other cities of Lesbos; and that Amphoterus, his vice-admiral, had captured Cos. He brought with him a number of the chief men of these places who were opposed to Alexander, as prisoners. These men the king sent back to their several cities to be judged by those, now holding power under himself, who were cognizant of the facts and better able to convict or acquit. By these victories, added to the closing against the fleet of their usual harbors, the Persian power at sea had been paralyzed, and Alexander had gained possession of the whole Mediterranean coast.

Alexander was now seized with a desire to visit the temple of Jupiter Ammon in the Libyan desert. Perseus and Hercules, his ancestors, were said to have consulted this oracle,

and Alexander not only wished to tread in the footsteps of these heroes, but desired to learn certainty concerning his own origin and future, or, as Arrian says, "that he might be able to say he had learned it." Both Plutarch and Arrian agree that Alexander claimed descent from Jupiter only in order to impose on the credulity of the populations he conquered. He did so, according to Curtius, "because he either believed Jupiter to be his father, or had a mind the world should think so, not being satisfied with his mortal grandeur." While admitting the truth of many of the allegations against this monarch, it must be allowed that folly was not one of his characteristics. His intelligence ranged far beyond that of most of the wisest men of his day. And he was much more capable of pretending a belief in his own divine origin for political effect, or because it administered to his personal vanity, than of really harboring it.

Accompanied by a considerable body of horse and foot, Alexander advanced along the seacoast to Parætonium, nearly two hundred miles from Alexandria, thence south an equal distance to the oasis where the temple lay. Aristobulus states that on this occasion rain fell in this always arid region as a sign that the gods were propitious, and that the march of the army was led by two, Curtius says great flocks of, ravens (Ptolemy, son of Lagus, says two snakes, uttering a voice), which moved on before them the entire distance. The voyage was certainly prosperous.

The oasis was five miles long by three wide. It was well inhabited and tilled, and full of olives and palms. Dew fell there, and the fertility of the spot was in wonderful contrast to the ocean of sand which surrounded it. Justin says Alexander gave the priests instructions as to what answers should be given to his queries, and particularly ordered them to salute him as son of Jupiter. "Now, whoever would judge

sagely of the sincerity and credit of the oracle, might easily have perceived by its answers that it was all imposture," says Curtius. Having, at all events, consulted the oracle to his satisfaction, though his queries and their answers are not divulged by history, Alexander returned by the same route to Alexandria, and thence to Memphis, as narrated by Aristobulus; or straight across the desert to Memphis, according to Ptolemy. Possibly, a part returned by the former, and Alexander, with the hardier part of his force, by the latter route. Had Alexander not heard of Darius' new levies, he might have moved farther along the coast towards Carthage. But this important news beckoned him in the other direction. Carthage was isolated and entirely innocuous. Alexander remitted it to the future.

At Memphis many embassies from Greece came to the king, each with its own request. Always expert in his policy, Alexander was able to send all these embassies back with a feeling of satisfaction. He also received a small reinforcement from Antipater. This consisted of four hundred Greek mercenaries under Menidas, five hundred Thracian cavalry under Asclepiodorus, and several thousand phalangites.

In providing for the future government of Egypt, Alexander returned, as was his habit with all conquered peoples, to its ancient and beloved customs. The king had a fine sense of how to mix civil and military rule among peoples used to a central government. He kept the civil entirely distinct from the military control. The former was invested with no power except that of levying taxes and carrying forward the old and well considered laws and customs then prevailing, which Alexander was wise enough not to upset; the latter was removed from the temptations of finance, from the danger of handling moneys. Native ministers were continued in office, but carefully watched; only the head of the state was

changed ; thus the people had no chance of organizing resistance. The citadel of every town was put in charge of a trusted band of his own Macedonians. In addition to this a general commanded outside, with a sufficient Macedonian force to act as a leaven for the native levies he was directed to make, and command and drill in the Macedonian manner. Alexander was generally readily accepted as king, because the people knew of the change only by a general lightening of their burdens, and a less oppressive method in the collection of taxes.

In this instance Alexander appointed an Egyptian, Doloaspis, governor of Egypt ; but placed the military command in Macedonian hands. He left two Companions, Pantaleon in Memphis and Polemo in Pelusium, in command of garrisons. Some Greek auxiliaries, which he also left in Egypt, he intrusted to Lycidas. Peucestas and Balacrus were commissioned generals in command of the Egyptian army, which, including the above garrisons and auxiliaries, consisted of four thousand men ; Polemo was also admiral of the navy of thirty triremes. Charge of Lybia he gave to Apollonius ; of part of Arabia to Cleomenes. Calanus succeeded Balacrus in command of the Greek auxiliaries who kept on with the army. Ombrion succeeded Antiochus, who had died, in command of the archers. Leonnatus became one of the somatophylaxes. Alexander, says Arrian, was induced to leave the country under many governors on account of its distance from his probable future campaigning grounds, and because he deemed it unsafe to intrust a country so large and full of resources to the command of any one person. The lists of viceroys, governors and commanders left in the various countries often vary in the different authors. Changes in command account for this. It is not important to us.

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CAPTAINS



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DODGE



